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1
INTRODUCTION
Writing the Self: Feminist Experiment and Cultural Identity

This dissertation examines how twentieth-century experimental women writers construct
non/narrative texts whose text-subjects mediate identity and call for increased possibilities for
subject-identification in the world. The use of innovative formal strategies and experiment with
narrative, combined with the content of identity critique, make these texts political projects that
variously explore gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity in relation to contemporary American
culture. In this project I bring discussions of identity into the theorization of formally innovative
writing. I work to move away from the kinds of essentializing practices of identity politics—in
which subjects are fit into specific identity categories—and toward more complicated,
contextualized, and historical understandings of identity formation. I begin with the notion that
identity categories, or markers, play out in different contexts and are, at different moments:
simultaneous, fluctuating, overlapping, and spatial (instead of hierarchical). I then continue
toward readings of literary texts that function as new models of identification for spatially
contextualized subjects. This project is significant for the way in which it brings together a
diverse selection of non/narrative writing by women in the twentieth-century, and combines
textual and cultural analysis to think through identity issues in relation to contemporary social
subjects.
This project is grounded in literary modernism and moves into work by contemporary
American women writers at the end of the twentieth century. I begin by pairing the work of
Gertrude Stein and Lyn Hejinian in chapter 1, and that of H.D. and Beverly Dahlen in chapter 2.
As modernists, Stein and H.D. are key figures who negotiate identity and non/narrative writing,
and are important influences for Hejinian and Dahlen. The paring of modern and contemporary
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authors in the first two chapters illustrates a correlation between writing styles and practices as
well as how these diverge from the early to late part of the century. Hejinian’s body of work,
beginning in the 1970s, can be read as coming out of Stein and thinking avant-garde practice
through her own contemporary politics as a Language poet. Dahlen seems to pick up H.D.’s
Freudian project, and additionally incorporates deconstruction and feminist criticism of the
1970s and 80s in her work. Hejinian and Dahlen also serve as intermediaries between the
modernist and later contemporary writers—many of whom have been influenced by modernists
such as Stein and H.D., as well as subsequent avant-garde authors and practices. Chapters 3 and
4 focus on contemporary prose and hybrid works by Pamela Lu, Renee Gladman, Claudia
Rankine, Juliana Spahr, Gloria Anzaldua, and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha. These writers, to
different degrees, use a variety of formal strategies and problematize narrative autobiographical
writing to simultaneously focus on language as instrumental to subjectivity and to represent
“experience” as cultural content. They negotiate practices of avant-garde experimentation and
writing that explores identity-as-process through examinations of gender, sexual orientation,
race, ethnicity, and history. Their text-subjects become witnesses to the discrepancies in
culturally inscribed norms, and call for expanded possibilities for narrative and social
representation; and the texts become new models for representing contemporary subjectivity.
Reading the primary texts through theorists including Julia Kristeva, Judith Butler, Susan
Stanford Friedman, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, and Kelly Oliver, among others, offers me ways to
show how textual practice and cultural critique in this literature lend toward theorizing expanded
possibilities for personal and social subject identification—how subjects identify—in the world.
This project is invested in continuing to open spaces of possibility for textual practice and social
subjectivity, as well as the feminist political impulse to dissolve margins and bring those
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“marginalized” voices into spaces with greater potential for personal and social identifications
and politics.

Famously and repeatedly, Gertrude Stein writes: “I am I because my little dog knows
me.” What may be less well known about Stein is that her dog Basket (and later Basket II)
played an important part in Gertrude and Alice Toklas’s life together. Gertrude went on daily
walks with Basket as part of her domestic and social routine, and one famous photo shows
Gertrude, Alice, and Basket (who was not a little dog but a large white poodle) walking down the
street of what looks like a small French village. This image further conveys the importance of
daily habit and domestic life to Stein, whose work is infused with the personal and domestic, as
well as the work of her artist contemporaries (she had an extensive collection of modern art) and
her regular salons and intimate conversations with her contemporary writers and intellectuals.
The quote above represents the fusion of Stein’s form and content, and the relation between her
personal life and her experimental writing practice—which could not always be explicitly
separated. A subject is in relation (to others, within society), and it is these relations that are
simultaneously in need of examination. Setting one’s identity in relation to one’s dog maintains
this sense of self in relation to other, while shifting that relation so that we take notice. We begin
to participate in the journey that is Stein’s The Geographical History of America or The Relation
of Human Nature to the Human Mind, a journey that examines self in relation to other, to
society, from within a context of misunderstood modernist writer and eccentric literary celebrity.
This text is written after Stein’s famous American tour in the early 1930s—through which she
gained a fame and notoriety that she had not experienced before—which I discuss in chapter 1.
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Reading The Geographical History, through the personal and textual, sets a foundation
for this dissertation as a political interrogation of identity through the experimental feminist text
and its cultural function and theorization. Stein destabilizes “identity” through linguistic play,
repetition, analogy, and reading the abstract through, at times, more tangible phenomena
including: landscape, scenery, plays (as in drama), money, the detective story, and
autobiography. Finally, she constructs a hybrid genre text that is not prose, poetry, or
autobiography but a combination of these, and simultaneously also a meta-text that theorizes its
own interrogation of genre (form) and identity (content). I read The Geographical History
retrospectively: as a queer politics, a non-normative practice that fuses form and content
resulting in a cultural critique of identity and the possibilities for its representation, and as an
open text that we might use to further the impulse to destabilize and reconceive of terms such as
nature and identity. Using Stein as a starting point, I proceed to contextualize my readings in
terms of the fusion between form and content, and between the textual and the cultural. The
primary texts in my study, to different degrees, incorporate hybrid genre strategies in their
presentation of cultural content such that clear distinctions between form and content become
impossible; each informs the other. Similarly, in this work, textual practice and cultural
commentary or critique also, ultimately, cannot be separated.
I begin my dissertation by bringing together seemingly divergent theoretical perspectives
in order to draw connections between the textual and the cultural that I will expand over the
course of this project. Audre Lorde writes that “poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of
our existence. It forms the quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams
toward survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible
action.” Further, poetry “lays the foundations for a future of change” (Sister 37-38). Julia
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Kristeva writes: “The text is a practice that could be compared to political revolution: the one
brings about in the subject what the other introduces into society. The history and political
experience of the twentieth century have demonstrated that one cannot be transformed without
the other” (Revolution 17). And Judith Butler writes that “possibility is not a luxury. It is as
crucial as bread” (Undoing 29); she believes that opening possibilities for gender expression, in
particular, and for recognition and representation, in general, are crucial for survival. I see this
dissertation as bringing together the textual and political project of Kristeva (particularly from
Revolution in Poetic Language) and the cultural, gender studies, and queer theory work of Butler
(Gender Trouble, Undoing Gender, Giving an Account of Oneself) together with Lorde’s
proposal that aesthetic practice is active, social, political and can be an instrument for change.
Kristeva maintained a life-long investment in social politics and revolution, particularly since the
student/worker protests of May 1968 in France, and Butler, in addition to studying gender and
culture, can be said to read “form” carefully: from forms and structures of gender roles, relations,
and performance to narrative as a form of accounting for oneself. I see these two figures at the
center of this project and in conversation, both invested to different degrees, and at various
historical moments, in textual and cultural understandings of language and identity.
The range of primary literary texts considered here—through different means and to
varying degrees—theorize the subjective “I” through writing that is at times metaautobiographical. From Stein’s non/narrative, inconclusive meditations on “identity” and
“autobiography” to Cha’s visually fragmented catalog of diasporic and marginalized histories in
Dictee, these texts incorporate theories of autobiography as only one of many strategies for
documenting experience. They seem in fact to pick up on Sidonie Smith’s proposal that for
women, who do not have access to the universal narrative “I,” autobiography is particularly
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suited to the positional and situated nuances of identity that do not result in a unified “self”; they
“make trouble with that generic ‘I’” both in terms of genre (autobiography) and a generic lacking
of an individual voice (Subjectivity 5). Subjects of (women’s) autobiography, Smith argues,
“often take up the old autobiographical forms, piece by piece. They turn them over, around,
inside out, to tell another kind of story. In doing so they try to dematerialize the very cultural
apparati that would materialize them as specific kinds of subjects”; narrating traditionally
silenced experiences is seen as working against cultural inscriptions of subjectivity (183). 1
Avant-garde practice often takes this assumption further to interrogate the materiality of
narrative itself as an apparatus of cultural hegemony. The writers in this study are already writing
from a space outside of the question of narrative and autobiographical “truth” and enact, through
material textual practices, these other kinds of stories.
Throughout the project, I move beyond formalist readings to examine questions of
narrative and identity, through theories of the relation between avant-garde art and the social, as
well as through contemporary critical work in feminist poetics. The 1970s and 1980s turn to
work by modernist women became both a material, political project of recovery and an
appreciation of aesthetic practice; consequently, the dialogue between the modern and the
contemporary began to revise theories of literary modernism in terms of gender, textual practice,
and social and cultural relevance. In the 1980s and 1990s a number of critical texts emerged —
including Rachel Blau DuPlessis’s transformative The Pink Guitar—and debates on formal
practice and feminist politics began to form. I cite Elizabeth Frost below, who notes the rift
between avant-garde women writers and those writing about identity politics through
transparently accessible narratives in the 1970s. The split became importantly controversial in

1

For more on autobiography in general, and feminist autobiography particular, see the work of Anderson, Lejeune,
Marcus, Miller, Smith, and Stanley.
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poetry communities at the time, as the debate between Ron Silliman and Leslie Scalapino—
arguing on opposite sides of the “formalism” vs. “identity politics” debate proved.2
My project seeks to take the conversation of experimental feminist poetics further into
the realm of prose writing, to look at work that explores concepts of identity in ways that are
neither completely transparent nor unreadably opaque. The first two chapters begin with identity
critique and questioning of social norms presented in Stein and H.D., and takes these insights
into readings of the (intertextual) projects of Hejinian and Dahlen and their examinations of
“genre” (such as journal writing and autobiography) for contemporary subjects. The last two
chapters move into the late twentieth century, in which I read texts that offer political feminist
versions of the postmodern; here concerns with identity and self-representation open onto a
continuum, a politics, for identification and speaking. The modern critique of the socially
enforced Oedipal complex takes on new forms by the end of the century. Postmodern trauma is
enacted in Do not Let Me Be Lonely; in Pamela the narrator is unable to articulate her own
history and experience; and in Juice, text-subjects find it impossible to tell their own (racially
marginalized) stories. In my reading, this leads to new models of representation in Spahr’s The
Transformation and Anzaldua’s Borderlands/La Frontera. Spahr creates a pronoun—and
gender—“neutral” account of non-heterosexually normative domesticity, and Anzaldúa creates a
hybrid genre text that rearticulates patriarchal, heteronormative cultural traditions and narratives
in different terms. Both of these writers reflect on the complex relationships between colonizer
and colonized, oppressor and oppressed. Anzaldúa’s project of coming to terms with her own
antithetical experiences manifests in a model of possibility for culturally and historically
oppressed lesbian, Chicana subjects. Spahr and Anzaldúa queer their writing processes and
textual products in order to construct an “other” account of non-normatively heterosexual
2

See Watten and Hejinian, Poetics Journal 9 (1991)
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experience. Finally, Cha’s Dictee becomes witness, in Kelly Oliver’s terms; going beyond the
call for dismantling structures and subjects’ need for recognition, the text-subject becomes what
Cha names “diseuse,” which means the one who is skilled at speaking. Dictee opens a space,
through its hybrid, textual materiality, in which silenced voices and histories come to “bear
witness.” In the literature I have chosen, text-subjects are created and revised through subversive
narrative and formal strategies, and identity is explored as a continual process and not as a
unified product. Incorporating Kristevan theories of textual materiality with cultural studies
readings of race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual identification, I argue that these primary texts go
beyond experiment to act as models for political change in the world. The writers of these texts
create subjects who enact the importance of dismantling binary structures (straight/gay,
self/other, male/female, oppressor/oppressed); they call for alternative means of identification
that often are not available through ideological social norms and the essentializing nature of
group identifications.
This project seeks to move away from the kinds of practices of identity politics in which
subjects are fit into specific identity categories (race, class, gender, sexual orientation) and
toward more complicated, contextualized, and historical understandings of identity formation as
processual (how the simultaneous, fluctuating, overlapping, and varying degrees of identity
categories play out in different contexts and moments). My readings assume identity as process
and show how the writers theorize the social construction(s) of identity in the world through the
content as well as the formal strategies of their texts. Although Butler advocates subjects’ need
for “recognition,” Kelly Oliver argues that subjects might go beyond recognition to participate in
the act of “witnessing,” as that through which subjects gain the ability to address and respond, to
speak, in relation to events and others. Further, as Oliver explains: “None of us develops a sense
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of ourselves as subjects with any sort of identity apart from relations with others”; witnessing
therefore becomes not simply a project of individual identity but an “ethical and political
responsibility” (10-11). For Oliver, to “conceive of subjectivity as a process of witnessing”
necessitates the ability to address and respond “in relation to other people, especially through
difference” in order also to “realize an ethical and social responsibility to those others who
sustain us” (19). The witness to history, the document that gives voice to the previously silenced,
enacts a model of political and social transformation, one through which subjects can speak
through their experiences, and witness the injustice of narrative and social norms that serve to
restrain, contain, and stabilize identities and subjects-in-process.
The primary texts presented here, although diverse in content, all deal in textual politics
that extend out into the cultural realm. The call for new languages, finding other means of
representation and seeking greater possibilities for identification in the world is a politics in
action. These texts offer material examples that might motivate further textual practice and social
change; they use formal strategies to break through (symbolic) narratives that “naturalize”
(gendered, sexual, ethnic) experience; and they function within symbolic structures (of
patriarchy, language, history) while simultaneously embodying Kristeva’s semiotic space of
disruption, rupture, contradiction, and negativity. The discussion of cultural identity translates
into the readings of the primary texts discussed below as they enact formal incoherence, and
textually perform the clarity and insight found in spaces of interruption. Subjects “interrupted by
alterity,” as Diane Chisholm writes, do not simply fit into cohesive narratives of experience.
Finding new and alternative means of documenting such antithetical experience continues to
offer alternative possibilities for recognition, representation, speaking, and witnessing that do not
simply result in narrative cohesion and closure. These writers create subjects-in-process who
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move through the space of the text similarly to multiply situated subjects in the world, while the
multiple and contradictory discourses of the world are enacted through the formal strategies on
the page. The subjects of these texts become witnesses to the limited nature of ideological
narratives, and the limiting effects of language and binary structures, and they instead serve as
textual models of non/narrative, enacting greater possibilities for identification, representation,
and witnessing of subjects’ complex experiences in the world.

I.

Experiment and Identity
For the purposes of grounding this project within current conversations about formally

innovative writing by women in the twentieth-century—what some call avant-garde, languagecentered, feminist experimental writing, or non/narrative writing—I would like to begin with
Elizabeth Frost’s project in The Feminist Avant-Garde in American Poetry, which examines “the
work of modern and contemporary women writers who contest issues of gender, race, history,
and sexuality in innovative poetic forms” (xi). Frost is in part responding to studies of American
poetry by women that “tended to focus on a poetics of personal experience, frequently grounded
in identity politics” and subsequently “marginalized avant-gardism in feminist poetics” (xii); it is
also a study of the work of poets who share a belief that language both shapes, and can take part
in changing, consciousness (xii). True to the tradition of avant-garde practice, Frost writes, “each
[poet] weds radical politics to formal experiments” (xii).3

3

Using both the history of avant-garde practice and revising the term in relation to "radical feminist poetries," Frost
defines "avant-gardism as any artistic practice that combines radical new forms with radical politics or utopian
vision . . . I hold that the avant-garde venture unites formal innovation with political engagement: The avant-gardist
assumes that a daring new artistic practice has the potential to change the world by inciting a change of
consciousness. In my view, radical political belief precedes and necessitates formal invention on the part of the
avant-garde artist: More than an aesthetic choice, experimentation bears the full weight of urgent social conviction"
(xiv-xv).
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Frost marks the 1970s as a moment in which politically feminist poetry, and concerns
with aesthetic practice in women’s writing, diverge. As work by women writing accessible
political poems became popular, especially in relation to activist politics of the women’s
movement, Kathleen Fraser and others decided to create a space for women poets interested in
aesthetic practice as politics, following in the tradition of the avant-garde and contextualized in
their contemporary moment. Frost notes Fraser in particular, who worked to create a space for
reclamation of the work of modernist women writers and for the continuing practice and
acceptance of work by contemporary innovative writers. Fraser’s own politics came to include
the formation of the journal HOW(ever)—which printed twenty-four issues between 1983 and
1992 and continues presently online—and the continual negotiation of feminist theory and poetic
practice.
Instead of focusing on work in the tradition of the confessional poetry of Anne Sexton or
Sylvia Plath, or what came to be seen as the feminist poetry of Adrienne Rich or the late work of
Elizabeth Bishop, HOW(ever) looked to answer the question: “What about the women poets who
were writing experimentally?” and included work of writers such as Rae Armantrout, Barbara
Guest, Fannie Howe, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Beverly Dahlen, Hannah Weiner, Myung Mi Kim,
Sheila K. Smith, Mei Mei Berssenbrugge, Gail Scott, Laura Moriarty, Nicole Brossard, and
Carla Harryman, among others. Co-editor Frances Jaffer considered HOW(ever) a space for “The
poetry feminists usually eschew, believing that now is the time for women to write
understandable poetry about their own lives, and with feeling, with the heretofore undeveloped
self in prominent display,” and because “the myths of a culture are embodied in its language, its
lexicon, its very syntactical structure.” Further, Jaffer argues, “to focus attention on language and
to discover what can be written in other than traditional syntactical or prosodic structures may
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give an important voice to authentic female experience. Certainly one should be read side-byside with the other” (HOW(ever)). The philosophy behind HOW(ever) was not to displace
mainstream feminist literature, but to widen the “canon” by including writing that was doing
political work on the level of language and formal structure. Although Jaffer’s meaning is not
completely clear, and pointing to a sense of “authenticity” can be problematic for many reasons,
I would argue that for Jaffer, “authentic female experience” enacted at the formal level of the
text must recognize the variety of experiences of subjects situated within multiple social,
economic, gendered, and other contexts, and discourses, as well as opening further possibilities
for aesthetic practice.
The project and politics of HOW(ever), as an early moment in the poetics of late
twentieth-century avant-garde women writers, has been essential to the further recognition and
theorization of feminist aesthetics. The original impetus has been enhanced and revised by later
poetics anthologies and studies—Moving Borders, Breaking the Sequence, Ann Vickery’s
Leaving Lines of Gender, DuPlessis’s oeuvre, Frost’s Feminist Avant-Garde—that, to different
degrees, expand the range of representation to include more ethnic and cultural diversity and
well as ranges of experimentation and commentary. Though Moving Borders (discussed below)
and Leaving Lines of Gender present limited conversations on the relationship between textual
experimentation and cultural politics, each marks an important historical moment that seeks to
make public writers and texts that had previously, for the most part, been kept on the margins
(the margins of the already marginalized avant-garde). Further, Breaking the Sequence is one of
few texts dealing with experimental fiction writing—most discussion of women’s experimental
writing centers on poetry—in which contributors explore various ways in which experimental
fiction writers “[explode] dominant forms” of traditionally masculine fiction writing. DuPlessis,
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throughout her work, crucially opens spaces of poetics and criticism for feminist re-readings of
masculine modernism and cultural interrogations of textual and linguistic practice, while Frost’s
project brings textual practice and cultural politics in twentieth-century poetry together in a way
that allows for a greater range of conversation on form and content in the chosen texts. Frost
begins with historical examinations of Stein and Mina Loy, moves into a section on race and
gender through a reading of Sonia Sanchez and the Black Arts Movement, and finally considers
tradition simultaneously with contemporary hybrid practices through the work of Susan Howe
and Harryette Mullen. In a way, where Frost moves toward the hybrid text as a means of
enacting cultural tensions, I see my project beginning: with hybrid genre writing that further
continues the conversation of the inseparability of form and content, with particular regard to
cultural politics.
The publication of HOW(ever) began in 1983 in order to bring together the writing of
women who were, and had been, writing in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as put them in
conversation with modernist women predecessors. In 1984, Poetics Journal published a special
issue on “Women and Language,” edited by Barrett Watten and Lyn Hejinian, highlighting the
creative and critical theorizing among women writers affiliated with the language-centered
writing of the 1970s, and which critically focused on what Ron Silliman would call “the
referential dimension of language.” Silliman’s anthology, In The American Tree, expanded the
canon of transgressive literary practice selected in Donald Allen’s earlier New American Poetry
and included writing that interrogated the structures of language as a political practice. A number
of women writers included in Silliman’s anthology are also prominent in Mary Margaret Sloan’s
1998 anthology, Moving Borders, which, like HOW(ever), specifically brings together the
innovative work of contemporary women writers from the 1970s to the 1990s. Moving Borders,
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though, primarily focuses on the variety of formal practices, leaving aside any discussion of
feminist politics. Additionally, around this time critical work on contemporary experimental
poetry by women began to emerge as a new field in itself; the field of poetics includes creative
and critical writers who now regularly explore questions of historical canonicity (expanding the
canon to include scholarship on experimental women writers), aesthetics, and cultural, social,
and political relevance of experimental work.4
The field of poetics has moved beyond the examination of modernist textual disruption as
political practice, to include a variety of approaches to reading texts by both men and women in
terms of gender and gendered politics. Some modernists such as William Carlos Williams and
James Joyce have been read in terms of their “feminine” styles of writing because of the ways
they subvert and resist language structures in response to (patriarchal) social structures.5 Others
like Mina Loy appropriated the avant-garde practices of her male counterparts to create, at times
overtly, feminist political texts that were in part due to her dissatisfaction with the social position
of women in general as well as their inability to fully participate in the literary circles around her
at the time.6 The French theorists in the 1970s and 1980s provided additional alternative ways to
expand the discussion of textual practice, through textual analyses, and toward studies that seek
to relate formal practice and real world politics. 7 Taking on the metaphorical “feminine” and
“masculine” styles of modernist writing, for example, critics such as Marianne DeKoven (A
Different Language) and Linda Kinnahan (Poetics of the Feminine) focused on the textual styles
of writers such as Stein, Williams, and Loy. Other critics, including DuPlessis and Frost, expand
their readings to investigate how formal issues are central to the politics and cultural critique
4

In addition to the critical work of DuPlessis, see work on modern and contemporary women writers and feminist
poetics by DeKoven, Keller, Miller, Kinnahan, Hogue, Hinton, Simpson, and Spahr.
5
In particular see Kinnahan.
6
See Loy’s “Feminist Manifesto”; “Songs to Joannes; and “Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose.”
7
In particular see Derrida, Irigaray, Cixous, and Kristeva.
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expressed in poetic texts, going beyond discussion of the styles of “gendered” writing. The field
has moved beyond the textual, material readings of formal innovation to show important
relations between formal strategy and content, be it political, social, personal, or otherwise. A
critic can no longer read simply for a gendered style of writing, but must also consider relations
between and among gender, race, sexuality, and/or cultural politics inside and outside of the text.
Key to my project is the importance of the feminist politics of the 60s and 70s, what
Felski calls the “phenomenon of women’s explicit self-identification as an oppressed group,
which is in turn articulated in literary texts in the exploration of gender-specific concerns
centered on the problem of female identity” (Felski, Beyond 1). Further, I expand and complicate
the idea of “self-identification” by including more formally innovative texts, in order to show
how the “oppressed group” of women is not a singular group at all but a network or field of
multiple voices and concerns. Felski argues against the idea of a singular “feminist aesthetic,”
since necessary to any project is “theorizing the historically specific locations of women in
culture and society” other than simply placing particular literary styles outside of dominant
linguistic structures. The separation between the literature of formal experimentation and that of
“social struggle and change” (6) is reinforced as “a link between literature and feminism can
only be established in a text that addresses themes in some way relevant to feminist concerns;
multiplicity, indeterminacy, or negativity are not in themselves specifically feminist, or indeed
specifically anything” (7). In going further to make the connection(s) “between literature and the
broader realm of social practice,” she argues, we must understand that “feminist literature is
understood as a form of meaning production, a construction of gendered identity which draws
upon intersubjective cultural and ideological frameworks rather than a more or less truthful
representation of an unproblematically given female reality” (9). Women do not encompass a
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“given female reality” but are contextualized in multiple realities, their writing presents a
multiplicity of experiences, histories, and understandings, and few, if any, would argue that any
literary text is a “truthful representation of an unproblematically given female reality.” Felski
complicates this somewhat in her more recent Doing Time in which she argues that “it is
impossible to define in general terms what a feminist aesthetic might be, that feminist
approaches to art must be plural, not singular” (190). The feminist recognition of “the value of
ambiguity, contradiction, and non-identity” in aesthetic practice can be useful, especially as art
may “help complicate and cast new light on our perceptions of maleness and femaleness, gender
and sexuality.” However, Felski argues, it is important to consider that “this aesthetic principle
of non-identity does not accord with the more concrete and goal-directed concerns of feminist
politics” (189). Although Felski draws a false division between aesthetic “non-identity” and
political “identity,” I agree that instead of simply relying on “the subversive effects of formal
innovation” as feminist politics, we need to consider larger, and multiple, contexts—the “social
and institutional frameworks of contemporary art”—as well as women’s place in the historical
production of art, in order to bring feminist politics and aesthetics together into more thoughtful
and complex relation.
Further, I want to show how the texts I’ve chosen enact identity as a process through their
formal strategies. The aesthetic is used politically in order, among other things, to draw our
attention to the impossibility of containing identity within singular categories (black, white,
lesbian, straight, etc.). This critiques social and institutional structures that define women, and
women’s art, historically. According to Lacan, before language we have no sense of self, no
identity; it is “the Symbolic Order of our culture, the social languages that identify us and lend us
identities, all of which exceed consciousness and never assume the form of knowable or
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conscious identity . . . . Our identity is given to us from outside, and we are constitutively
alienated” (Rivkin 393). Recognizing this, the authors in my study challenge the myth of the
social formation of identity by constructing texts that enact the more complex processes of
identity. Subjects cannot simply identify as one or another type of identity but are in
(dis)continuous, uneven, simultaneous, spatial, historical contexts through which they make
sense of themselves and the world around them. From Stein to Cha, these writers play with
language and textuality, break away from normative expectations, and challenge the myth of
narrative (identity) as cohesive and singular in order to create new forms of representation for
thinking through the complex ways subjects identify.
Although “permanently troubled by identity categories,” Judith Butler believes them to
be “sites of necessary trouble” (“Imitation” 308) that we can use for thinking and discussion of
identity more productively. She explains, “In avowing the sign’s strategic provisionality (rather
than its strategic essentialism) . . . identity can become a site of contest and revision” (312). In
terms of marginalized, or other, communities, Biddy Martin examines the importance of “the
possibility of reconceptualizing identity without abandoning it and its strategic deployment
altogether” (275) and proposes moving away from focusing on particular groups or “identities”
and thinking instead in terms of what Theresa de Lauretis calls “micropolitical practices,” as
Martin explains: “practices of self-representation which illuminate the contradictory, multiple
construction of subjectivity at the intersections, but also in the interstices of ideologies of gender,
race, and sexuality” (277). If narrative autobiography can be read as representing the
contradictory and multiple—as in the work of Audre Lorde writing black, lesbian, female
experience—then this project expands that conversation to read work that includes the textually
contradictory and multiple. The writers here enact the tensions of identity categories through the
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non/narrative writing of personal and social experience; their text-subjects are continually in
process as they question and theorize identity and how subjects identify in the world.
In reading This Bridge Called My Back, Martin cites Anzaldúa, among others, for their
attempts to attend to the complex intersections of race, gender, and sexuality:
By demonstrating the complex discursive and institutional intersections of race, class,
gender, and sexuality and their inscription on the bodies and psyches of women, these
autobiographical essays, poems, and letters relate psychic and political struggles in ways
that make ‘identity’ irreducible to consciousness. The category ‘women of color,’ as it is
elaborated in This Bridge, stands in a critical relation to assumptions of unity based on
identity. (282)
This Bridge begins to address the complexities of identity through the use of different genres of
writing (poems, letters, essays); the editors seek to show that there is no single way to represent
or articulate identity; they want to alleviate the danger of reproducing “a cultural politics that
places its faith in identity and in writing” (Martin 282). In This Bridge, the contributors use the
various genres to “elaborate” identity. The texts in my study take this idea further to challenge
representation at the level of genre itself; the writers use, and misuse, narrative as a means of
challenging ideologically imposed identities on subjects, and practice a variety of formal, textual
strategies. The text, like identity, is irreducible to singular, linear representations of a subject’s
participation in the world. The complexity of formal, textual elements is analogous to, and
enacts, the complex, shifting, layered, discontinuous, and non/narrative “realties” of identity.
Martin explains that for the lesbian-identified contributors in This Bridge, “lesbianism
clearly does not figure as the exclusive ground of either identity or politics; however, it is neither
divisible from nor subordinate to other identities . . . . It marks a desire for more complex
realities, for relationships filled with struggle and risk as well as pleasure and comfort” (Martin
284). In terms of lesbian autobiography, Martin continues:
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Lesbianism ceases to be an identity with predictable contents, to constitute a total
political and self-identification . . . . It remains a position from which to speak, to
organize, to act politically, but it ceases to be the exclusive and continuous ground of
identity or politics. Indeed, it works to unsettle rather than to consolidate the boundaries
around identity, not to dissolve them altogether but to open them to the fluidities and
heterogeneities that make their renegotiation possible. (289-90)
In this sense Martin considers lesbian identity as an active and fluid process that “works to
unsettle” the confines of static “identity.” Taking this idea further, I use the term “queer” to
consider active processes of undoing, an activity of critique and of implementing non-normative
(textual and social) strategies. I read queer theory and a poetics of non/narrative identity together
to consider that the experimental text may be read as analogous to sexuality, that the (queer)
non/narrative is in relation to (straight) narrative in that there are many versions and
manifestations of both non/narrative narrative practices.
A number of the primary texts in my project can be considered queer in terms of their
non-heterosexually identified subjects enacting complex sexual identities through formal
innovation. Butler writes, “David Halperin has said, 'Queer is by definition whatever is at odds
with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it
necessarily refers. It is an identity without an essence.' . . . It's not (necessarily) just a view on
sexuality, or gender. It also suggests that the confines any identity can potentially be reinvented
by its owner” (Gauntlett). Although I do not want to generalize the term so that it is no longer
useful, I do want to consider queerness as a practice of critique in my readings of the texts here.
Many of the writers “identify” as non-heterosexually normative, but to varying degrees of
openness in their writing. In order not to assume, or place unnecessary emphasis on, sexual
orientation that is not already considered in the content of the texts—and as it seems to make
sense within the arguments of this project—I use “queer” as a way of reading non-normative
practices and processes of textual construction, as well as how it may apply to the content of the
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stories of the text-subjects. A “queering” of the normative, narrative text enacts social critique.
The queerness is in the content (narratives of non-heterosexually identified subjects) and in the
form (non/narrative and other formally experimental strategies). Queer subjectivity may be read
as analogous to textual innovation, but it is also enacted through textual practice; narrative, in
many of these texts, is “queered” as a way of enacting alternative practices and identifications
that cannot be simply reduced to linear, cohesive identity or narrative choices.
Diana Fuss engages the relationship between identity and identification and claims that
although the two terms cannot be simplistically differentiated, they are in intimate relation with
one another and yet have differing functions. She writes that “identifications are erotic,
intellectual, and emotional” and that “while we tend to experience our identities as part of our
public personas—the most exposed part of our self’s surface collisions with a world of other
selves—we experience our identifications as more private, guarded, evasive” (2). Fuss
contextualizes identification as a process that is not static, but is open to fluctuation of intellect
and emotion. If identity is relational, than those relations begin with personal identifications and
then move to the social. The process of identification becomes one of a political nature
particularly when subjects’ identifications are determined for them, or when the range of possible
ways to identify is limited by cultural norms and expectations. Fuss explains:
At the very same time that identification sets into motion the complicated dynamic of
recognition and misrecognition that brings a sense of identity into being, it also
immediately calls that identity into question . . . . Identification is a process that keeps
identity at a distance, that prevents identity from ever approximating the status of an
ontological given, even as it makes possible the formation of an Illusion of identity as
immediate, secure, and totalizable. (2)
The work of theorizing identification, upsetting the illusion of secure identity, and looking to
new or other possible ways for subjects to identify is part of the politics of this project. I would
argue that, as my primary texts serve as examples of “other” ways of narrating, they also
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function as models for thinking through identity—and the processes of identification within the
self—and increased ways in which subjects (in the text and in the world) might identify.
Increased possibilities for subjective identification might mean greater awareness of the complex
and dynamic nature of identity, and might allow subjects greater social recognition and active
participation.
II. Politics and the “Experimental Prose Narrative”
In my selected primary texts, content (the “what”) and form (the “how”) are so intimately
connected that they construct each other. The content, or the stories and “meanings” of the texts,
cannot be separated from how they are constructed, organized, articulated, challenged,
manipulated, and presented. Formal writing strategies—including language play, narrative
subversion, repetition, interrogation of the parts of speech and point of view, among others—are
as much related to meaning as the ideas and stories themselves; in fact, formal devices are often
used purposefully and strategically so that the content is read through, and meaning informed by,
formal elements. In this project I use tools of poetic reading and critique, particularly coming out
of avant-garde and experimental poetics, to read hybrid, prose texts in terms of both content and
form.
Toril Moi argues that “extreme reflectionism simply cannot accommodate notions of
formal and generic constraints on textual production, since to acknowledge such constraints is
equivalent to accepting the inherent impossibility of ever achieving a total reproduction of reality
in fiction” (46). Although few would now argue with the notion that reality cannot be
transparently reproduced in fiction, Moi additionally cites Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s
Madwoman in the Attic—a text that still read widely as a foundational text for women’s and
feminist studies programs—who assert that, through the use of various literary devices, the
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female writers they study simultaneously conform to and subvert patriarchal literary standards.
However, the devices tend to remain on the surface of the texts for these critics, who finally see
the narrated characters as the doubles of the authors; the text is the place in which the real
(fragmented and conflicting) experiences of women are organically unified. This idea is
challenged by the history of avant-garde practice in which the conception of wholeness of the
text or the author of the text is only an illusion, and it is this impossibility of the unification of
disparate elements (experiences, understandings of the world, multiple elements of identity
formation) that is enacted, in multiple ways, in the avant-garde text. The basic problem,
historically, has been this division between realist content as feminist politics, and the idea that
formally innovative work cannot be political or contain social critique. This project largely deals
with how the selected writers respond to and construct alternatives to linear, progressive,
narrative texts, particularly texts that claim to be autobiographical or document a life story in
some way.
I am not interested in challenging the genre of autobiography as much as I am in using
the primary texts here to explore the many possible other ways to write stories “about”
experience. Each text in its way responds to the difficulties of narration, interrogates narrative
and language structures as social/historical constructions, and understands that as subjects and
citizens we are as much formed by language as by other ideological social tools. These writers
both use and dismantle narrative strategies, and for this reason I use the term “non/narrative,” as
it is used in the special issue of Poetics Journal (no. 5, 1985) on Non/Narrative, and in the recent
issue on Non/Narrative in the Journal of Narrative Theory. According to Carla Harryman, “the
editors [of Poetics Journal] chose to resist creating a simple binary between narrative and
non/narrative practices, representing a spectrum of positions by new narrativists, poets, and
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artists” (2) that “would invite readers to take narrative and nonnarrative equally seriously” (3).
The issue of Poetics Journal was aimed at writers thinking about narrative in their own work,
and was also meant to “encourage critical study of non/narrative in scholarly contexts that could
in turn enable the development of a narratology that took seriously the non” (3). Building upon
these early goals in a new historical moment, Harryman explains that
the theoretical work of the socially engaged non/narrative text stems from its production
of a crisis of understanding. Works that shift between genres disturb categorical frames
. . . . They radically break rules of story-telling to stage a necessary disruption of
asymmetrical power relations, the limits of knowledge, psychological and social
operations of recognition and misrecognition, the complex connections between private
experience and larger social forces, and the cooperative construction of meaning. (2)
The writers I study here use narrative strategies in a variety of ways, and none of the texts
disavow narrative altogether. “Breaking the rules” of narrative writing not only disrupts and calls
attention to itself as disruption, but makes readers also participate in the textual experience as a
larger social politics and “cooperative construction of meaning.” Working through narrative, as
one of many ideological means of socialization, I suggest that my primary texts, through the
construction of both form and content, may be read as exploratory interrogations into the nature
of identity formation in a historically patriarchal, racist, and homophobic society.
Social and literary resistance, challenging borders and oppositions—this is all work being
done currently in queer/gender/sexuality studies and activism, and has been enacted in the work
of the “New Narrative” writers. Robert Glück has become a central figure for this group, who, he
explains, in the 70s and 80s “were fellow travelers of Language Poetry and the innovative
feminist poetry of that time, but our lives and reading lead us toward a hybrid aesthetic,
something impure.” This hybridity, in addition to aesthetic practice, often had to do with queer
and gay identifications not represented among other literary movements at the time, and the use
and necessity of narrative in New Narrative aesthetic practices. For them, Language Poetry
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served as a model for formal experiment but was too limited in terms of cultural and identity
politics; the New Narrative writers, who predominantly identified as gay men, pushed the genre
of autobiographical narrative in more hybrid directions. As Glück explains, “We were thinking
about autobiography; by autobiography we meant daydreams, nightdreams, the act of writing,
the relationship to the reader, the meeting of flesh and culture, the self as collaboration, the self
as disintegration, the gaps, inconsistencies and distortions, the enjambments of power, family,
history and language” (Glück). As Dianne Chisholm explains, “the narrative of New Narrative
represents gay lives as constructed on location. It calls historical, gay-consciousness into being at
a moment when Language Poetry dominated the literary scene with its performative
deconstruction of narrative voice . . . . Writing autobiography is New Narrative’s mode of
representing the complex constructedness of self in commodity society” (56). Important to
Chisholm’s project is the “aim of rendering antithetical experience perceptible”; looking at work
that brings together “narrative and montage, activist and negative critique” (60) is then
revolutionary in terms of breaking boundaries and creating spaces of possibility for new models
of autobiographical writing and social/sexual identification.
The New Narrative movement, according to Rob Halpern, offered “one response to some
unresolved impasses between Gay Liberation, the Avant-Garde, and a New Left that seemed at
times unresponsive to the exigencies of sexual politics” (82). Narrative storytelling about real
gay lives was as important to these writers as dismantling the ideological structures of narrative
itself. Recognizing the power of narrative to construct subjectivity, these writers constructed
hybrid, non/narrative writing, which in turn could also work politically bringing innovative
writing and (gay) politics together in a productive way. Steve Abbott, a central figure of the
group, wrote at the time, “New Narrative is language conscious but arises out of specific social
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and political concerns of specific communities . . . . It stresses the enabling role of content in
determining form rather than stressing form as independent from its social origins and goals”
(qtd. in Halpern 82-83). In New Narrative, as in Language writing, form and content, as well as
the formation of a theory of non/narrative, are in close relation. For New Narrative writers,
content additionally includes narrative representations of gay identities and politics in the 1970s
and 80s on the West Coast. Used strategically and consciously, as Halpern explains, “narrative
has the potential to make perceptible the occlusions and voids in that history where other stories
and their corresponding subject positions might then appear for the first time.” In his own
reading of the writers, and literature of the period, Halpern is “suggesting an approach to
narrative as a political response to that history of enclosures: narrative as a nonsite, or a
placeholder, for something in excess of that one story . . . . New Narrative could then be read in
dialectical tension with its apparent opposite, non-narrative, each persisting in and through the
other” (105). Reading narrative and “non-narrative” in and through each other is itself a socially
productive theory, and political use of, narrative. Halpern further argues, “New Narrative has the
potential both to map and transform our conditions of possibility for organizing the social
material—feelings, language, affects—that enables new subjectivities to emerge, while making
legible the conditions of their emergency, the social lines of force that constrain who speaks and
what can be said” (106). This is how I see my project here intersecting with Halpern’s
examination of the New Narrative writers: the writers in my study use narrative to represent
(often autobiographical) content, while interrogating both the content and the use of narrative in
its representation. Narrative and non/narrative, like form and content, are in dialectical relation as
they theorize their own processes of construction. My primary texts, through a variety of styles
and voices, work through feminist (identity) politics, “autobiography,” and the gendered nature
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of avant-garde practices in twentieth-century American literature. These texts use
narrative/non/narrative to examine and theorize identity, and offer possibilities for subjective
identification and understandings of identity in the world outside of the texts.

In order to further examine the (potential) social or political efficacy of formally
innovative work, I want to turn briefly to examples of avant-garde literature as social practice.
Although a number of theorists have dismissed the historical avant-garde as “failing” as a
political or social aesthetic movement, I want to point to some of the texts that provide
substantive accounts for historical and continuing politics that go beyond simplified notions that
“negativity . . . is identical to . . . political agency” (Watten 150). As Barrett Watten argues:
The first notion to be cast aside is that the negativity of the avant-garde is always the
same refusal—prototypically, that of male artists to participate in normative culture after
the traumatic rupture of total war. Avant-garde negativity is quite variously articulated in
relation, particularly, to gender and nationality at specific historical moments. There is no
‘one’ avant-garde, defined by the paradigmatic example of the historical avant-garde.
(154)
The project of “reconciling radical form with social agency,” he explains, “is the burden of any
new consideration of the avant-garde,” even taking into account that “avant-gardes are usually
small groups of practitioners at a far remove from the mechanisms of social reproduction” (154).
Using the work of El Lissitzky, a Russian Constructivist, Watten frames a conception of the
“constructivist moment” and claims that:
In his radical work of the 1920s, the no longer traumatic but now open horizon of
revolution and the proposal of such objects are united in the construction of form as an
exemplary parable of action. As the word revolution itself constructs a horizon of
possibility out of an experience of extreme disruption, the continuing revolution is an
open horizon of pure possibility that leads to a production of new objects that, in turn,
interpret its meaning. (165)
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The constructivist moment is one in which the negativity transforms into the art object and
subsequently opens a space for an exploration of utopian possibility, for a potential “series of
constructive acts” (165) to follow the initial negative impulse; it is through the incompleteness
and openness of the object as art, in the context of the social and historical articulation of the
artist, that of the “horizon of possibility.” It is “an elusive transition in the unfolding work of
culture in which social negativity—the experience of rupture, an act of refusal—invokes a
fantasmatic future—a horizon of possibility, an imagination of participation. Constructivism
condenses this shift of horizon from negativity to progress in aesthetic form” (191). The
constructive space is the space of possibility. To bring together the constructive relation between
radical formal strategy and social agency, Watten uses examples such as Detroit Techno and the
“reflexive relation between the negativity of Detroit’s social history . . . and the boundarybreaking shock waves of technological innovation” (195-96). The specific potential politics of
gender or other point of interrogation can be seen in the constructive moment of each specific
text. An example is the work of Gertrude Stein, in which the negative disruption of language
opens the constructive potential for a new gender consciousness. According to Krzysztof Ziarek,
Stein
poses the problem of the relation between the two “avant-gardes”: on the one hand, the
modernist textual practices and formal innovations and, on the other, the “avant-garde” of
feminist writing, with its critique of cultural formations, sexuality, and politics. These
two avant-garde moments in Stein’s work illustrate the convergences between avantgarde textual practices and a reconceptualization of experience outside of the parameters
of patriarchal discourse. (151)
Ziarek argues that Stein’s work “is never a matter of a formalist aesthetics,” because it actually
works to remap “the very structure of experience, against the predominant representational and
linguistic practices” (152). Stein, he writes, “rewrites the relations constitutive of experience on
the elemental linguistic level: relations between words and syntactical rules.” One might say that
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the formalism of her aesthetics is precisely the cultural critique that is at the heart of her project.
But Stein’s genius lies in the ways in which she enacts her cultural critique through her
subversive linguistic strategies. Tender Buttons and Lifting Belly, for example, are “about”
lesbian domesticity, romance, and desire; from the caressing of nouns in Tender Buttons and the
public presentation (the text) of the private lesbian domestic space, to the lesbian “sex act”
enacted through erotically charged, repetitive language, Stein challenges given conceptions of
both language practice and lesbian desire, and opens spaces of possibility for sexual, lesbian, and
gendered representations and identifications outside of the text.
Echoing Audre Lorde’s claim that “poetry is not a luxury,” Judith Butler argues that
“possibility is not a luxury; it is as crucial as bread” (Undoing 29). The New Narrative writers
are thinking in terms of sexuality and politics, as well as how textual strategies might enact
possibilities for “rendering antithetical experience perceptible.” The texts that I examine in this
project take this sense of possibility further into explorations of feminist and gender politics in
relation to, and enacted through the use of, formal strategies and narrative subversion. At the
borders, up against the boundaries, in the constructive moment, spaces of possibility open to
allow for new models and ways of knowing, for alternative means of identifying and speaking.

III. Methodology
In this project I deal with strategies—for writing and reading texts—and formations—of
texts and identities in the world. A feminist politics as reading practice looks to possibilities at
the level of form, and examines identity in terms of race, ethnicity, sex, gender, class, history,
and geography. Rachel Blau DuPlessis asserts that “there is female aesthetic, but not a female
aesthetic, not one single constellation of strategies” (“For the Etruscans” 3) but “various and
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possibly contradictory strategies of response and invention shared by women in response to
gender experiences” (10). It is within the text, following DuPlessis, that one can enact struggle
and resistance, through the simultaneous construction of form and content: “What we have been
calling (the) female aesthetic turns out to be a specialized name for any practices available to
those groups—nations, genders, sexualities, races classes—all social practices which wish to
criticize, to differentiate from, to overturn dominant forms of knowing and understanding with
which they are saturated” (16). Each text must be read with specific attention paid to its practices
for resistance and the ways in which it may open spaces of potential politics and action.
Kristeva is especially useful for exploring the relationship between aesthetic practice, the
social/historical/political, and the construction of identity in my chosen texts. It is true that some
feminist critics have dismissed Kristeva’s work “for its ahistorical conception of the sign, its
dismissal of the political, and its essentialist notion of the body” (Hennessy 47) and for her
emphasis on the textual rather than on real social action.8 In fact, Kristeva spends a good deal of
time, over the course of her work, considering the relation between aesthetic practice and social
politics. Specifically, for the purposes of this project, I am primarily interested in Kristeva’s idea
of the subject-in-process as it is presented in Revolution in Poetic Language, and how this is
relevant in terms of the linguistic and the political, for reading experimental work and its
potential use for studying culture.

8

Additionally, the Materialist Feminists whom Hennessy cites fault Kristeva for focusing on avant-garde texts that
have little relevance for collective social action, and, she writes, “despite its suggestiveness as a critique of the
unitary subject of western rationalism, Kristeva’s conception of heterogeneity within signification, her notions of the
materiality of the disruptive ‘Other,’ of contradictions and heterogeneity, are inimical to a feminist agenda
committed to emancipatory social change” (51). It is also important to consider Kristeva’s own commitment to
political struggle especially through the example of the May 1968 Revolt; this became important for Kristeva and
other French intellectuals who thereafter believed that social revolution was still possible. See Moi’s Introduction in
The Kristeva Reader on this, as well as Revolt, She Said in which Kristeva champions the continuous freedom to
revolt in aesthetic and cultural realms.
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In her chapter on Kristeva, Toril Moi writes: “Instead of an exclusive emphasis on the
gender of the speaker, [Kristeva] recommends an analysis of the many discourses (including
sexuality and gender) that together construct the individual” (169), or as Kristeva states, “I
favour an understanding of femininity that would have as many ‘feminines’ as there are women”
(qtd. in Moi 169). Kristeva is clearly invested in understanding gender, like symbolic language,
as socially constructed and not biologically determined. Following this, Kristeva’s theory of the
subject-in-process—or the relation between (or evolution of) the subject and (evolution of)
language—seems especially useful for looking at the relationship between the subject of the text
and the space of potential politics opened by disruptive textual strategies. 9 According to Moi, the
subject-in-process (or the disruption of the subject) for Kristeva parallels, or works as an analogy
to, revolutionary disruptions of society. If we go back to Watten, it is in the disruption itself that
space is made available for the construction of material and social alternatives. Kristeva does not
necessarily need to show how society will be overturned, but instead offers a linguistic theory
that demonstrates how symbolic language is used to continually (re)construct subjects in society,
and in its disruption is the opening of space for social politics. Kristeva’s idea of the interaction
between the semiotic and symbolic, by which symbolic language is disrupted but not abandoned
altogether, is not unlike bell hooks’s more material, culturally activist notion that the oppressed
use the oppressor’s language while simultaneously remaking it as their own.
In the non/narrative text, identity, like gender, is seen as constructed, relational, and in
process. The texts I’ve chosen use formal strategies to break away from (symbolic) narratives
that “naturalize” (women’s or gendered) experience. These texts function within the symbolic
structures (of patriarchy, of language) but simultaneously embody Kristeva’s semiotic space of
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See Prud’homme and Légaré.
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disruption, rupture, contradiction, and negativity, which exists before gender, before the
symbolic gender system socializes the subject. For Kristeva:
The opposition between feminine and masculine does not exist in pre-Oedipality [the
semiotic] . . . . Any strengthening of the semiotic, which knows no sexual difference,
must therefore lead to a weakening of traditional gender divisions, and not at all to a
reinforcement of traditional notions of ‘femininity’. . . . Femininity and the semiotic do,
however, have one thing in common: their marginality. As the feminine is defined as
marginal under patriarchy, so the semiotic is marginal to language. (Moi 165-66)
Gender is relational, and since women are positioned as marginal in symbolic, patriarchal order,
“Kristeva’s emphasis on marginality allows us to view this repression of the feminine in terms of
positionality rather than of essences. What is perceived as marginal at any given time depends on
the position one occupies” (Moi 166). It is clear here that she is thinking of gender or other
identity markers as discursive and relational.
Ultimately, Kristeva is interested in language “as a heterogeneous process”; it is a
“complex signifying process rather than a monolithic system” (Moi 152). Or, according to
Kristeva, “the kind of activity encouraged and privileged by (capitalist) society represses the
process pervading the body and the subject, and . . . we must therefore break out of our
interpersonal and intersocial experience if we are to gain access to what is repressed in the social
mechanism: the generating of significance” (Kristeva, Revolution 13). It is the process that
signifies, not the (commodified) end-product. Further:
The text is a practice that could be compared to political revolution: the one brings about
in the subject what the other introduces into society. The history and political experience
of the twentieth-century have demonstrated that one cannot be transformed without the
other . . . . Hence, the questions we will ask about literary practice will be aimed at the
political horizon from which this practice is inseparable, despite the efforts of
aestheticizing esoterism and repressive sociologizing or formalist dogmatics to keep them
apart. We shall call this heterogeneous practice significance to indicate, on the one hand,
that biological urges are socially controlled, directed, and organized, producing an excess
with regard to social apparatuses; and, on the other, that this instinctual operation
becomes a practice—a transformation of natural and social resistances, limitations, and
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stagnations—if and only if it enters into the code of linguistic and social communication.
(Kristeva 17)
The political horizon is inseparable from literary practice—the text—and these together enact a
process of transformation through the “code of linguistic and social communication.” In order to
encounter significance, we must move outside of rigid conceptions that separate art and politics;
to focus on process is to be open to the dynamic potential for literary practice as social action.
“This heterogeneous process . . . is a structuring and de-structuring practice, a passage to the
outer boundaries of the subject and society” (17). The text brings about change in the subject,
like revolution brings about change in society, and “one cannot be transformed without the
other.” The subject is affected by and through textual and linguistic practices, and this subject
then enacts social revolution as action. But the subject is also in continual process of formation
and alteration, as is society in a continual state of revolution (or revolution can be continuous).
This is both a metaphorical and literal politics, and moves beyond theories of stylistic or textual
disruption as aesthetic affect.
My use of Butler begins with her cultural analysis of gender in Gender Trouble and Undoing
Gender, and further considers her discussion on how we account for ourselves, as ethical
subjects in the world and in relation to one another, in Giving an Account of Oneself. In Gender
Trouble, Butler seeks to dismantle the reliance on understandings of the binary nature of
masculine-feminine gender expressions and to show that gender is not a stable formation but is
dynamic, and that changing and multiple gender expressions are possible within a continuum of
possible gender expressions. “Gender trouble” is the potential for multiple, more flexible gender
expression through the disruption of the performance of gender. Undoing Gender continues and
revises this project by examining the variety of gendered identifications and advocating for
dismantling social and gender norms in order to create spaces of possibility, as a matter of
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survival, for subjects’ identification and practice. Giving an Account moves somewhat out of the
focus on gender and sexual identification to consider how we narrate ourselves to others. If we
have subjective agency, it is because we are in relation to others, and we account for ourselves
within that self-other relation. I use Butler’s ideas here to theorize the uses and limitations of
narrative for text-subjects often trying and failing to articulate their life stories and experiences.
Through Butler, I show how narrative necessarily fails, thereby opening productive gaps in
which the necessary work of understanding self in relation to other, and in terms of social
politics, can and should happen. The ethical project is in attending to the gaps, instead of
fictitiously making the inconsistencies or disturbances cohere, in order that we better understand
our responsibilities for ourselves in relation to others and to society.
Additionally, the text, like identity, is a constructive process, and it is also spatial. Susan
Stanford Friedman suggests that “academic feminism involves moving beyond gender” in part
due to “new positional, locational, spatial . . . concepts of identity” or what she calls “the new
geographics of identity” (Mappings 17). As an order of feminist practice, Friedman suggests, this
new way of conceptualizing “performs a kind of dialectic that reflects opposing movements in
the world today revolving around the issue of identity” which is “polyvocal and often
contradictory” (19). In order to move beyond “gynocriticism and gynesis” Friedman looks to
“the blending and clashing of overlapping or parallel discourses of feminism, multiculturalism,
poststructuralism and postcolonial studies” to offer six “discourses of identity within this new
geography of positionality” (20): 10
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Friedman explains, “For gynocriticism, the existence of patriarchy… serves as the founding justification for
treating women writers of different times and places as part of a common tradition based on gender. For gynesis, the
linguistic inscriptions of masculine/feminine—indeed language’s very dependence on gendered binaries—underlie
various feminist unraveling of master narratives and discourses” (Mappings 18).
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1. multiple oppression includes the differences among and between women from various
cultural, class and other backgrounds; to define women only in terms of gender renders
other oppressions invisible;
2. multiple subject positions occur as the intersection of different or competing cultural
formations of race, ethnicity, class sexuality, and etc.;
3. contradictory subject positions occur when one is simultaneously oppressed in some way
and privileged in an other;
4. subjectivity is relational; gender is in relation to sexuality and class; identity is
understood as a fluid site vs. as a static or fixed essence;
5. situationality means that identity resists being fixed but instead shifts from one context to
another;
6. ethnic, postcolonial, diasporic hybridity occurs through geographical migration.
The concepts of relationality, contingency, and positionality of identity, through Friedman,
connect to both Kristeva’s textual politics and Butler’s cultural politics for marginalized subjects.
Using Kristeva and Butler, and Friedman’s geographic, spatial theory of identity discourse, I
seek to bring the textual and cultural into closer relation, particularly in terms of how they can
mutually aid in advancing political endeavors for marginalized subjects and others who are
unable to conform, to various degrees, to social norms and expectations.
Although the specifically feminist analysis throughout this project varies from one text to the
next, it is important to recognize that women’s experiences as citizens and writers is socially,
culturally, and historically contextualized. We learn from many modernist writers that form as
well as content can be (or not be) about experience. For this project, I am interested in reading
texts written in (fictional or nonfictional) autobiographical or poetic styles, and specifically texts
that fall outside of any easy means of categorization in terms of form, gender, or feminist
politics. In trying to define the parameters of what makes a text feminist—from authorial intent,
to political content, to reader interpretation, to textual stylistics—Elizabeth Grosz concludes that
“no text can be classified once and for all as wholly feminist or wholly patriarchal: these
appellations depend on its context, its place within that context, how it is used, by whom and to
what effect. These various contingencies dictate that at best a text is feminist or patriarchal only

35
provisionally, only momentarily, only in some but not in all its possible readings, and in some
but not all its possible effects” (23-24). The primary texts I’ve chosen here vary in terms of style
as well as feminist or other politics. Some are more clear about their politics in their content than
others, some are working through their own processes of thinking through their politics through
the writing itself. The text-subjects and narrators examine, work through, and make discoveries
about gender, race, sexuality, and identity while simultaneously involving readers in their
processes, and leaving the conclusive space open for cooperative thinking and potential real
world action. As Judith Butler explains in Giving an Account of Oneself, the narrative “I” does
not replace or even represent the “I” that remembers that past, but instead the narrative “I” is
added to the “I” of real experience, thereby making the cohesive narrative of a self difficult, if
not impossible. These texts show us the fictional nature of self-narration through their own
non/narrative, hybrid formal strategies and the refusal of their text-subjects to identify as unified
and coherent subjects. We are contextualized and formed by the symbolic order, symbolic
language, and the physical space or geography surrounding us; all of these are constantly in
relation and shifting, in process; and the relation between these and one’s having a sense of
identity or self-understanding is a dynamic and fluctuating process that is only made more
dynamic by the gaps and disturbances that affect the seeming stability of systems. The
construction of the text and the construction of identity are processes that can function to open
spaces for greater possibilities for (more complex) subjective understandings and identifications
in the world. And allowing for a more expanded range of representation and identification for
subjects in the world can lead not only to greater awareness but also to a greater potential for,
and actualization of, real world politics.
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IV. The Chapters
I am interested in how modern and contemporary women writers negotiate their writing
practices as both aesthetic and social/historical, and see language and narrative as structures to be
addressed, dismantled, and challenged. These writers deal with the “real” world by way of
language and the use of textual strategies in order to create works that are not polished, cohesive,
narratives that represent “life” but instead enact social/cultural concerns in a fusion of form and
content. I put these modern and contemporary writers together for a couple of key reasons. First,
we read the past (texts) through contemporary perspectives. Secondly, the fact that women
modernists such as Stein and H.D. were actively recovered in the 70s and 80s is important to
reading more recent work. Contemporary writers both come out of tradition and create new
practices for interrogation and writing. The work of Hejinian and Dahlen comes out of the
feminist modernism of Stein and H.D. which sets up the culturally informed, political
postmodernism of the late twentieth-century writers I read here.

11

These writers take their

particular feminist politics beyond masculine traditions of modern and postmodern literary
practice, through their own formal, aesthetic practices that fuse with examinations of, and
responses to, cultural possibilities and limitations for (often marginalized) subjects.
In chapter 1, “‘I am I because my little dog knows me’; or, the Intertextual Self: Gertrude
Stein and Lyn Hejinian,” I show how Gertrude Stein’s The Geographical History of America or
The Relation of Human Nature to the Human Mind, and Lyn Hejinian’s My Life, Writing Is An
Aid to Memory, “What’s Missing from My Life,” and A Border Comedy, critique identity as
socially and culturally contextualized, and enact their critiques through innovative, formal,
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Although the texts by Hejinian I read here are more recent, it is in the 70s that Hejinian and Dahlen are working
with other language writers to create new ideas about writing and “identity” by way of avant-garde historical
practice, as well as reading and recovering modernist texts (by women) that had been disregarded for some time. See
chapter two on H.D. and Dahlen.

37
textual writing strategies. For both authors the process of construction (of a text) and the process
of identification (of a self) are continuous, layered, and intertextual. As works that both
incorporate and exceed tradition and the individual, these texts challenge notions of
autobiography, highlighting the need for narration and identification that are heterogeneous,
spatial, and non-linear. Stein and Hejinian push beyond their singular stories to create works that
are intertextual, geographical, and continuous, but that also recognize and rupture social norms
for writing and identifying. Their texts draw attention to narrative fallibility and institute
alternative practices for non/cohesive, non/narrative identification. Butler claims that the demand
that one maintain a consistent and cohesive self-identity at all times does a certain kind of ethical
violence to subjects who do not continuously “cohere.” Instead, she argues, suspending this
demand, allowing space for nonidentity and narrative rupture can potentially allow a subject to
exist less constricted by norms of identity instituted through norms of language and narrative. If
language forms us before we are formed, then exploring narrative itself, in both form and
content, can give us insight into the relationship between language and identity for subjects in the
world. Taking Butler into account, we see how Stein and Hejinian theorize this relationship
through their interrogations of the content of narrative (examining the stories we are told, and
tell, about ourselves) and the formal properties of narrative (challenging linear narrative
progression, calling attention to the fantasy and fallibility of narrative cohesion). Their texts
enact interruption, and recognize the limits of knowing both at the levels of form and content. In
working to dismantle the limitations of language, Stein and Hejinian, in different times and
through different means, construct textual examples of tolerance and boundary breaking,
showing us how we might further push against the constraints of social and cultural structures
that define, or confine, the range of possibilities for subjective identification.
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In chapter 2, “Third Person Self (Narrated): H.D. and Beverly Dahlen,” I expand the
critique of narrative identity by illustrating how H.D. and Dahlen examine feminine identity and
the gender binary through themes of domesticity and psychoanalysis, and by way of
autobiographical fiction and the poetic journal. H.D. and Beverly Dahlen create subjects-inprocess who dismantle binary structures in order to open spaces for more layered accounts of
(gendered) experiences and identities. In HERmione, H.D. places geography in relation to the
domestic, relational, and “the difficulty of establishing female identity” according to Rachel Blau
DuPlessis. The pressure to decide between the heterosexual marriage proposal and the
“Otherness” role of lesbian/poet, as DuPlessis explains, puts pressure on the possibility of
singular, narrative identity as subjectivity is complicated through alternative syntactic structures
and non/narrative strategies. Further, Dahlen’s A Reading (the series 1-20) negotiates subjective
understanding through the narrator’s textual “conversations” with Freud, and foregrounds an
engagement with language and the psychoanalytic process. Following Kristeva’s notion of the
subject-in-process, and reading these primary texts through Theresa de Lauretis’s theory of
perverse desire, I argue that these works by H.D. and Dahlen offer models of alternative (nonnormative) practice, and potentially work toward changing habits of thinking and knowing to
open spaces for (textual and worldly) subjective expression and representation.
Through different uses of narrative strategy and different means of ending their texts,
both H.D. and Dahlen pervert the hold on narrative desire in order to break the habit of reading
for satisfaction and resolution. The focus for these writers is on the process of coming to know,
as a means to explore “other” ways of thinking and seeing the (female, lesbian, bisexual) self in
relation to the larger world. Freud’s theory of castration means that men and women are always
framed within the context of the penis, while the disavowal of castration creates spaces for other
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types of relations and contexts that can affirm non-normative sexual, literary, and social practice.
I use the theories of Hayden White, who challenges our acquiescent notions of narrative history,
and Peter Brooks, who makes us think more deeply about how and why we read narrative texts,
and show how even Freud questions his own assumptions about narrative and sexual desire, and
H.D. and Dahlen further create examples of habit-breaking, giving us (perverse) non/narrative,
feminist texts that call into question how we know and why we act. From Kristeva, we draw on
processes of becoming, through the textual and into the cultural/social realms. As Elizabeth
Grosz writes, “The subjectivity to which Kristeva refers is constructed within the text. This
discursive ‘I’ is not entirely distinct from the living social subject: the latter is to a large extent
socially structured and positioned by the discursive construction of the ‘I’ in the symbolic” (55).
H.D.’s HERmione and Dahlen’s series A Reading offer material means for creating new habits of
textual practice and affirming an array of linguistic, social, sexual, and gender relations and
practices. The (non)narrative construction of the “I” in the texts, we see, can allow for social
identification in difference, in dialectical relation with symbolic, normative discourse and
culture.
In chapter 3: “The Text-Subject in Social Context: Pamela Lu, Renee Gladman, and
Claudia Rankine,” I move into late twentieth-century writing that deals with sex and gender as
well as race, ethnicity, language, hybridity, and history. Lu’s Pamela: A Novel, Gladman’s Juice,
and Rankine’s Do not Let Me Be Lonely enact oppositional politics as poetics at the levels of
both form and content. Formal textual strategies break away from normative narrative practices
to create hybrid texts that call attention to historical and contemporary social issues for minority
voices, while identity and subjectivity are examined as social constructions in which the
narrators often do not seem to fit. They go beyond the projects of the modernist and Language
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poets to theorize postmodern identity from queer, feminist perspectives that they enact through
formal strategies, and situate their subjects’ processes of identification within textual
investigations of identity and the need to revise the concept of identity for contemporary
subjects.
Following Homi Bhabha, I argue that oppositional politics, languages, cultures, and
histories disrupt and create gaps in the narratives of “national will” highlighting their ideological
and fictional status. For example, Asian and African Americans have not historically had access
to dominant narratives, and have been traumatized by violent histories that do not fit into
narratives of nationhood. My readings point to the gap between experience and narration, and
toward greater possibilities for cultural difference and identification. The non/narrative,
autobiographical-style text is both a metaphorical and literal example of plurality, difference, and
giving voice to historically silenced and marginalized subjects and their narratives, while calling
attention to the social construction of all narratives that serve to make our experience cohere.
They dismantle socially constructed narratives of identity and create alternatives for subjective
identification. The subjects’ counternarratives give voice to perspectives to those otherwise
ignored, serving a politics that promotes creating new models for minority identification.
The question of national identity constructed through narratives of what Homi K. Bhabha
terms “national will” is important to these writers as they present minority voices through
narrators unable to use those totalizing narratives. The narrator in Lu’s novel cannot remember;
the narrators in Gladman’s stories are lacking both memory and history; and Rankine’s
non/narrative text explores the lack of useful narratives for traumatized postmodern subjects. I
show how these texts are examples of how real (minority, contemporary) experience does not fit
in with the larger cultural narratives through which we are “interpellated” as citizens. Looking to
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the real experiences of diverse citizens, Bhabha underscores the space of ambivalence between
the national will and the “daily plebiscite—the unitary number” (310-11). This kind of locational
thinking challenges and complicates narrative historicity that constructs history terms of
patriotism, citizenship, and national will.
As Rankine’s narrator tells us at the end of Do not Let Me Be Lonely: “I tried to fit
language into the shape of usefulness. The world moves through words as if the bodies the words
reflect did not exist” (129). The text can be a point of mediation, between experience and its
resulting traumatic effects. Rankine’s narrator underscores the need for narratives of history and
nation that are complex, connotative, rhetorical, psychic, and diverse. Do not Let Me Be Lonely
presents a history in the present that is fragmented, confused, depressing, and yet hopeful. If,
after Paul Celan, the poem is similar to a handshake, Rankine writes, “The handshake is our
decided ritual of both asserting (I am here) and handing over (here) a self to another. Hence the
poem is that—Here. I am here. This conflation of the solidity of presence with the offering of
this same presence perhaps has everything to do with being alive” (130). This is the kind of
storytelling through which “the nation speaks its disjunctive narrative” (Bhabha 311) and as
viewer/witnesses, we become involved in further opening spaces for counter-narratives that give
language to silenced voices. Through writing and speaking these alternative narratives, subjects
can respond to totalizing narratives, create other possibilities for identification, and work toward
the communal handshaking that occurs when citizens are no longer writing, reading, speaking,
and existing in isolation but become, instead, a part of the process of creation, of renarrating
history and experience, of creating new types of national identities.
In Chapter 4, “‘Possibility is not a luxury’: (Re)presentation and (Re)identification
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in The Transformation, Borderlands/La Frontera, and Dictee,” I bring the readings of the
previous chapters together to conclude with models that enact new forms of language, practice,
and witnessing for textual and social subjects. This chapter explores language and hybridity, and
individual and cultural identity in Juliana Spahr’s The Transformation, Gloria Anzaldua’s
Borderlands/La Frontera, and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictee. Through non/narrative and
hybrid textual practice, the subjects in these texts question the concept of identity, and search for
alternative, more complex means of identification. They negotiate ideological cultural narratives
from within the contexts of their individual experiences; and they create new ways of using
language that, for each, comes to represent new strategies for identifying. Interrogating and
dismantling social norms for gender performance, sexual practice and desire, and ethnic and
geographical dislocation, these subjects-in-process are enacted in the formal strategies of their
texts. These texts, further, challenge binary structures, and open spaces for nonbinary models of
representation.
These texts challenge binary structures—such as self/other, masculine/feminine,
colonizer/colonized—open spaces of possibility for subjective understanding, and act as models
for expanding possibilities for representing experience and politics in the text and in the world.
Their subjects enact the need for recognition, and go beyond this to become speaking subjects,
witnesses to their own experiences and the cultural conditions around them. I use Kelly Oliver
here to bring together the conversation of the textual and cultural, to move beyond both Kristeva
and Butler, into deeper discussion of the relation between textual subjectivity and the hybrid,
prose interrogation of identity, and the cultural manifestations of complex subjective
identifications. These texts bear witness to the problematic nature of Western, masculine,
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heteronormative narratives and, through non/narrative and other formal strategies, speak to
cultural experiences that exceed the norms (of form and content).
All three of these texts offer final examples of how experimental writing can and does
open possibilities for politics at the textual level and in the world. Kristeva writes: “The text is a
practice that could be compared to political revolution: the one brings about in the subject what
the other introduces into society.” By exploring the multiply related and positioned discourses of
identification in the non/narrative text, I believe we can continue to imagine increased
possibilities subjects in the world. These texts simultaneously enact the difficulty and necessity
of using language to increase means of recognizability for both textual and cultural subjects.
From constructing alternatives to mainstream heterosexual domestic relations, to transgressing
and rewriting traditional narratives for women, to re-visualizing and re-framing fragmented and
previously invisible details of history, Spahr, Anzaldúa, and Cha create subjects-in-process who
move through the space of the text similarly to multiply situated subjects in the world, while the
multiple and contradictory discourses of the world are enacted through the formal strategies on
the page. The subjects of these texts become witnesses to the limited nature of ideological
narratives, and the limiting effects of binary structures, and they instead serve as models of
alternative narrative practices enacting greater possibilities for identification and representation
of subjects’ more complex experiences in the world. Subjects achieve subjectivity in relation to
self and others, and through their ability to witness the gaps in history and through their own
alterity in view of totalizing cultural narratives. These text-subjects I argue, over the course of
their texts, come to realize their abilities to address (address-ability) and to respond (responseability) giving them, and their readers, agency, as a mandate to create change in the world.
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CHAPTER 1
“I am I because my little dog knows me,” or, the Intertextual Self:
Gertrude Stein and Lyn Hejinian

When suddenly you know that the geographical history of America has something to do
with everything it may be like loving any man or any woman or even a little or a big dog.
Yes it may, that is to say it does (Stein, Geographical History 391).

In Gertrude Stein’s The Geographical History of America or The Relation of Human
Nature to the Human Mind, and Lyn Hejinian’s My Life, Writing Is An Aid to Memory, “What’s
Missing from My Life,” and A Border Comedy, critiques of identity formation are enacted
through innovative textual writing strategies. As works that incorporate and exceed tradition and
the individual, these texts challenge notions of autobiographical writing, and stress the need for
narration and identification that are heterogeneous, spatial, and non-linear. As subjects, we are
always in flux and changing, not always (if ever) coherent and unified, and the limits of language
contribute to limited possibilities for identification in the world. Understanding this, and working
to dismantle the limitations of language, can lend toward pushing against the boundaries of other
social and cultural structures that define, or confine, the range of possibilities for subjective
identification. Working within and against the boundary spaces (on the page and in the world)
might offer further opportunities for interruption and revision (of the myth) of social and
narrative cohesion. Moving through the “autobiographical” to the intertextual, Hejinian calls
attention to the relationship between the materiality of language and the social construction of
identity and how one documents a life. Moving from Stein to Hejinian, I hope to show how each
uses the process of the construction of the text as a way to theorize identity and interrogate
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representations of the “self.” In these texts, interruption, eruption, resistance, and contradiction
work as textual strategies that emphasize the complicated nature of the representation of identity.
Both Stein and Hejinian construct texts that are intertextual, incorporating previous texts
and ideas while working through their own processes of discovery and reflection. John Mowitt
explains Kristeva’s theory of intertextuality points to a break
with the critical perspective that comprehends the utility of sources in terms of the
antinomy between ‘tradition’ and ‘individual talent,’ where tradition (whether literary or
cultural) serves as a repository of influences activated by an aesthetic consciousness
whose inner force transcends them. Intertextuality, on the other hand, obliges one
approach literary discourse as though its production transforms and thus constitutes not
only what should no longer be called ‘tradition,’ but also what should no longer be called
the ‘individual.’ (110-11)
These texts challenge the notion of the individual author as one who “transcends” tradition, and
underscore the problematic nature of narrative autobiography. The process of construction (of a
text) and the process of identification (of a self) are continuous, layered, and intertextual. A text
can be intertextual in a literal sense in the ways that it cites and records other texts, and also more
subtly in how other texts influence a writer and thereby participate in construction of her text.
Kristeva’s use of the term “intertextuality,” for example, goes beyond the notion of incorporating
sources:
The term inter-textuality denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into
another; but since this term has often been understood in the banal sense of ‘study of
sources,’ we prefer the term transposition because it specifies that the passage from one
signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the thetic—of enunciative and
denotative positionality. If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of
transpositions of various signifying systems (an inter-textuality), one then understands
that its ‘place’ of enunciation and its denoted ‘object’ are never single, complete, and
identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated.
(Revolution 59-60)
In this way, the new text, or signifying system, is a dynamic and hybrid practice, one that is not a
study of sources from a distance, nor an authorial transcendence. This kind of intertextuality
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points to texts as systems at the level of signification itself. Every text is a signifying practice, an
intertextuality of “various signifying systems” that is never single, complete, or self-identical.
This intertextuality makes authorial transcendence impossible, challenges dominant narratives of
tradition and influence, and problematizes the very idea of narrative. As Mowitt explains:
What Kristeva is thus seeking to oppose to the familiar notion of sources is a model of
intertextuality that insists upon the way literary texts transform and thus remain marked
by, not merely other things like them (i.e., other texts), but other inscriptions of meaning
. . . . Moreover, by stressing that texts are sites of an ongoing permutation, Kristeva
exploits intertextuality to capture the reciprocal action that constitutes the relations
among and within texts, as well as between particular texts and the processes that unfold
beside them. (110-11)
Cohesive, linear narrative may not capture this “reciprocal action” that otherwise shows through
in more “poetic” texts, in Kristeva’s terms. The relations among and within texts, and between
texts as ongoing processes of permutation, make the intertextuality of these texts dynamic and
processual, practices of signification that cannot be contained as static products. Kristeva’s
theory is about meaning at the level of signification, as well as how this plays out in, or as, the
text. The poetic text especially is a “signifying practice” that is a “transposition of various
signifying systems”; the signifying practice is then inherently plural and irreducible to any
cohesive, singular element.
Reading Stein and Hejinian through Judith Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself gives
us another way to think through the idea that an autobiographical account can be intertextual in
Kristeva’s terms, and show the gaps and processes of narration, instead of presenting a coherent
narrative product. Butler examines the ethical implications of accounting, or self-narration; the
social nature of one’s giving an account to another; and the difficulty of “capturing” this account
in narrative form. Though Butler is not speaking of literary texts necessarily, Stein and Hejinian
can be read as enacting Butler’s theorization of non/narrative accounting. Retrospective readings
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of Stein and Hejinian through Butler show how narrative accounting of identity breaks down, as
well as how this breaking down becomes a necessary and productive moment in the theorization
of identity. Butler writes:
The singular body to which a narrative refers cannot be captured by a full narration, not
only because the body has a formative history that remains irrecoverable by reflection,
but because primary relations are formative in ways that produce a necessary opacity in
our understanding of ourselves . . . . Moreover, the very terms by which we give an
account, by which we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others, are not of
our making. They are social in character, and they establish social norms, a domain of
unfreedom and substitutability within which our ‘singular’ stories are told. (Giving 2021)
The idea of singularity in our stories is a social construction. We are contextualized as subjects
according to social norms, and it is through these norms that we understand ourselves. Butler
explains that “the terms by which we give an account” are not our own, and it is within this
sociality that we tell our stories. These “structural conditions,” and the narrow realm of social
normativity within which we are expected to (narratively) conform, make it impossible to narrate
oneself singularly, or to understand oneself fully. For Butler, as a cultural theorist and
philosopher, these are ethical questions pertaining to subjects in relation to one another. Stein
and Hejinian use literary, textual space to examine the use (and impossibility) of narrative in the
theorization of identity through formal stops and starts, fragmentation, detours, and repetition.
The texts are in process, refuse closure, and play with narrative and other formal elements to
mimic and deconstruct the concept of autobiography, while commenting on the difficulty of
narrating a life through terms that are not our own.
Through her reading of Foucault, Butler points to the social norms that influence how we
self-identify—and how we are recognized by others—through “norms of recognition”; because
of this normativity, recognition is limited, and “self-questioning” becomes difficult:
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It also turns out that self-questioning of this sort involves putting oneself at risk,
imperiling the very possibility of being recognized by others, since to question the norms
of recognition that govern what I might be, to ask what they leave out, what they might
be compelled to accommodate, is, in relation to the present regime, to risk
unrecognizability as a subject or at least to become an occasion for posing the questions
of who one is (or can be) and whether or not one is recognizable. (Giving 23)
If, as Butler explains, a “social dimension of normativity . . . governs the scene of recognition”
then these norms are also subject to shifting or “rupture” (23). The self-questioning begins a
process of “troubling” the socially normalized ways in which we identify and are recognized. In
Gender Trouble, Butler explores how alternative gender performances “trouble” normalized
constructions of gender; similarly, so might “certain breakdowns in the practice of recognition
mark a site of rupture within the horizon of normativity and implicitly call for the institution of
new norms” (Giving 24). Stein and Hejinian enact this practice in their own work, both at the
level of formal strategy, as well as for Stein in particular, in terms of sexual identification as
content in the writing. In the Geographical History the “breakdown in the practice of
recognition” is both textual and personal; Stein writes an experimental work that challenges its
own recognizability for readers used to clear narrative structure, and as a lesbian she is also
unrecognized by social/sexual norms. The Geographical History might be read as a “queer” text,
which enacts rupture on multiple levels simultaneously. 1 Queerness, in both form and content, is
used as a way to trouble narrative structure that will be explored more fully later in this chapter.
In general, the narration of a self to another, especially in terms of sexual or other identity
markers, is inherently faulty, Butler explains, “since our exchange is conditioned and mediated

1

I’m using queer as different from the more specifically “identity” term, “lesbian,” as a way to think about queer as
an active process of critique through textual and social practices. Butler writes, “It's not (necessarily) just a view on
sexuality, or gender. It also suggests that the confines of any identity can potentially be reinvented by its owner”
(Gauntlett); anything outside of the heteronormative might be considered “queer” or in terms of queer readings of
texts, a queering of the normative, narrative text in which the “queer” text enacts social critique.
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by language, by conventions, by a sedimentation of norms that are social in character and that
exceed the perspective of those involved in the exchange” (Giving 28). By its very nature, the
story one gives of oneself is not singular since “the narrative authority of the ‘I’ must give way to
the perspective and temporality of a set of norms that contest the singularity of my story” (37).
Any story claiming to have narrative authority cannot be taken as entirely truthful, but writing
that foregrounds this narrative fallibility might help to show the role that language, as a social
structure, plays in the “fabrication” of narrative, autobiographical-style documents.
My narrative begins in media res, when many things have already taken place to make
me and my story possible in language. I am always recuperating, reconstructing, and I am
left to fictionalize and fabulate origins I cannot know. In the making of the story, I create
myself in new form, instituting a narrative “I” that is superadded to the “I” whose past
life I seek to tell. (Butler, Giving 39-40)
In the end, both the narrative, and the identity purported in that narrative, may be read as
fictional. The self is created in narrative form that can never entirely represent the “I” of past
experience. And because this self is born into social and linguistic structures that are always
already articulating that self, the layers of narrative continue to build one upon another in the
continual making of its stories. Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself is a philosophical
investigation into one’s ability to account for oneself and one’s actions, and this for Butler is an
ethical question; we are responsible to ourselves and others to be able to give an account, but we
must recognize the impossibility of narrative coherence in the accounting. Butler explains:
“suspending the demand for self-identity or, more particularly, for complete coherence seems to
me to counter a certain ethical violence, which demands that we manifest and maintain selfidentity at all times and require that others do the same” (42). Showing the failure, the rupture—
the queerness and the gaps—is important for understanding the ways in which we are all
contextualized by social and linguistic norms, and that these affect the construction of our
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narrative accounts. Demanding self-identity, Butler proposes, results in a kind of ethical violence
for subjects for whom the coherently narrated (stable) self is ultimately only a fiction. The
subject at the heart of a narrative account is no more than the narrative “I” plus the “I” of past
experience. 2 These two versions of the self may not cohere, or the effort to make them cohere
may result in a failed account, which ultimately may be more important than the effort to create
narrative flow and unity. Butler explains that this failure may actually be “essential to who we
are” (42) as subjects who are narrated, and yet not fully able to narratively articulate our own
stories.
This is not to say that there is no need for narrative structure at all, but if all of life is
“rendered in narrative form” this could have negative consequences (52). Butler’s point is that
we have an ethical responsibility to see how we are subjects constructed through social and
historical norms, and to recognize the contexts in which our narratives are constructed, since the
“I” who begins to tell its story can tell it only according to “recognizable norms of life
narration.” Stein and Hejinian begin on the margins, with strategies of disorientation,
understanding that experience cannot be presented in cohesively narrative ways. Through their
non/narrative strategies, these texts challenge normative complicity, and offer critically useful
theories of identity for subjects in the world, thereby pushing past the narrative and normative
boundaries toward the institution of new means of “accounting.”

Stein, The Geographical History of America
The Geographical History, she told the reporter, was written “somewhat more clearly”
than some of her pervious writings. Asked about the difficulties of her style, Gertrude
maintained: “I cannot afford to be clear because if I was I would risk destroying my own
thought. Most people destroy their thought before they create it. That is why I often
2

See Scott’s essay “Experience” in which she explains how the “I” of experience is also a product of the social
conditions by which a subject is always already constructed; there is no authentic or essential experience.
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repeat a word again and again—because I am fighting to hold the thought. (Mellow,
Charmed Circle 503)

Written in the summer after her famous American tour over the fall, winter, and into
early spring of 1934-35, The Geographical History of America or The Relation of Human Nature
to the Human Mind, and the related work, What are Masterpieces and Why are there So Few of
Them, come out of Stein’s experiences of the tour as well as the lectures she gave during the
tour.3 Before the American tour, Stein was well known, but not well read, having had trouble
publishing her work. However, when The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas was published in
1934 it became instantly popular in the United States. In 1934, Stein and Toklas had been living
together in Paris for nearly thirty years and although Stein had become a popular figure of
attention in the media, she was still not taken seriously as a writer. The Autobiography was well
received for its accessibility (it wasn’t as difficult as much of her previous work), as well as its
content (it reads like a history of the art scene in Paris in the 1920s). About the time The
Autobiography was released, Stein’s opera Four Saints in Three Acts premiered on Broadway
and was also a popular success. With the combination of these, and the encouragement of friends
and advisors, Stein agreed to do the American Tour. The tour consisted of a series of lectures
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According to Haas, Stein’s post-American tour writing can roughly be divided into entity and identity writing.
Identity writing is writing for an audience in work such as in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas and Everybody’s
Autobiography, Lectures in America, Narration, and What are Masterpieces, among others. Entity writing is
considered by Stein to be “real” writing, which were often more like philosophical reflections, which include the
Geographical History (Primer). What are Masterpieces, written around the same time as The Geographical History,
takes up the History’s ideas and themes and presents them in a shorter, more concise and clear manner. Or as
Lénárt-Cheng argues, Stein herself saw the autobiographical writing as the “moneymaking style” as opposed to her
other more “creative” work. Dydo argues, however, that there was no real separation between audience and real
writing over the course of the work: “Her texts do not progress linearly from one concern, say, with grammar, or
with the novel, to another, nor do they go as I had earlier thought, from “real writing” to public or audience writing.
They never move away from real writing, and Stein’s real voice was never lost” (5).
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which she wrote to give in cities all over the United States, as well as another series on
“Narration” which she gave specifically, over a series of meetings, at the University of Chicago.4
It seems appropriate that Stein’s success came with the Autobiography, even though the
romantic/domestic relationship between Stein and Toklas was never openly discussed. Toklas
was, according to scholars, instrumental to Stein’s work on all levels, and their shared domestic
life infused Stein’s work. The domestic and the aesthetic were intimately connected for Stein;
her and Alice’s life together was a fusion of personal and aesthetic relations. As Shari Benstock
points out, “Stein’s relationship with Toklas was the occasion for linguistic experimentation,
exploration, and the expression of childlike joy. For Stein and Toklas, the assumption of an
artistic priority is particularly important in understanding the personal dimensions of their Paris
life” (176). Also key to Stein’s work was her love for, and collection of, modern art and her
conversations with her contemporary artists and writers. Her fascination with American English
also become even more prominent for her while living in France. English, for Stein, was a means
to deconstruct language, and to write “American-ness.” For Stein, Benstock explains,
“everything in her adult life became a subject for and was subjected to her art. So when she
speaks of her own experience living in Europe, or the need to distance herself from America in
order to write about it, she is also suggesting the need to distance the facts of her personal life in
such a way that she can reapproach them through her writing” (14). This negotiation of attention
to the materiality of language and the infusion of personal experience are central to her body of
work, and its reception over her lifetime.
Stein’s The Geographical History of America is an exploration of the relationships
between consciousness, writing, identity, geography, language, and social norms. Through these,
Stein interrogates the relation, or difference, between human nature (what might be some kind of
4

See Mellow for more on the American Tour.
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“essential” identity) and human mind (which is responsible for thinking and writing) in order to
theorize and enact a deconstruction of readers’ understanding of what any of these terms “mean.”
The process of linguistic interrogation serves to distance the reader from any assumed
understanding of identity, and instead to think more critically about what it means to identify.
The Geographical History is a kind of biographical and cultural commentary focused on writing,
thinking, and dismantling social organizations of language and sexuality. The formal practices of
the text become strategies for enacting cultural critique and offering alternatives (languages,
narratives, and content) to dominant modes of discourse and socialization.
Stein, as in much of her work, is concerned in The Geographical History with
simultaneity, or enacting a continuous present on the page, and doing away with writing that has,
as she repeats throughout, a beginning, middle, and end. 5 It is written using mainly present tense
verbs and gerunds, and only occasionally, and therefore noticeably, is the writing in the past
tense. At times phrases or fragmented ideas are used in place of sentences with subjects and
predicates, and sometimes longer sentences get caught up in the sound of their words, repeat and
circle around as if stalling their movement forward. Stein seems to be showing us that if a
complete sentence has a beginning, middle, and end, then sentences that do not have subjects and
predicates, or which end up in a circle of repeated words, keep from moving forward. Each word
represents each new present moment; there is no past and no future but only “presence.”
According to its title, The Geographical History of America is analogous to “the relation
of human nature to the human mind.” The relation between these however, is that they are not
related, or their relation cannot be coherently articulated. Human nature, she writes throughout

5

Although this may not be exactly the same kind of continuous present as in work like Tender Buttons and Making
of Americans, it is I would argue yet another example of continuous present, grounded a kind of present tense in the
grammar of the language throughout, as well as on the level of the text as a whole having, as Stein writes, no
beginning, middle, or end.
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the text, “is not interesting.” The human mind, on the other hand, corresponds to, has to do with,
or may actually be, writing. We might interpret that the human mind is represented by writing, or
that writing is proof of the human mind that thinks, writes, constructs. Writing and identity, read
through Stein, are similar in that each is constructed, and discontinuous. Writing that has no
beginning, middle, and end and subverts cohesive narrative structure serves as an analogy for
alternative practices or identities that disrupt and call attention to social/structural norms as
constructed, and constricting. The Geographical History is uneven, disparate, and non/narrative,
as is the relationship between human nature and human mind; it may not be articulated
coherently, though it nonetheless, according to Stein, deserves thinking, writing, and reflection
as a process of discovery and learning.
The line famously repeated (in various ways) throughout the text, “I am I because my
little dog knows me,” points to the simultaneity of formal textual strategies used by Stein such as
repetition, word play, and challenging the limits of the signifier and signified relationship, as
well as the content of her cultural/philosophical investigation into the nature of identity
formation and negotiation in the world. The Geographical History challenges readers’
expectations by narrating from a first-person point of view while subverting how we are to read
the voice of the “I” of the text. The words “identity” “masterpiece” and “autobiography,” as well
as other terms having to do with writing and language, nature, and romance, are repeated
throughout the text; the repetition, with slight changes in usage, disorients the reader, making her
reconsider how these terms “mean” and how we are to understand their use for Stein.
Additionally, the text critiques the structural and the linear progression of narrative by using
chapter titles that do not progress “forward.” For example, chapter and section titles often seem
random: “Chapter II” is followed by “Chapter III” which is followed by “Chapter II,” and these
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are repeated as titles throughout along with variously numbered “Acts” and “Parts.” Recognizing
that language creates meaning, Stein reclaims ordinary terms that we otherwise take for granted,
and pushes them so that they become less recognizable, calling attention to the relation between
human nature and the linguistic and social construction of meaning.
As a key influence on contemporary experimental writers, Stein continues to be an
example for combining formal strategy and politics. Deborah Mix explains the importance of
“recognizing Stein’s presence and the vocabularies she offers” and how these contribute to the
“democratizing work of redefining experimentalism and the avant-garde so that we can
recognize their potential to embody a libratory and decentralized politics” (5). Stein’s formal,
textual strategies thus open possibilities for what can be represented, or altered, through
language, and point out how language is a socializing structure that must be challenged and
dismantled. According to Mix, her “texts operate not by avoiding or encoding meaning . . . but
by opening up meaning’s possibilities” (15). Stein’s politics operate simultaneously at the levels
of form and content, in order to model a critique of social structures (linguistic and cultural) that
limit possibilities for identification. Further, political engagement occurs on multiple levels:
between the writer and the language of the text, between the text and the reader, and between the
reader and the world. Mix quotes Patrocinio Schweickart who states, “Literature acts on the
world by acting on its readers” (21). And because there is always more work to do in the world,
contemporary writers continue to look to Stein’s example for engaging politics through aesthetic
form. 6

6

For more on Stein’s aesthetic politics and how it differs from other modernists’ insistence on the separation of high
and low culture, see Berry.
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In Stein’s Geographical History the relationships between identity and human mind and
human nature are decisively unclear; Stein keeps these concepts in flux, avoiding definition. Like
human nature, identity as a term is always in danger of being understood as essential, natural,
intrinsic to human existence. If human nature “just is” then identity also is something that is
assumed as naturally occurring; we believe that we are born with our identities. The human mind
is about writing and thinking, and the use of mind and nature together in often incoherent ways
seems to be part of Stein’s purpose. The line between nature and construction, for example, is a
constantly shifting one, or at best blurry, so that we can never be sure what we are born with, and
how we are made by the world into which we are born. It is this tension, and lack of clarity, that
plays out in The Geographical History through the circular “arguments,” repetition, rhetorical
play, and logical fallacies she uses to draw readers into the conversation, while refusing to draw
conclusions or spell out definitive explanations. Stein’s refusal to define or explain identity calls
attention to the fact that even though we use the term as if we know what it means, we really
have no idea; and the (slightly varied) repetition of the statement “I am I because my little dog
knows me” throughout The Geographical History breaks the notion of identity out of the abstract
box of assumed understanding. Putting identity in fluctuating relation to both human nature and
human mind throughout the text puts pressure on any simple definitions; concepts become
simultaneous, instead of one causing another in a hierarchy; and we, as readers, find ourselves
reading them on multiple levels and in multiple directions all at once. And each turn of each term
shifts the process just enough to continue to destabilize meaning, so that the writing is the
thinking, which is also the reading, continuously in process of interrogation.
Bringing the conversation back to the notion of queer practice, it is useful to consider that
as Stein destabilizes the meaning of the terms above, Butler’s explanation of repetition and the
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destabilization of gendered identity and the lesbian subject seems especially relevant to Stein’s
project:
Through the repeated play of this sexuality that the ‘I’ is . . . it is precisely the repetition
of that play that establishes . . . the instability of the very category that it constitutes. For
if the ‘I’ is a site of repetition, that is, if the ‘I’ only achieves the semblance of identity
through a certain repetition of itself, then the ‘I’ is always displaced by the very repetition
that sustains it. In other words, does or can the ‘I’ ever repeat itself, cite itself, faithfully,
or is there always a displacement from its former moment that established the
permanently non-self-identical status of that ‘I’ or its ‘being lesbian’? (“Imitation” 311)
If gender, like identity, is a performance, according to Butler, then we perform our identities
through repetition of our “selves”; the “I” has to repeat itself in order to achieve the “semblance
of identity.” The potential for “trouble” here comes by way of the impossibility of exact
repetition. The “I” can’t repeat or “cite itself” in the same way all the time so that there is a “nonself-identical status” more accurately representative of an “I” than a singular or stable
performance (or definition) of identity. Identity is not seamless, in Butler’s terms, but always
shifting; recognizing this processual movement of identity (in terms of gender, lesbianism, or
heterosexuality) calls attention to the fictional nature of sexual and other identity markers as
given and stable. Butler continues:
If repetition is the way in which power works to construct the illusion of a seamless
heterosexual identity, if heterosexuality is compelled to repeat itself in order to establish
the illusion of its own uniformity and identity, then this is an identity permanently at risk,
for what if it fails to repeat, or if the very exercise of repetition is redeployed for a very
different performative purpose? . . . . That there is a need for a repetition at all is a sign
that identity is not self-identical. It requires to be instituted again and again, which is to
say that it runs the risk of becoming de-instituted at every interval. (“Imitation” 315)
Sexuality, or identity, is not seamless, Butler argues here, even though the normative
“heterosexual” is constructed as such, believed to be coherently uniform and unproblematic both
in form and in content. Heterosexuality is the accepted norm, and it is so because it is seen as
seamless and stable, without disruption. However, heterosexuality, as identity, is precisely not
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stable, nor is any singularly defined identity marker, or even identity itself. The emphasis on
repetition is its own undoing; where repetition fails to repeat, gaps are found in the logic of
repetition as social interpellation. 7 Stein’s repetition calls attention to itself as an exaggeration of
its own power to influence. However, the repetition in excess destabilizes the idea and practice
of repetition as a tool of power and social construction. When repetition of sexual and gender
performance fails, or repeats inexactly, or for a different purpose than ideological inscription,
lends toward the undoing, or deinstitutionalization of language, and identity.
Performing or enacting queerness entails interrogating and going beyond normalized
boundaries; Stein insists on constantly pushing, even redefining the idea of the boundary itself.
Earlier readings of Stein’s discussions of the relation between human nature and human mind
often simplify a dualistic separation between the two.8 The distinction, for Stein, however, is
unclearly delineated. Throughout The Geographical History the two concepts influence and play
off of each other in complicated ways, and the play with language, and misuse of logical
argumentation, further draw attention to the fact that the two (nature and mind) are not the same,
but they are not in binary opposition either. The relation between the two is a continual process
that is dynamic and in flux. Although Stein deals with this relationship in a slightly more
accessible way in What Are Masterpieces, in The Geographical History the two purposefully
evade clear explanation or definition, while Stein simultaneously brings readers along through
the process of theorizing these, even if there are no absolute conclusions drawn. As a strategy,
this works against the boundaries and norms that rely on simple definitions and binary
constructions; for if we cannot clearly articulate the relation between human nature and human
7

I’m using Althusser’s theory of interpellation in which subjects are ideologically produced as social beings.
Curnutt points to the “distinction between the inner and outer self”; identity is that outer self that is tolerated and
not related to the inner self that “exists independent of observation.” Ashton uses the more clearly and simply
delineated concepts of identity and entity from What are Masterpieces to put human nature and human mind on
separate “sides” though in the Geographical History the two are in more complicated relation.
8
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mind, then we cannot define and categorize subjects based on who or what we think they are,
and our processes of knowing ourselves and others become “queered,” opening alternative
spaces for interrogative learning and understanding.
A close reading of The Geographical History will show further connections between
Butler’s theories of narrative and identity, and Stein’s representation of these—thus enacting in
her creative-philosophical text many of Butler’s philosophically, theoretical ideas. Early in The
Geographical History, Stein’s discussion of human nature and human mind, in relation to the
question of identity, is presented as complicated subject matter, and thus the process of
interrogation and discovery and begins:
Chapter III
The question of identity has nothing to do with the human mind it has something
although really nothing altogether to do with human nature. Any dog has identity.
The old woman said I am I because my little dog knows me, but the dog knew that he
was he because he knew that he was he as well as knowing that he knew she. (423)
Immediately, “identity” is disconnected from anything we think we might know about it. Stein
puts identity in uneasy relation to mind and nature. If any dog can have identity, then identity
cannot be an essential aspect of human nature, but points to our having identities as social
beings. The question of identity is one of relation, of one to another, yet Stein complicates this,
putting the old woman in relation to her dog who “knows” her, thereby setting up an
interrogation of the terminology itself that will always fall short of definition. Stein creates an
“unsatisfying” excess of language that will continually fail to account for itself, while we as
readers will only fall short in understanding whether or not there is even any such thing as
identity, let alone how we might define it. As Butler explains, making sense of identity in terms
of self-understanding will generally fail; the gap between naming and identity, and being “an
identity” limits one’s ability to narratively account for oneself.
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If the identity we say we are cannot possibly capture us and marks immediately an excess
and opacity that falls outside the categories of identity, then any effort “to give an
account of oneself” will have to fail in order to approach being true. As we ask to know
the other, or ask that the other say, finally or definitively, who he or she is, it will be
important not to expect an answer that will ever satisfy. By not pursuing satisfaction and
by letting the question remain open, even enduring, we let the other live, since life might
be understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we may try to give of it.
(Butler, Giving 42-43)
The Geographical History is excessive in its refusal to identify. The text highlights its own
inability or failure to account for the relation between nature, mind, and identity. There is no
answer that satisfies the questions presented, but instead the process of exploration, over the
course of the text, allows the questions to linger, to remain open as the meaning/content that
offers insight into the nature of identity formation in the world. Writing that calls attention to
itself in its failure to cohere according to social norms of language, sexuality, and representation,
pushes the limits of what is acceptable and “troubles” the system. This opens new spaces of
possibility; as Butler says, “by letting the question remain open, even enduring, we let the other
live” or we let identity remain open and in process, exceeding definition and containment.
In an early section, titled “The question of identity” (401), Stein begins to play with “I”
as the first-person pronoun that represents identity, and the number one (written variously as one,
I, 1); and uses repetition of the “I” as a defamiliarizing strategy in order to detach herself and her
reader from really knowing what the pronoun represents. Notice the repetition of the signs “I” (as
both pronoun and roman numeral) and “one” in the following passages:
Part IV
The question of identity
A Play
I am I because my little dog knows me.
Which is he.
No which is he.
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Say it with tears, no which is he.
I am I why.
So there.
I am I where.
Act I Scene III
I am I because my little dog knows me.
Act I Scene I
Now that is the way I had played that play.
But not at all not as one is one.
Act I Scene I
I am I because my little dog knows me. (401)
Act I Scene I
Which one is there I am I or another one.
Who is one and one or one is one.
I like a play of acting so and so.
Leho Leho.
Leho is a name of a Breton.
But we in America are not displaced by a dog oh no no not at all not at all
at all displaced by a dog. (401)
Scene I
I am I yes sir I am I.
I am I yes Madame am I I.
When I am I am I I.
And any little dog is not the same thing as I am I.
Chorus. Or is it.
With tears in my eyes oh is it.
And there we have the whole thing.
Am I I.
And if I am I because my little dog knows me am I I.
Yes sir am I I.
Yes madame or am I I.
The dog answers without asking because the dog is the answer to
anything that is that dog. But not I. Without tears not I. (405)
The constant repetition of “I” and its interchangeability with the number one, makes the reader
question the viability of an “I” that knows itself, or that understands the relation between the first
person pronoun, and third person pronouns. In order to be an “I” and give an account of oneself,
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according to Butler, one has to be in relation to another; there is no “I” without an other, or a
“you.” The repetition of “I am I because my little dog knows me” seems to be a strategy of
convincing, as if Stein (or her narrator) is trying to convince herself that she has identity because
she is recognized (by her dog, by others), but that the need for convincing is always a need and
never a fulfillment while questions still linger (“I am I why. I am I where”). There are also the
questions of interchangeability: “Which one is there I am I or another one” and so if one has
identity (“I”) how or why is that different from another’s “I”/identity and displacement: “But we
in America are not displaced by a dog oh no no not at all not at all at all displaced by a dog.” If
identity is interchangeable, and dogs and people all can have identity, then this also reduces the
importance of the concept altogether, creating, for Stein, a kind of nonidentity. If every “one”
has “identity,” and these are potentially interchangeable, and individual identities can be
displaced, then what is the point of identity at all as a concept? It is this which Stein continues to
explore (the relation between identity and nonidentity) throughout the text.
Linguist Emile Benveniste, according to Kaja Silverman, explains that “language,
discourse, subjectivity” are “shown to be theoretically inseparable” (43). Further:
There is no concept ‘I’ that incorporates all the I’s that are uttered at every moment in the
mouths of all speakers, in the sense that there is a concept ‘tree’ to which all the
individual uses of tree refer . . . . Then, what does I refer to? To something very peculiar
which is exclusively linguistic: I refers to the act of individual discourse in which it is
pronounced, and by this it designates the speaker . . . . The reality to which it refers is the
reality of the discourse . . . . And so it is literally true that the basis of subjectivity is in
the exercise of language. (Benveniste qtd. in Silverman 44)
Silverman explains: “Benveniste insists that the individual finds his or her cultural identity only
within discourse, by means of the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’” (45). It is through language, by way of
our pronominal relations to each other, that we are able to “find” our personal/cultural identities.
According to Benveniste, and Silverman, subjectivity is always already conditioned by the
available discourses and understanding of one’s place in the (linguistically constructed) world. If
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the “basis of subjectivity is in the exercise of language,” then subjects’ abilities to form ideas,
and negotiate their own processes of identity, necessarily work through language and discourse.
Or as Silverman further explains:
The subject’s discourse is constrained by the rules of language; it can only speak by
means of a pre-existing linguistic system. Moreover, ‘language’ must here be understood
in the broadest possible sense . . . every utterance must be conceived as having various
levels of signification, and issuing from multiple voices. It is spoken not only by the
palpable voice of a concrete speaker, writer, or cluster of mechanical apparatuses, but the
anonymous voices of cultural codes which invade it in the form of connotation. (50)
These anonymous voices are from previous (and continuing) “codes” and discourses, into which
we are born, and which determine speaking and writing in one’s contemporary moment
(Silverman 50). Subjectivity then is formed through discourses, and relations between language
and culture. Speaking (and writing) subjects are contextualized within a cultural and linguistic
system that “pre-exists the individual, and which determines his or her cultural identity”
(Silverman 52). If subjectivity is formed through language, then understanding and performing
our identities can be seen as both constructed, and potentially even more open to manipulation.
Through language we may be subject to ideological expectations and normalizing narratives, but
using language we might also subvert, and “re-write” those.
Stein takes on the cultural and linguistic systems in which she is contextualized, and tries
to write through them in ways that call attention to the fabricated nature of “human nature,” and
the false idea that “identity” is a natural part of that. In The Geographical History Stein takes the
material language of particular concepts (identity, autobiography, romance, etc.) and tries to
divorce them from their cultural significance created through discursive repetition and
acceptance. Her other-oriented use of repetition, and her refusal to define or explain, calls
attention to the process of signification and brings this back into the realm of the arbitrary. If
Saussure claimed that the relationship between signifier and signified is an arbitrary one, use and
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repetition have changed the status of this relationship to one that is more determinative. Stein
challenges the signifier-signified relationship in order to show that identity and subjectivity are
not essential and given, but these are as constructed as anything else that is not part of the literal,
natural landscape. In order to understand “identity” one has to understand the nature of the
cultural and linguistic systems that have constructed the concept itself. And if “identity” is a
construction that has no essential core, then the idea of “autobiography,” as an account of an
identity, is doubly fictional. The Geographical History is a material example of an attempt to
dismantle and call attention to the linguistic and narrative systems that claim to offer us the tools
for self-understanding; Stein uses the materials of language to show the impossibility of
complete subjective awareness. In addition to repetition and dissociation, Stein uses particular
tropes or examples to draw connections and open new spaces for re-thinking the concepts under
scrutiny.
Early in the text, Stein draws on the idea of the detective story in order to investigate the
mystery (and documentation) of identity:
The whole book now is going to be a detective story of how to write.
A play of the relation of human nature to the human mind.
And a poem of how to begin again
And a description of how the earth look as as you look at it which is perhaps a play if it
can be done in a day and is perhaps a detective story if it can be found out. (409)
And:
How I do like numbers this Detective story number one.
Detective story number I. About how there is a human mind.
And how to detect it.
Detective story number I.
The great thing to detect in a detective story is whether you have written as you have
heard it said. If you do write as you have heard it said then you have to change it. (411)
“Detective story number I” might be the first in a series of stories, or a story about “how to
detect” identity. An autobiography might be a detective story in the ways in which it compiles
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the details of a life and then tries to make sense of them in some kind of narrative form. Stein’s
project does something different in the ways it explores concepts we think we understand, and
puts them under the pressure of language, calling attention to just how little we do know. How
can writing an alternatively narrated text aid in understanding? Writing and human mind are
intimately related; writing and thinking are inseparable. This work is an autobiographical
detective story about self and writing, or the writing self, and this writing is always in process
negotiating between what is heard and said and written, and is always subject to change.
Customarily focusing on the present tense of writing, Stein claims to disavow history,
possibly because history is not of the present and can only be written in retrospect. She writes,
“Now history has really no relation to the human mind at all, because history is the state of
confusion between anybody doing anything and anything happening” (422). And it’s not about
remembering and forgetting:
The land has something to do with the human mind but nothing to do with human
nature.
Human nature is animal nature but the human mind the human mind is not.
If it were then the writing that has been written would not be writing that any human
mind can read, it has really no memory nor any forgetting.
Think of the Bible and Homer think of Shakespeare and think of me.
There is no remembering and there is no forgetting because memory has to do with
human nature and not with the human mind. (408)
Autobiography, for Stein, is a space for exploration. Remembering is about the past, while
writing, or the human mind, has to do with the present constantly turning into a new present. In
the middle of The Geographical History a section on autobiography relates language and writing
in a continuous beginning again, in which, Stein writes, “human nature is not only uninteresting
it is painful but I it is not I who doubt what it is all about but naturally what it is is what it is not”
(458). An “I” (person) is a “one” (individual) who is not an “I” until known by another, Further,
two later consecutive sections: “Autobiography number one is almost done. Autobiography
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number one” and “Autobiography number one now almost completely begun” show the constant
starting again, this text representing a life that is continually in process. Time, like narrative
progression, tries to contain that which doesn’t abide by such constraints.
Autobiography I
When I was one that is no longer one of one but just one that is to say when I was a little
one, but not so little that I meant myself when I said not one. (448)
Story, like identity, cannot be contained to linear, progressive narrative. She writes:
The story of my life.
Chapter one.
At that time I had no dogs
Chapter II
So I was not I because my little dog did not love me. But I had a family. They can be a
nuisance in identity but there is no doubt no shadow of doubt that that identity the family
identity we can do without. (458)
The “family identity” is yet another way of identifying through a social institution. Like
language and other social structures, the family reinforces certain norms of identification and
behavior. Social, cultural, and familial recognition may become difficult if a subject seeks
alternative possibilities of identification outside of social norms for particular identificatory
categories. The significance of being recognized by one’s dog, for Stein, is an example that both
points to the complexity of identity and recognition, and may expand the sense of the possible: if
identity, which begins within the family structure, is impossible, being recognized in alternative
ways becomes necessary. Still, the difficulty of socially constructed identity lingers, and Stein’s
repetition of the phrase “I am I because my little dog knows me” calls attention to the importance
of continuously negotiating an unanswerable question. While this repeated phrase may be read as
displacing human identity by putting that in relation to dog identity, it can also be read as calling
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attention to alternative means of recognition. In her personal life, Stein’s dogs were important to
her as companions, and using the example of the relationship between dog and owner further
sheds light on that between self and other (one identity in relation to another); “I am I because
my little dog knows me” disorients the reader and calls attention to “identity” from yet another
perspective, even while the reader recognizes the relationship between one and one’s dog as
familiar and ordinary. If identity cannot be thought without a consideration of an “I” in relation
to a “you,” Stein makes readers think about just how complicated this relationship actually is.
Moving out of the autobiography section, Stein, seemingly more concretely, brings
money, romance, landscape, and scenery into the mix. If the abstract becomes tangible through
the use of concrete examples, then Stein’s examples prove to be of little use, except to continue
an interrogation of abstract concepts such as identity and human nature through some brainteasing play between language and logic.
Volume I
Money is what words are.
Words are what money is.
Is money what words are
Are words what money is.
There can be no romance without nature, there can be no money without words.
There can be nature without words.
Nature is here used in the sense of natural scenery and what land is.
And so nature is not what money is. (461)
We can read various interpretations into the text above, though it seems clear that Stein is
thinking of examples that are related to nature, mind, and identity in the ways they are created as
social constructs. Words, like money, like language, can be exchanged with arbitrary value.
Words can be put together in non-narrative and seemingly nonsensical ways, and still have
meaning,9 or they can be used in narratives that appear natural even while they are the material

9

Stein writes, “I took individual words and thought about them until I got their weight and volume complete and put
them next to another word, and at this same time I found out very soon that there is no such thing as putting them
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element in the construction of the text. Romance is related to nature, but this is different from
human nature which becomes “naturalized” through socially constructed narratives. Romance is
also akin to natural scenery and land, which Stein will later explain is continuous and has no
beginning, middle, or end. We might also interpret that (queer) romance is natural in this sense,
outside of time and money and words, though, she also writes, “money and words and
romanticism have no time or identity in them” (462) and “it carefully comes about that there is
no identity and no time and therefore no human nature when words are apart. Or rather when
words are together” (463). Stein constantly reminds us not to follow the impulse to define, or
consider one element more “natural” than another. We can follow the logic of argument, but we
inevitably have to participate in that logic and make our own sense of it. Stein is creating a logic
that does little to form arguments or come to conclusions. Separate from argument and
conclusion, the process of logic is simply one of interrogation. Separated from their cultural
meanings, money and words and romanticism might also stand on their own terms, so that we
can begin to see them as separate from our preconceived notions.
Further in the text, and more specifically in terms of geography, Stein writes, “In a small
country where the land is not flat and where as you look you see what it is if it is as it is a great
deal of poetry can and will and shall and must and may be written” (467). As writing comes out
of, or is in relation to, the cultural realm, location plays a key role; the text and its context are in
critical relation. As an American living in France, Stein used the negotiation between these
geographical and emotional spaces in much of her work. For example, she writes: “But in a flat
country it must have content but not form and that may make a master-piece but is it poetry”
(467). Poetry, as writing that interrogates language, emotion, and culture, can be read as
together without sense. I made innumerable efforts to make words write without sense and found it impossible. Any
human being putting down words had to make sense out of them” (“A Transatlantic Interview”).
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analogous to geographical texture. Poetry, like language, like identity, is not flat. And the
relation between form and content is like that between a subject and her geographical and
cultural context, geography being used here both figuratively and literally. Stein wrote “about”
America, using everyday American English, from her physical context of France. Of her time in
America, during the tour of 1934, Stein wrote “the being here it is so natural that it is not real”
(qtd. in Retallack 15), a statement that points to the distance, both geographic and linguistic, that
seems necessary for trying to make sense of this relationship between the “natural” landscape
and constructions of identity (or how it is defined) in the world.
Stein’s continuous present tense functions, in part, as anti-narrative, or against narratives
that “naturalize” who and what we are. Human nature is socially constructed because we can’t
talk about it without language; we construct language to create understanding of human nature,
and so the deconstruction of these narratives, for Stein, has to be approached through linguistic
practice. Returning to Butler and Benveniste, it can be said that since subjectivity is possible
because of discourse, writing the “I” places the subject in relation, and constructs identity, in
writing. The subject of the text (the “I” of experience + the narrative “I”) is contextualized, for
Stein, through language and geography. Landscape and scenery are continuous, and similar to
the continuous present:
Ordinarily anybody finishes anything.
But not in writing. In writing not any one finishes anything. That is what makes a
master-piece what it is that there is no finishing.
Please act as if there were the finishing of anything but any one any one writing knows
that there is no finishing finishing in writing. (480)
In writing, Stein enacts the continuous “not-finishing” in which there is no fabricated narrative
with a beginning, middle, and end with closure, but is instead a continuous process. She uses the
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example of a play, and compares this to the example of natural landscape, or scenery, both of
which seem continuous, without beginning, middle, or end:
A little play.
War and storms.
Romanticism and money and space.
Human nature and identity and time and place.
Human mind.
Master-pieces.
There need be no personages in a play because if there are then you do not forget their
names and if you do not forget their names you put their names down each time that they
are to say something.
The result of which is a play that finishes. (482)
A play, or to play, is active. Identity, like narrative, is expected to be cohesive, a finished
product, named and determined, the product at the end of the process (which then is forgotten),
and naming leads to recognizability (in terms of given cultural codes and discourses). Stein,
however, seems more interested in writing (identity) as play, which is not determined or narrated
in a closed structure, but open, dynamic, in flux, continuous. As Jennifer Ashton points out,
“naming” for Stein “has been understood as the sign whose structure of meaning is the very
paradigm of determinacy” (582) and so, not naming keeps the play open, not determined, not
finishing. Or:
What is a play.
A play is scenery. (485)
A play, like natural scenery is continuous and has no beginning, middle, end; it is instead
continuous action in the present tense. A play enacts the story, while a novel tells a story of
something that already happened. Without naming, and without linear progression, a play might
continue, like scenery, indefinitely.
Coming to the end of The Geographical History, Stein writes, “I am I because my little
dog knows me. The figure wanders on alone” (487). But one can only be a one, an “I” in
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relation, and as differentiated from an other (my little dog). The figure is alone, but the “I” is
relative (the sign in the sentence, the speaker in discourse). “I so easily see that identity has
nothing to do with masterpieces although occasionally and very inevitably it does always more
or less come in” (487). And so identity, like geography and culture, enter into the text whether
intentionally or not. Stein constructs The Geographical History to explore these questions of
identity, and in the process ruptures our understanding of what it means to identify, creating the
concept of nonidentity, and thereby opening space for other means of identification. As subjects,
we are always in flux and changing, not always (if ever) coherent and unified, while the limits of
language contribute to limited possibilities for identification in the world. Understanding this,
and working to dismantle the limitations of language, might make us more tolerant and open to
continuing to push against, and revise, the boundaries, the borders: of language, of texts, and of
other social and cultural structures.

Hejinian: Intertextual (Self) as Text
A core member of the group of Language poets known for considering language and
textuality in political terms, Hejinian takes her politics beyond the textual realm to interrogate
narrative, and representations of identity, especially as these manifest in autobiographical
writing. Hejinian is most well known for her experimental prose work My Life, published in two
versions (1980, 1987), and another, later version, My Life in the Nineties. In 1980 the book was
composed of 37 sections of 37 sentences each, written when she was 37. The later version,
written when she was 45, is composed of 45 sections of 45 sentences each. Written as a type of
non/narrative, non/autobiography, My Life builds on the poetic theories of her earlier Writing Is
an Aid to Memory, enacting in the text insights and reflections on how one remembers,
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represents, and documents memory. Hejinian’s essay, “What’s Missing from My Life,” and the
long hybrid poetic work, A Border Comedy, continue to explore the documentation of memory
and writing a text of a “life,” and move further to interrogate the idea of representation itself. In
A Border Comedy, Hejinian incorporates a theory of intertextuality as an alternative way of
writing (a non/narrative, non/representational text) which pushes against borders that otherwise
limit self-identification in writing. Throughout her work, Hejinian assumes, after Stein and
among others, that identity is not stable but dynamic and in flux. And following Butler above,
Hejinian seems to agree with the notion that narrative accounting necessarily falls short, and that
this failing works against the demand for coherent self-identity, often resulting for Hejinian, in
work that employs constructive processes of non/narrative and non/autobiographical writing.
In a work of involuntary memory like Proust’s, Walter Benjamin explains, “the materials
of memory no longer appear singly, as images, but tell us about a whole, amorphously and
formlessly, indefinitely and weightily, in the same way as the weight of his net tells a fisherman
about his catch . . . . And his sentences are the entire muscular activity of the intelligible body;
they contain the whole enormous effort to raise this catch” (Benjamin 216). In a similar way, the
paratactic New Sentences of Lyn Hejinian’s My Life are the muscle and the movement of the
whole of the work.10 Each individual sentence tells the reader something about the whole; the
consecutive nature of the parataxis, the fact of one sentence following another, builds (and unbuilds) toward a totality of sorts, that moves through space and a vertical documentation of
memory. In light of the Benjamin quote above, it is not simply that the parts add up to the whole,
but that the sentences are the effort to raise the catch, and the effort is in the “fishing” or the
process, the labor, itself. My Life enacts the difficulty (or impossibility) of moving beyond the
10

See Silliman; “the new sentence” refers to the paratactic, anti-narrative strategy of democratically placing
sentences in physical relation, one after another, without linguistic or grammatical transitions or relations between
them.
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effort; the documentation of a life is a process, not a product to be neatly packaged in narrative
form; and over the body of her work we see an ongoing interrogation of the possibility of
representing identity in textual form.
Benjamin’s “The Image of Proust” offers an example of both a quest for, and theorizing a
method of, documenting the past in its inclusion of both remembering and forgetting. The
following is the key passage in the essay:
We know that in his work, Proust did not describe a life as it actually was, but a life as it
was remembered by the one who had lived it. And yet even this statement is imprecise
and far too crude. For the important thing for the remembering author is not what he
experienced, but the weaving of his memory, the Penelope work of recollection. Or
should one call it, rather a Penelope work of forgetting? Is not the involuntary
recollection, Proust’s mémoire involuntaire, much closer to forgetting than what is
usually called memory? And is not this work of spontaneous recollection, in which
remembrance is the woof and forgetting the warf, a counterpart to Penelope’s work rather
than its likeness? For here the day unravels what the night was woven. When we awake
each morning, we hold in our hands, usually weakly and loosely, but a few fringes of the
tapestry of lived life, as loomed for us by forgetting. However, with our purposeful
activity and, even more, our purposive remembering each day unravels the web and the
ornaments of forgetting. (204)
The text is the document of the life as it is remembered, in relation to what simultaneously has
been forgotten. As Penelope weaves and unweaves her shroud so is experience remembered and
forgotten; the woof and the warf of weaving, the threads crossing over and under each other,
form the web of the text of memory, including what is not remembered at all. Specifically,
Benjamin says, “the important thing for the remembering author is not what he experienced, but
the weaving of his memory.” It is significant that he specifies the remembering author, the
person documenting his memories. Benjamin’s Proust is concerned with the weaving of his
memories more than with the present or with real experience. “For,” as Benjamin writes, “an
experienced event is finite—at any rate, confined to one sphere of experience; a remembered
event is infinite, because it is only a key to everything that happened before it and after it”
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(“Image” 204). Like a web, the text of memory is tightly woven, yet open to the potential infinity
of remembrances. Hejinian’s My Life might be read as imitating Proust’s continuous, open
project in a contemporary, experimental, non/narrative form. The images in her paratactic
sentences can be seen as involuntary memories that appear sometimes without provocation or
conscious effort. Further, My Life as a continuous work seems to be an ongoing project,
especially with the recent publication of My life in the Nineties.
Craig Dworkin compares My Life to quilts of the nineteenth century, pieced by hand from
scraps of cloth, artifacts of lives lived by the quilt makers. He writes: “The surface of a quilt
constantly negotiates between the individual strips and blocks of fabric on the one hand (varied
and small patterns), and the entire composition on the other (an overall pattern composed of
varied small patterns)” (69). The quilt/text is also a “union of public and private” (60) as work
arising out of both personal and social/historical contexts. The quilt analogy emphasizes the
constructed nature of a work like My Life. The quilter might pick and choose pieces and put them
together in any number of possible ways, and “meaning” might then be determined through the
squares (language) in its structure and placement; the final quilt/text is only one particular
construction among infinite possibilities. The quilt-like formation of My Life incorporates this
multiplicity of possibilities, and responds to that. There is no single life story, but always a
number of possible ways of constructing stories about a life.
Dworkin takes the first part of his essay’s title, “Penelope Reworking the Twill,” from
My Life to suggest Hejinian’s notion of meta-construction at work in the writing. He italicizes
and embeds her lines within his own to highlight her commentary on the “autobiographical” text.
“Like Penelope reworking the twill, Hejinian is rewriting in an unstable text, and the meanings
of that text are constantly in flux; this continual re-creation of meaning works to indefinitely
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postpone completion and closure in the book and to sustain Hejinian’s Life (eternal time—
reversal) in a textual evasion of the mortality of her ‘life’” (71). Further, he explains, “Hejinian
has constructed a form of biography which plays a life that is always past and fixed against a
perpetual activity of reading that is always present and open, repetitious, moment by moment
beginnings in the middle” (71). Like Penelope’s reworking, the text recedes and moves forward,
or like Stein’s Geography, it exists in a state of continuous present, or simultaneity of
(remembered) events. The text is constantly done and undone, created and destroyed. It works
more reliantly on spatial logics than temporal (chronological, linear) progress; as Penelope
postpones completion, so My Life moves sideways or vertically. The text is one of both
recollection and forgetting, woven tightly together and simultaneously pulled apart with every
turn of the word and placement of the sentence. Memories documented are both recovered and
re-covered, presented and manipulated in the construction process, the undoing of the/a self
constructed in the process of textualizing.
Construction is open and web-like, subject to Penelope’s method of postponement and
advance; the (un)woven shroud is the artifact of a life re-objected/objectified between the covers
of the text. As Hejinian writes, “You cannot determine the nature of progress until you assemble
all of the relatives” (My Life 13). The text thus becomes an assemblage, a material practice of
incorporating the disparate and fragmented pieces of the past. Though it is impossible to collect
all of the relatives, Hejinian points to the assemblage of what is relative as that which is key to
the text, or, “to follow the progress of ideas, or that particular line of reasoning, so full of
surprises and unexpected correlations, was somehow to take a vacation” (12). But a vacation
from what? The linear, narrative, chronological text? She writes: “A pause, a rose, something on
paper, in a nature scrapbook. What follows a strict chronology has no memory. For me, they
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must exist, the contents of that absent reality, the objects and occasions which now I
reconsidered” (16). Although fully admitting, even drawing attention to, the fact of the
autobiographical text as a fabrication, the further oppressive construction of linear chronology
may restrict the materialization of memory, the absent reality. Proust focused on the importance
of mémoire involuntaire, in which a memory would be allowed to (re)surface unexpectedly and
without constraint. Autobiographical writing, Hejinian seems to assert, which constrains memory
to linear narration, may not open space for the absent reality of such memories.
Through lyric repetition and paratactic relation of ideas and events, the construction of a
text like My Life confirms, “It is impossible to return to the state of mind in which these
sentences originated.” She continues, “So I borrowed my father’s typewriter. There was a
garden, a hole in the fence, a grandfather who had no religion—one can run through the holes in
memory, wearing a wet hat, onto the sidewalk covered with puddles, and there are fingers in
them” (40). Always grounding the more abstract in concrete, imagistic details, Hejinian works
throughout the text to let the philosophical resonate. We are reading about a life that is actually a
reflection on writing and reading “through the holes in memory” and outside of the constraints of
linear narration. My Life in fact seems more invested in “dimension, longevity, color, and
pleasure” (35) and how to enact these on the page. “The world seen in a foreign English, as
awkward as surprising, with a vocabulary from the thesaurus instead of from the dictionary” she
writes, for vocabulary is relative, not exact. Pointing back to Stein, she suggests that any words
put together in a space can “mean,” and depending on placement and context, meaning is flexible
and relative, and often in process. “I may have started inexactly,” her narrator explains, “I
thought, nearsighted to a buttercup; I will begin again, and I rolled over into the next
indentation” (53). Ultimately, My Life is a text of active inquiry, never satisfied with transparent
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narratives of the events of a life, constantly beginning again, rolling over into every next
sentence, every next indentation. The text reaches after “the pith, restlessness, and the severe
sanity of inquiry” which is enacted through the layering and weaving of images and memories
calling attention to themselves as fragments woven together. “My Life is as permeable
constructedness” (133) Hejinian writes, as a confirmation of sorts, that both the author’s life, and
My Life are permeable and constructed, relative and in flux.
Hejinian’s Writing Is an Aid to Memory reflects on the process of documenting memory,
while it constructs itself through that reflection. As an example of Hejinian’s process for thinking
about the fragmentation of memory, and well as what remains and what is lost in the act of
remembering, this text is useful to read alongside My Life, before moving to Hejinian’s later,
more intertextual, Border Comedy. Writing is more fragmented and less narrative than My Life, it
is sectioned by number instead of by title, and each of the sections is of varying length. Some
sections in Writing contain only parts, and parts of parts, though particular themes arise over the
course of the work, such as fractals, verticality, the cyclical, and the natural. It is also a musical
text, as if memory (and its documentation) is a lyric event. For example, in section 19 she writes:
“do trees in the thickness of thoughts / glides out of the minute / across as through thread / fiddle
by the rough of hidden music”; and a little further down: “fixing do trees glide two rates.”
Through these examples, as in much of the text what becomes apparent is the play between
language and meaning, and the relation between the particular and the whole. The plural “trees”
(instead of a singular forest) draws an analogy between many single trees in the forest and the
thickness of thoughts; memory is like a forest, and its documentation requires weeding through
the forest to focus on the detail of the particular. Yet the forest itself “glides” out of the “minute”
or smallest particular, or out of a minute in time, a reflection on the fractal-like nature of the
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individual mirroring the whole, and the whole found in the miniature, in this text. The weaving
reference, “across as through” such as across space as through time, or across and through the
very material of construction, and the thread of the individual memory, are used with other
memories (scraps) to weave a life, a text, a quilt. Hejinian continues, “fixing of memory of
erasing at any page / so the praise is a limit to any connection” again recalling the Penelope work
of fixing (as in setting in place) and erasing, “at” any page (instead of “on”); this fixing/erasing
might be encountered on any page at which one arrives in the reading (or remembering). This is
not just something found on the page in time (during writing or reading) but a place (space)
arrived at. Praise is also not always truth(ful), and mere praise (content-less, or without truth?)
only limits real connection or communication. Writing instead moves away from limits, and
memory is not limited in its potential for documentation. Texts of memory include what is
forgotten, both praise and criticism, and fragments, which by definition include both positive and
negative; what is included highlights what is lacking.
Hejinian further uses the fragment, in both its positive and negative aspects, in an essay
titled: “What’s Missing from My Life,” the purpose of which is to comment on the social and
historical context of one section (the ninth) of My Life. She does this by first contextualizing the
time of the writing of both the original 37 line, and the later 45 line, versions (1977-78, 198687), and then gives more detail about the years 1949-50, the time period of the “content” of the
piece. Of the Bay Area in 1977-78, and the activities of the Language poets, she writes, “A
process of heterogeneity was unfolding—a collectively instigated production of differences. My
Life is probably a reflection of that, insofar as it is coherently structured but internally disparate”
(1). She writes about the Reagan 80s and the sense of “utopian promise” of the 70s turned to one
of near despair, and the greater urgency for (and difficulty of) the “production of difference” in
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creative work (2). The heart of the matter though is “What’s Missing.” First, she sets out to
discern (social/historical) themes in the text as it exists, and then “defends” the fact that:
What’s missing from My Life are the numerous sentence-memories that might have
named particular public events and/or referred to larger historical conditions and social
forces that no doubt structured and in manifold ways conditioned those memories and
shifted them about. Indeed, the very modes of memorizing are no doubt culturally and
also historically determined. But defense of these at least apparent omissions is that My
Life was intended as a work of memory not of history; it is a work composed of sentences
shaped by memory and the possibilities of English syntax. It was intended as a portrait of
memory’s work at identity-in-the-making . . . since the particular events I want to talk
about in this paper occurred when I was only around 9 years old, I can’t fault myself for
insufficiently remembering them. (2-3)
Feeling the need to “defend” the original text(s) Hejinian seems to draw a line between the
social/historical and the personal. That specific sentences naming public and historic events are
not included seems to inhibit the fact of a work arising from the context of the social and
historical, as well as the personal, whether or not these are addressed directly. Her point is to add
more, “real” historical documentation into the text itself, in addition to the conditioned
memories, shifted (implicitly) by the social/historical. She admits that “memorizing”
(remembering, memorializing, or memorizing images of memory) is culturally and historically
determined. Does she simply mean to reiterate the cultural and historical location of a person
experiencing, and then later remembering those experiences? Or is there no separation between
cultural and personal so that our memories, when documented, will reflect, either implicitly or
explicitly, the cultural and social situation of their origins? Hejinian further asserts that the work
is one of memory and not of history, a possible negation of her previous statements. But if
autobiography and memory can be constructed in alternative ways (in texts like My Life), is not
history also subject to the possibilities of syntax? Additionally, she qualifies the risk of
insufficiently remembering events, in regard to the context of My Life, which is filled with
commentary on the inability to sufficiently remember and document memory. She seems to be
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asking if history maintains its status as more objective because it is “public,” as opposed to
memory, as more personal.
Having given this disclaimer, Hejinian continues with a historical read of the ninth
section of My Life, and adds 18 lines to the original 45-line version, to include some of the
social/historical moments of crisis to which the work is, at least implicitly, responding. The
historical contextualization, specific in its narration of events and the politics of the time, appears
only in subtle ways in the text itself; Hejinian does not overtly include the public events of
reference, though they clearly help to construct the text. Her explication of the 1950 context of
the work highlights the cultural marketing of the U.S. nuclear family, and the example of the
California idyllic nuclear family of Governor Warren. Post-WWII xenophobia, she writes, turned
“into an obfuscating auto-phobia preventing clear understanding at a cultural level of either other
or self” (4). In addition to anti-communist patriotism legislated by government and enforced in
the workplace, the “American nuclear family was invented as a strong site of defense” (11) for
growing large numbers of patriots (encouraged to have more All-American babies). The negative
consequence, Hejinian asserts, is the “self-contained, self-containing potentially explosive
American nuclear family, a thesis of the 1950s which the 1950s tried to withhold from its
antithesis. The result is . . . a muddle which is never superseded—an absolutely undialectical
culture” (14).
Following Fredric Jameson, Hejinian does a reading of her own work. History, for
Jameson, is the absent cause that is present in its effects in the literary text; he asserts that we can
read the literary text in terms of its form, logic, and semantic elements in order to get at the
historical crisis or situation to which the text is responding. Reading a literary text for the absent
cause of history makes that history accessible and subject to its “retextualization,” by bringing
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that history to the surface and figuratively revising (as in re-vision, or seeing again) the text in
consideration of the subtextual historical situation (Political 102). Hejinian reads through the
ninth section of My Life in order to locate the historical situation to which the text is responding;
she then both interprets the historical absent cause of the text, and literally revises it to include a
greater awareness of that subtext. Hejinian seems to be reading and revising her own work
through (and in response to) Jameson. Further, as Jameson writes,
The type of interpretation here proposed is more satisfactorily grasped as the rewriting of
the literary text in such a way that the latter may itself be seen as the rewriting or
restructuration of a prior historical or ideological subtext, it being always understood that
the ‘subtext’ is not immediately present as such, not some common-sense external reality,
nor even the conventional narratives of history manuals, but rather must itself always be
(re)constructed after the fact. (81)
The literary text interprets the structural situation at work, under its own surface, and a reading of
the text in this way (re)creates the situation to which the text responds, “it articulates its own
situation and textualizes it” (Jameson, Political 82). This historical (re)construction of the text
potentially creates multiple readings of the original historical situation, and Hejinian’s revision
plays with that in the ways it uses the surface language to engage subtextual content.
Additionally, My Life, like the disparate “histories” under its surface, can be read as an
accumulation of accounts, purposely not singular, linear, or narratively cohesive.
In the new, expanded version of the ninth section, Hejinian writes:
As for we who ‘love to be astonished,’ I’m not your maid I’m your mother. Little
sailboats were capsizing in the bay. It didn’t seem the least bit amazing that they had
tunneled the highway through the living redwood tree, for in so doing they had changed
the tree into the tunnel, made it something it had not been before, and separated it forever
from any other tree.
And:
He stated that I am not a member of the Communist Party or any other organization
which advocates the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, and, though it
would seem to contradict this he said too that I have no commitments in conflict with my
responsibilities with respect to impartial scholarship and free pursuit of truth.
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And:
To bring us in from the dark on summer nights when we were playing ‘hide and seek,’
she would call ‘olly-oxen-free,’ laughing at the door. So that later, playing alone, I could
imagine myself developing into a tree, and then I yearned to do so with so much desire
that it made me shapeless, restless, sleepless, demanding, disagreeable. (“What’s
Missing”)
Although not constructed specifically as a political narrative, the newly added lines include more
overt political references to the renunciation of Communist affiliation in universities in the 50s,
as well as moments of reflection and documentation of the narrator’s past mental impressions as
she is remembering and recording them. The text itself, this revised piece and the whole of My
Life, is “shapeless, restless, sleepless, demanding, disagreeable” as it works fragments, images,
objects, history, politics, self, and voice into the process of documenting the past. Hejinian
reiterates this at the end of “What’s Missing” when she writes: “it is the role of art to bring
experience to experience—to make us conscious of ourselves and our realities—to infuse life
with its proper liveliness. It is the role, in addition, of avant-garde art in particular to keep
differences active as a perceived fact and active principle—to sustain the ethical charge in
aesthetics and keep intelligence intelligent” (14). The text of “experience” might be one in which
history and experience are more actively interrogated, in order to “make us conscious” and
aware. The formal, textual elements in Hejinian’s work enact the differences and disparate
materials at work in any history or experience, and the challenges posed in recording these, so
that we as readers might become conscious of the constructed nature of the historical or
autobiographical text. Hejinian uses Jameson to work through her own text, retrospectively,
while continuing her project of bringing memory and history together. She is simultaneously
reading and writing the open, non/narrative text as an ethical project of “keeping differences
active” instead of homogenizing the inconsistencies.
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A Border Comedy takes the insights from the texts above and proceeds to move from
memory, history, and personal experience into a consideration of the social and political need to
recognize difference, instead of demanding unified and coherent narratives and subjects. It
examines the relationships between poetry, self, and knowledge; between aesthetics, intellect,
and social responsibility. Its emphasis on the intertextual offers an alternative way of reading that
is indeterminate and resists closure, and creates a text-subject who discovers, negotiates, and
explores the external ideas by way of her own reading and writing practices. The construction of
the text is the process of making connections among disparate ideas, exceeding both the
traditions cited and the individual author explaining those. A Border Comedy constructs, in
Kristeva’s terms, a “new articulation” of signification, yet another alternative to the narrative
account of a life. Hejinian is interested in the play between the narrative “I” and the language of
other writers and thinkers; the narrative “I” is constantly in dialogue, in relation to other texts
and ideas, language and discourse, experience and memory. The poetic text is a combination of
the experiences of the author in her selection of extratextual details, and the narrative that is
constructed to bring the details in to relation to each other on the page. The text, a reflection of a
self and her reading and thinking practices is constructed in a way that makes its own process of
construction readily apparent, and allows for spaces to resonate among ideas, writing, and
potential effects on readers.
Divided into “books” instead of chapters, the first begins with a sense of change and
pushing against borders, of interstitial spaces and reflection on what falls “between,” and on the
relationship between past and present:
All the clouds can feel our bodies change
If we just use some imagination
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Some instigation
Is that ambition?
Then let the rains descend
The imagination is useless unless the mind is free of prejudice
So that all the faculties can enjoy their objects
Objects turning day to night
Appearance to lightsource, fountains to rice
And what is knowledge in this condition?
Bondage?
Flight? (11)
Imagination and instigation (combined with a lack of prejudice) are central to strategies for
opening spaces in which difference and discontinuity can linger, toward greater possibilities for
social understanding. Freeing the mind of prejudice is a way of opening, or pushing against
boundaries that constrain, in order to allow for access to ideas that fall outside of those
constraints, to allow for other, not previously accepted possibilities. The indeterminate, non/
narrative text is one way of using the imagination in new and different ways, in order to change
perceptions (turning day to night), and offer us, the readers, the choice to use knowledge in order
to be constrained, or to be free and take flight. Further, she writes:
The void in which one changes at a moment of encounter
A space, as Heidegger says, for which room must be made room, not at but in a
Boundary
A boundary is not that at which something stops, but, as the Greeks recognized,
That from which something begins
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Its essential unfolding (18)
This essential unfolding is also a resistance to closure; if the boundary marks a point of
beginning, or unfolding, it doesn’t mark the end, or closure of the text, but instead represents a
space of possibility. The “open text” according to Hejinian, “foregrounds process . . . and thus
resists the cultural tendencies that seek to identify and fix material and turn it into a product . . . it
resists reduction and commodification” (“Rejection” 43). A Border Comedy uses the idea of the
border as a space of intersection and potential. On one side of the border, the self stops, but the
border itself—and what may exist beyond—is the space in which the world and the self begin a
continuous process of mutual construction, “not at but in a / Boundary.” The text formally enacts
the intersections between self, world, the negotiation and reading of other texts, and the readers
themselves.
Each “Book” in A Border Comedy is a consequence of the narrator’s writing and thinking
through a collection of others’ ideas, and acts as an exercise in conversation, instead of
explanation. The narrative here is the process of connection and conversation, and the self of the
text is no more than the text-subject in a continuous (and fluxuating) process of construction. Or
as Gerald Bruns writes, borders for Hejinian “are sites of ‘encounter’ and milieus of
‘experience’, and that, perhaps more importantly, they are mobile or fluid rather than fixed”
(397). Hejinian writes:
Stucco and sensation, narrative and window skills, depth perception and the
Stretch
Of the continuous destination
Whose parturition through wordy lips and hidden flaps
Is read in a narrative possession of pulled repeats
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But preserves and concentrates its power and is capable of exerting it even
After a long time
In distant places
The repetition stirred to marvelous travel
From interior to exterior or from monstrous to minute
Without the illusion of sequence
Or victory
And actually, it’s a lot of fun
Related to experience
And its correlate, the ability to follow a story (18-19)
The continuous destination is the focus on the process, the journey, instead of the product of
arriving at a closed point. The continuous, or open, text repeats and moves out of any particular
sequence. Like Stein’s Geographical History, the process of narrating, like the process of
thinking or experiencing, is subject to stops and starts, circulation, repetition. The text is both
external and internal—both functioning on its own terms and participating in the larger world,
both of the self and of the materials from which it is constructed. A Border Comedy enacts the
non-sequential processes of exploration and discovery, of experience of the self in the world.
Capturing present reality in the text is challenging particularly because of the continuous
nature of experience; the continuous present tense leaves every moment behind and keeps
anything from ever finishing. For example, “Book Twelve” begins:
A “story of our time” would be hard to confess
If confession is what it would take
And hard to declare
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As a good among goods
Hard to have taken
Knowing it lived, a winged creature
Having the unstable identity of anything and the steady state of the psyche
Producing it
Always in the present tense, perhaps because of some paradoxical relationship
That dreams have to experience
The contents of a dream having already been experienced but being experienced in dreams as unexperienced
Which prevents dreams from bring finished and keeps life and dream looping
Their links and rattling their chains (156)
The text, as a document that may or may not capture experience, is like a confession that cannot
narrate itself. The difficulty in the telling of the story, is the telling, because the “unstable” story
is told through the seemingly “steady state of the psyche / Producing it.” Butler’s idea of
narrating an account is particularly relevant here as Hejinian calls attention to the seemingly
transparent narrative of experience that is actually a fabricated mix of past experience and
narration. Instead, “experience,” itself socially contextualized, is further complicated by the
impossibility of trying to narrate it; experience can only be experienced through its effects in the
text. “In this sense,” Hejinian writes in her essay “Strangeness,” “the process of writing, like the
process of dreaming, is a primary thinking process. Thinking explores, rather than records, prior
knowledge or an expression of it” (143). Language as process (as opposed to transparent
narrative as product) sheds light on the difficulty of narrating a life. Hejinian writes, “Language
discovers what one might know, which in turn is always less than what language might say”
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(“Rejection” 48). Instead of using language to explain what one knows, she might use language
as a way into discovery and further understanding. In A Border Comedy, this exploration
reverberates through the connections between the various citations juxtaposed into dynamic
relation.
We can hear Stein echoed in the idea that language as process and action, as continuous
exploration of questions, can lead us in to insights that we would not have gotten to otherwise.
Through language we question what we know, and how we know who and what we are in the
world.
It is only in sentences that vocabularies produce verbs
As intimate word values
Or yellow sentence branches
And ships pack and moons canoe
Every phrase
An occurrence uncurtailed (A Border Comedy 157)
In Stein’s Geographical History, the constant turning of thoughts through the language on the
page leads the reader through processes of understanding, without confining that to definition
and explanation. Knowledge is gained in the recognition of relations and intersections, of citation
and association, of intuition and feeling. When the writing becomes strange, it confirms that it is
possible to learn through language, instead of using language to explain (insufficiently) what we
(do not) know. In his discussion of A Border Comedy, Bruns explains that “Heidegger thought
that having an experience with language does not occur in the speaking of it but rather when
words fail or get away from us, going off on their own” and that this failure may also be related
to forgetting, which is key for Hejinian’s interrogation of memory throughout her work. Bruns
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continues, “one experiences memory most dramatically not in the possession of it but in its loss
. . . forgetting is, like the border, a starting-point, a beginning, a frontier way of writing
differently” (406). Or, as Hejinian writes,
What I want to write, then, is that the unlike is always inevitable and never
Sufficient
What we experience is the iffy and hedged (161)
Letting this insufficiency, the “hedged” emerge through the language, in the text itself, the
“unlike” becomes an alternative to cohesive narrative complicity. In Butler’s terms, this moment
when narrative falls short is one of necessity and productivity. This “way of writing differently”
enacts the “iffy and hedged” nature of experience, not in some more “authentic” way, but in a
way that allows writer and reader to engage in conversation about the nature of representation
when a “self” attempts to write about “experience.” One cannot narrate, or account, for oneself
except through this insufficiency, a kind of active hedging of self-understanding.
A Border Comedy uses parataxis as a formal devise to both draw attention to the
individual disparate details, and to emphasize the importance of relation and contiguity within a
larger context. The placement of seemingly unrelated pieces next to one another also foregrounds
what falls between, what is unsaid. In her essay “The Rejection of Closure,” Hejinian explains
that
in the gap between what one wants to say (or what one perceives there is to say) and what
one can say (what is sayable), words provide for a collaboration and a desertion. We
delight in our sensuous involvement with the materials of language, we long to join
words to the world—to close the gap between ourselves and things—and we suffer from
doubt and anxiety because of our inability to do so. (56)
The paratactic text exposes the gaps, calling attention to our limited abilities to use language to
make us cohere as transparently narrated subjects. Or, again echoing Butler, every time we fail at
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narrating ourselves, we learn something. Using language as a tool of exploration, and allowing
the gaps to resonate, opens spaces of possibility for a greater range of experiences that do not
otherwise narratively “cohere.” Or, as Hejinian writes:
But I should remember
This is an extended act of conjugation
And might this not put us in a wonderfully instantaneous relationship
To narrative
One which construes narrative as an exchange
Of accidents (163-4)
Recognizing “narrative as an exchange of accidents” brings our attention back to the active,
process-oriented composition of A Border Comedy as a material text. The accidents occur in the
placement of Hejinian’s and others’ language and ideas on the page. Further, the (accidental)
exchange continues as the reader becomes yet another element of the text in her negotiation of
the multiple and continuously shifting details, associations, and gaps through which she must
read herself. Both the text-subject and its reader are “identities-in-process” as they move through
the constructive parataxis that is the content of this work. The final book of A Border Comedy
ends with the following:
It is the one who orders the story who must listen to it
And take on chance
In pushed continuities
In realities snoozed or gossiped near the heaping point, the occasion
And what is chance if not immediate resemblance
A way of knowing things together
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Which is why it is change
And after all difference
With its slide, decision, and coinciding
That seizes everything
And the teller’s intention—believe it or not
Is fortune given
Living always (212)
Hejinian explains that “the ontological and epistemological problem of our knowledge of
experience is, to my mind, inseparable from the problem of description” (“Strangeness” 158).
The difficulty with (knowing) experience is the difficulty of describing (through language) that
experience. A text like A Border Comedy, if not able to make sense of experience, is conscious
of the fact of its inability to do so in a coherent way. The strange, or open, text, to some extent
leaves the material of its content to chance; it acts as “a way of knowing things together”
creating a space for understanding that is not packaged and confined within closed borders of
intelligibility. It is this failure of intelligibility that is the fortunate moment of learning, the
moment during which new spaces of possibility are opened for further exploration, for expanded
possibilities for recognizing disparate and unintelligible experiences of subjects in the world.
And it is at/on the border where the action happens. Stein and Hejinian both seem to ask what we
can potentially do when we come up against the borders and boundaries: do we remain within
their constraints, or go beyond and push them further out, to allow for expanded ways of
knowing, seeing, understanding, exceeding what the borders contain?
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Conclusion
Stein and Hejinian push beyond their singular stories to create works that are intertextual,
geographical, historical, and continuous, but that also recognize and rupture social norms for
writing and identifying. Their texts draw attention to narrative fallibility and institute alternative
practices for non/cohesive, non/narrative practice and identification. Butler claims that the
demand that one maintain a consistent and cohesive self-identity at all times does a certain kind
of ethical violence to subjects who do not continuously “cohere.” Instead, she argues, suspending
this demand, allowing space for nonidentity and narrative rupture, can potentially allow a subject
to exist less constricted by norms of identity instituted through norms of language and narrative,
and in more ethically responsible relation to others. If language forms us before we are formed,
then exploring narrative itself, in both form and content, can give us insight into the relationship
between language and identity for subjects in the world. Taking Butler into account, we see how
Stein and Hejinian theorize this relationship through their interrogations of the content of
narrative (examining the stories we are told, and tell, about ourselves) and the formal properties
of narrative (challenging linear narrative progression, calling attention to the fantasy and
fallibility of narrative cohesion). Their texts enact interruption, and recognize the limits of
knowing both at the levels of form and content. In working to dismantle the limitations of
language, pushing against the borders of what and how we “know,” Stein and Hejinian, in
different times and through different means, construct textual examples of tolerance and
boundary-breaking, showing us how we might further push against the constraints of social and
cultural structures that define, or confine, the range of possibilities for subjective identification,
and for subjects’ relations with one another, and toward greater awareness of personal-social
responsibility.
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CHAPTER 2
Third-Person Self (Narrated): H.D. and Beverly Dahlen

Through their readings of Freud, and in combination with innovative textual strategies,
H.D., in HERmione and Beverly Dahlen, in A Reading, critique socially constructed identity and
create models of alternative practice. They use Freudian strategies, such as free association and
non/narrative, in their writing practices, and work through Freudian theories, in order to create
texts and uncover knowledge. Over the process of the construction of the texts their text-subjects
move toward understanding identity as process, and theorizing new means of identification for
subjects who do not fit into social norms; they fuse their engagement with, and critiques of,
Freud with their own identifications as women and artists (and for H.D. as a bisexual and
lesbian). These writers begin in Freud, altering narrative and other formal textual elements, and
create content that evokes marginalized, or negated, discourses and subjects. The texts and the
text-subjects are in-process, their processes of textual and subjective understanding,
interminable. Through their textual inquiries, H.D. and Dahlen break conventions of narrative,
point of view, and citation as practices of identifying with other ways of knowing. Breaking
social norms and conventions, and creating alternative models, contributes to long-term changes
in restrictive cultural narratives for women, artists, lesbians, bisexuals, and those whose
experiences are antithetical to the limitations of social norms. Reading these texts through
Theresa de Lauretis’s theory of perverse desire, I argue that H.D. and Dahlen take their
“perverse” non-normative practices (of writing and cultural critique) and turn them into positive
models for personal and social identification.
Written in 1927 and not published until 1981, H.D.’s novel is based on events in her life
after leaving Bryn Mawr College and before going to Europe for the first time. Although
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HERmione was written before she saw Freud for analysis in 1933-34 and thereafter became a
lifelong friend and correspondent, she was already beginning to read his work and consider his
theories. As a modernist writer, H.D. was in conversation with her (male) avant-garde
contemporaries, as well as continually working through her own critiques of gender and social
norms in her writing. Dahlen’s cross-genre work—which includes poetic and narrative
techniques as well as journal writing—in twenty sections over four books, was written in the late
1970s and early 1980s. She can be read both in relation to the work of her contemporaries in
California in the 1970s, including Robert Duncan and other members of the San Francisco
Renaissance, as well as the Language poets, New Narrative writers, and especially the
experimental women writers who formed HOW(ever). Dahlen and her contemporaries in the
1970s and 80s were also actively involved in reading and recovering the work of modernist, and
other avant-garde, women writers, work that was important historically and also became
influential for Dahlen’s own work. Focusing on language and subversive narrative strategy (each
to a different degree), H.D. and Dahlen deal with gender politics, sexuality, and textuality in
relation to concerns of marginalized subjects. Through a fusion of form and content they create
textual examinations of cultural identity, and create alternative models of textual and
identificatory practice.
These texts can be read as pushing beyond the dualism of fixed identity/negated identity,
toward an awareness of more complex processes of identification. Turning to Kristeva who
“challenges traditional notions of identity” (Oliver, Reading 1) and “the traditional notion of the
paternal function” (3), I show what H.D. and Dahlen are intuitively enacting in their texts.
Reading Kristeva, Kelly Oliver explains: “In traditional Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis it
is the paternal function that initiates the negation and identification that finally propels the infant
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into both language and subjectivity” (3); further, Kristeva is “concerned with analyzing the
complexities of the maternal function, which she maintains have been left out of traditional
psychoanalytic theory” (3). This is important for Kristeva because of what has become the
problematic nature of the “maternal” in western society, “since the maternal function is not
separated from our representations of women or the feminine, women themselves have become
abjected within our society” (6). In essence, the oppression of the maternal functions as the
oppression of women since, for Kristeva, “social problems always have their core in
representation . . . that our representations of maternity are not only detrimental to women but,
since the first relation is with the mother, to all human relations.” Kristeva argues that we need to
“reconceptualize and rearticulate the relation between women and reproduction” (6-8). She sees
the maternal as “the other” in the (Freudian) Oedipal, and (Lacanian) phallic symbolic systems.
Because representations of maternity historically serve to subjugate women as inferior and
lacking, Kristeva sees the deployment of linguistic and social re-presentations of the maternal as
a way to break through the paternal function. 1 Concerned with otherness and alterity, as
represented by the oppressed maternal function, Kristeva uses the (marginalized) discourses of
poetry, maternity, and psychoanalysis, as Oliver explains,
for a reconceived ethics that operates according to a love of difference rather than the
regulation and exclusion of difference [and] provides the possibility of an ethics of
difference, a feminist ethics . . . . Kristeva’s continual concern with negotiating between
identity and negation in order to avoid both the totalitarianism of absolute identity and the
delirium of complete negation is central to feminism . . . . The subject-in-process/on trial
is an identity-in-process/on trial. Kristeva proposes a way to conceive of a productive but
always only provisional identity, an identity whose constant companions are alterity,
negation, and difference. (Reading 13-14)
H.D. and Dahlen extend Freud’s theories to create texts that enact Kristeva’s subject-inprocess—what Oliver also calls an identity-in-process—in which the semiotic becomes visible
1

For more on the relation between the rejection of the maternal and historical, social oppressions of women see
Chodorow.
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within the symbolic, both disrupting normative discourse and opening space for other(ness)
discourses. According to Kristeva, the symbolic organizes and unifies (normalizes) the otherwise
incoherent semiotic elements; though, always still present, the semiotic threatens to disrupt
symbolic unity.
In Sexual Subversions, Elizabeth Grosz gives an overview of some of Kristeva’s theories
on identity, subjectitivy, and abjection. 2 Instead of becoming coherent and unified, “difference”
is given space as important to the “process” of “provisional identity.” Grosz explains:
The symbolic organizes the libidinal drives according to a phallic sexual economy, a
normative and generative linguistic structure . . . and a subjective and social identity.
These various identities—sexual, linguistic, subjective—are provisional and threaten to
dissolve when . . . the semiotic transgresses its boundaries. These are moments of
breakdown of identity (psychosis), meaning and coherence (poetry) and sexual identity
(perversion, fetish) . . . Each demonstrates the usually repressed semiotic contributions to
the symbolic by providing the semiotic with expression. (48)
If semiotic disruption manifests in psychosis, poetry, or perversion, then it also marks a moment
of potential change; upsetting the unity of symbolic organization opens space for other
possibilities, outside of normative structures. When meaning and coherence are transgressed (in
poetry and avant-garde art) political commentary, philosophical insights, abstract emotion, and
difference are given space to emerge and resonate. When the semiotic transgresses the
boundaries of sexual identity, perversion (especially according to de Lauretis whom I discuss
below) becomes a positive space of potential for more varied expression and identification of
sexual identities. Further, according to Kristeva, as Grosz explains:
The dominance of the symbolic is never guaranteed or secure. Symbolic components are
liable to exceed the boundaries and limits imposed in them, thus bringing to a crisis point,
and possibly to a point of revolutionary rupture, the previous stability which was secured
only at the cost of the submersion of the semiotic. (Sexual 49)
2

Although Grosz later turns away from the study of psychoanalysis and the French feminists, and moves in different
directions regarding feminist theory and cultural study (writing on the politics of the body, space and time, and
Darwinism and nature, for example), this early overview of Kristevan thought is useful for summarizing some of
Kristeva’s basic notions on the relationship between the semiotic and symbolic.
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The point of rupture is the moment of revolutionary potential. This rupture occurs textually, after
Kristeva, in disrupting linguistic and narrative structure, and subjectively, disrupting the structure
of unified identity in favor of difference. I argue that H.D. and Dahlen incorporate the Kristevan
semiotic, constructive processes in revolutionary disruption of narrative and linguistic norms in
their texts, and also create models of subjectivity for textual and worldly subjects to function
outside of binary and heterosexually normalized, culturally informed “identities.” They advocate
for subjects who identify in less coherent and unified ways, thus queering the (otherwise
normative) text and (heteronormative) identity categories in the move toward models that serve
to enact more complex, spatial processes of identity.
H.D. and Dahlen (re)consider the “other” or “repressed” in their texts and bring these to
the forefront of their thinking. Enacting Freudian analysis in their writing, narrative comes to be
seen as transparent and provisional, and desire (for “meaning”; for narrative closure), it becomes
clear, can never be fully realized. 3 Freud utilizes narrative strategies both in analysis and in the
narrativization of analysis, particularly in his case studies. During analysis, hidden or repressed
material is brought from the unconscious into consciousness, and through the process of
transference, both analyst and analysand use the recovered material (memories, dreams) to
“narrate” the patient’s situation. In writing the case histories, in the interpretation of recovered
material, Freud relies on literature, philosophy, material artifacts, figurative language and
narrative.4

3

Although Freud did not believe one could do analysis on oneself, H.D. and Dahlen interpret analysis as a strategy
for material textual practice as well as seeking knowledge through writing; they are using analysis as a model and
practice, and (non)narratively constructing subjectivity through their writing processes.
4
The literary/figurative is necessary for the articulation of the science. Reading H.D., in relation to Freud, Dianne
Chisholm explains, “H.D.’s Freud . . . is the Freud who calls on the poets . . . who relies on his schooling in classical
philology, folklore, and mythology to interpret the symptomatic dreams of his patients, who employs figurative
language no less than the technical discourse of conventional medicine and traditional philosophy to conceptualize
operations of the psyche” (3).

98
Narrative then is one literary element among many that Freud uses to interpret his work
with patients. Peter Brooks reads Freud’s case history of the Wolf Man in order to explicate a
theory of narrativity in Freud. In general, Brooks explains, “the case-history within history, and
personal history within the case history, pose forcefully major questions about the nature of
historical and narrative understanding, suggesting both the necessity and the limits of narrative
meanings, and the complexity of our uses of narrative plot” (265). Freud’s case histories call
attention to themselves as seemingly transparent reports of analysis as they negotiate the original
story and narration of that story. Freud “must manage to tell, both ‘at once’ and ‘in order,’ the
story of a person, the story of an illness, the story of an investigation, the story of an explanation;
and ‘meaning’ must ultimately lie in the effective interrelationship of all of these” (Brooks 273).
Nonetheless, Brooks explains that Freud recognizes the “provisional status” of narrative and its
“drive toward the end and a resistance to ending,” especially in relation to psychoanalysis, which
is:
inherently interminable, since the dynamics of resistance and the transference can always
generate new beginnings in relation to any conceivable end. The narrative of the Wolf
Man must be given closure and shape, but these are provisional, and could always reopen
to take in further circles of meaning and theory . . . . The closure demanded by narrative
understanding—the closure without which it can have no coherent plot—is always
provisional, as-if, a necessary fiction. (281)
This is evident in the example of the Wolf Man story, Brooks explains, since Freud revised the
case history with a different reading of the original dream about the wolves, the dream that was
key to the whole of the Wolf Man’s analysis. Instead of simply relying on the original, cohesive,
narrative account of the Wolf Man’s analysis, Freud destabilizes the dominance of narrative
meaning by opening the possibility for other meanings, and making closure impossible. Freud
seems to both rely on and distrust the “narrative plot” with its coherent beginning, middle, and
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end in giving accounts of analysis that are “inherently interminable.” 5 Further, Brooks explains,
“like the modernist novel, the case history of the Wolf Man shows up the limits of storytelling
while nonetheless insisting that the story must get told. The plots of narrative have become
extraordinarily complex, self-subversive, apparently implausible” (285). Both the desire to tell,
and the desire to read the incoherent in coherent narrative form, according to Brooks, drives the
impulse to narrate. “It is of overwhelming importance to us that life still be narratable,” he
writes, “which may mean finding those provisional, tenuous plots that appear to capture the force
of desire that cannot speak its name but compels us in a movement—recursive, complex,
unclosed—toward meaning” (285). We believe that if it can be narrated, it can be understood, as
if narration equals meaning. Freud understood the difficulty (or impossibility) of narrative
closure, and recognized possibilities for the interminable openness of analytical or narrative
“meaning.”
In his chapter, “Narrative Desire,” Brooks further explains that desire functions in
narrative to carry a plot forward, and may also be an element of the story told. Formally, desire
works as momentum, as part of the “dynamic operation” of narrative, “connecting beginning and
end across the middle and making of that middle—what we read through—a field of force,” even
if it can never be fully realized (47). Realization of desire may only result in destruction and
death; it necessitates lack, and fulfillment results in what Freud theorized as “the drive toward
extinction” in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (Brooks 50). In other words,
the paradox of the self becomes explicitly the paradox of narrative plot as the reader
consumes it: diminishing as it realizes itself, leading to an end that is the consummation
(as well as the consumption) of its sense-making. If the motor of narrative is desire,
5

Brooks is using Freud’s own theory of analysis interminable in part from Freud’s essay “Analysis Terminable and
Interminable” in which Freud discusses the various possibilities for the termination of analysis depending on factors
including the reasons for analysis in the first place (trauma or constitution) as well as the eventual subsiding of
recurring symptoms and consciousness of repressed material. Although analysis may end for various reasons, it may
not always be “complete” or include satisfactory resolution.
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totalizing, building ever-larger units of meaning, the ultimate determinants of meaning lie
at the end, and narrative desire is ultimately, inexorably, desire for the end. (52)
This may be what H.D., Dahlen, and even Freud are responding to, if as Brooks points out, “the
realization of the desire for narrative encounters the limits of narrative,” these writers seem
already aware of those limits and understand the idea “that one can tell a life only in terms of its
limits or margins” (52). Desire is both a subject of exploration as well as a motivating textual
impulse in their work. To different degrees, H.D. and Dahlen move away from linear narrative
practices and resist closure, in order that the writing may, like analysis, go on interminably.
Through Freud and Lacan, Brooks points out that desire is in the “difference” between
what is “demanded” and what is “achieved,” or between “demand” and “need.” 6 Brooks
explains: “In this gap, desire comes into being as a perpetual want for (of) a satisfaction that
cannot be offered in reality. Desire is inherently unsatisfied and unsatisfiable” (55); we are
simultaneously propelled forward and resistant. Narrative, like analysis, moves forward with the
hope of resolution, or of “meaning” which will always fall short, which is always lacking
(Brooks 56). H.D., Dahlen, and Freud recognize what Brooks calls this “perpetual slippage” in
analysis and in writing which embody the gaps inherent in the desire to progress, find meaning,
and conclude. In seeking to tell a life story, “the claim that intelligibility, meaning, understanding
depend on a fully predicated narrative sentence, on a narrative totality, never is and ever can be
realized” (Brooks 60). Drawing attention to language as medium, and to narrative incoherence
and resistance to closure as practice, opens possibilities within the continuum between the drive
for pleasure and the drive toward death, allowing for other ways of narrating.
If Freud’s narrative case histories become unstable as cohesive narratives, then the truth
of the stories may also become fictionalized over the course of their narration. We might ask if
6

Brooks also cites Laplanche and Pontalis here, who write “Desire is born of the gap between need and demand”
(qtd. in Brooks 55).
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the status of the case-histories as fictional or nonfictional is important in the context of the larger
goals of psychoanalysis. As Hayden White argues, the use of narrative in the representation of
history puts “History” (as it is narrated) in danger of fictionalization, and the danger of
fictionalizing history, he argues, is the consequent moralizing that happens by way of
narrativization. Comparing different forms of historical documentation (such as annals and
chronicles), White points out the constructed nature of narrative in the field of historiography, in
which real events are put into the form of a (fictional) story. White questions narrative desire in
light of the fact that real events are not formally coherent to begin with but only after their
narrativization come to seem as if they happened, originally, in story form. In recognizing this,
“we catch a glimpse of the cultural function of narrativizing discourse in general, an intimation
of the psychological impulse behind the apparently universal need not only to narrate but to give
to events an aspect of narrativity” (5). We internalize the need for, and recognition of, narrative
as if it is a naturally occurring phenomenon, making it difficult to see through to the fact that
narrative is actually socially and linguistically constructed.
The forms of annals and chronicles offer a contrast to narrative representations of
historical events because of their fragmentation and lack of narrative closure. White, however,
considers these forms “not as the imperfect histories they are conventionally conceived to be”
but instead as examples of the “possible conceptions of historical reality” outside of narrative as
the dominant or accepted conception, “that are alternatives to, rather than failed anticipations of,
the fully realized historical discourse that the modern history form is supposed to embody” (6).
The notion of alternatives or difference is important. In the dominance of narrative
representation, the non-narrative forms of annals and chronicles have been relegated to “failed”
or not fully realized, and therefore not complete as historical texts until further narrativized, or
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used in combination with a cohesive narrative accounting. Though, as White explains, “Every
narrative, however seemingly ‘full,’ is constructed on the basis of a set of events that might have
been included but were left out,” recognizing this, we can then question “the notion of reality”
that “authorizes construction of a narrative account of reality in which continuity rather than
discontinuity governs the articulation of the discourse” (10). The dominance of narrative form,
White argues, is linked to a cultural value placed on narrative cohesion, a social and legal system
in which the norm of narrative structure erases the gaps and fragments, and values continuity
over discontinuity, cohesion over the disparate parts. Additionally, this becomes not simply a
matter of formal choice, but an ethical question of how narrative form may inherently be used
“to moralize reality”:
Interest in the social system, which is nothing other than a system of human relationships
governed by law, creates the possibility of conceiving the kinds of tensions, conflicts,
struggles, and their various kinds of resolutions that we are accustomed to find in any
representation of reality presenting itself to us as a history . . . . Narrativity . . . is
intimately related to, if not a function of, the impulse to moralize reality, that is, to
identify it with the social system that is the source of any morality that we can imagine.
(14)
White seems to argue, that—like Althusser’s notion of Ideology—narrative may function as part
of the social system in which, “insofar as historical stories can be completed, can be given
narrative closure, can be shown to have had a plot all along, they give to reality the odor of the
ideal” (21). Looking into this relation between the value of narrative and the larger
social/cultural system, White ultimately is suggesting “that this value attached to narrativity in
the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence,
integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary” (24). The
problem is the separation between the real events and their narrative representation. He asks:
Does the world really present itself to perception in the form of well-made stories, with
central subjects, proper beginnings, middles, and ends, and a coherence that permits us to
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see ‘the end’ in every beginning? Or does it present itself more in the forms that the
annals and chronicle suggest, either as mere sequence without beginning or end or as
sequences of beginnings that only terminate and never conclude? . . . . Or is the fiction of
such a world, capable of speaking itself and of displaying itself as a form of a story,
necessary for the establishment of that moral authority without which the notion of a
specifically social reality would be unthinkable? (24-25)
He suggests that narrative form serves as a reinscription of moral ideology—and normative
belief and practice—as seen through the Oedipal figuration and subjects functioning
pathologically in relation to “normative” cultural modes. In analysis, non-narrative pathologies
(repeating traumatic symptoms, disconnection from original events and conscious understanding
or articulation of those events) are dealt with by way of talk therapy, transference, and
articulation of the prior events. First the patient discovers—brings material up from the
unconscious—and articulates, and then Freud generally narrates the “histories” into stories with
plot developments, and closure/conclusions, in order to explain the process from pathology, to
recovery, to the move into “normal” social participation. However, even within this seemingly
cohesive narrative structure, Freud allows for slippage and gaps in narration and meaning. Freud
creates his own way of non/narrating so that the reader cannot follow him blindly but has to
engage with the analysis and its narration.
H.D. and Dahlen focus on the gaps and spaces and use these to work Freud from the
inside out. Their texts, uninterested in “normal” social participation, linger in the space of
difference, of non-normativity; they have a sense of the interminable and call attention to the
limits (and limiting nature of) narrative. Centered on process instead of narrative product, these
works displace the dominance of narrative and cultural norms and open spaces for other (nondominant, non-normative) identifications. Through their (non)narrative formal strategies,
unconscious material, (trauma, memory) is brought into consciousness (writing). These texts also
function within the Kristevan semiotic, (non)narrative space, before memories and ideas become
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unified into narrative structure, allowing for flux and fragmentation. In the space between where
material is repressed in the unconscious, and when it is constructed into normative narrative
structure, much can be learned about the function of narrative structure in relation to the
regulation of social norms and representation. Or, as Grosz shows, “In place of a structured, rulebound sign system [Kristeva] focuses on the becoming, of the processes involved in
representation” and she “coordinates these textual relations with the processes of subject
formation, especially with the ways it constitutes and challenges personal identities” (Sexual 61).
Here we see that Kristeva brings textual practice together with an understanding of subject
formation in the world. As a political project, “her various analyses are directed towards
rupturing certain conservative values (those embodied in the evaluation of identity over
difference) and, through this rupturing, the creation of new modes of reading, assessing and
valuing texts” (62). Subverting the dominance of narrative and linguistic structures in texts then
can ultimately lead to new modes for reading and understanding, and further to subjective
identifications that allow for variety and difference instead of conservative and limited
conceptions of identity.
As Rachel Blau DuPlessis explains in Writing Beyond the Ending, “to change story
signals a dissent from social norms as well as narrative forms” (20). Specifically, she examines
the shift in narrative and closure in novels by women from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries
in order to show how use and critique of narrative form, as a political and feminist project,
“makes the ‘meaning production process’ itself ‘the site of struggle’” (Kuhn qtd. in Duplessis
34). According to DuPlessis:
Twentieth-century women writers . . . [invent] narrative strategies, especially involving
sequence, character, and relationship, that neutralize, minimize, or transcend any
oversimplified oedipal drama . . . . Original bisexuality is extended the length of a
character’s life in H.D. . . . Women writers readjust the maternal and paternal in ways
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that unbalance the univocal sequence of object choices . . . . These changes are often
accompanied by pointed remarks about the plots, characters, and situations once expected
in narrative: gender polarization, patrisexual romantic love, the arrest of female quest, the
‘happy ending’ . . . . (37)
DuPlessis draws an analogy between destabilizing narrative practice and destabilizing Freudian
theory. She shows how narrative, as an ideological tool of culture, participates in the social
construction of gender roles and assumptions. As women gained greater political power and
voice in the twentieth century, in comparison to the nineteenth century, their uses of narrative
became more political, pushing beyond the previously proscribed narrative endings for female
characters of marriage or death. These writers, according to DuPlessis interrogate and complicate
the Oedipal complex in order to both critique and potentially change the structure from within.
Further, in different texts among a variety of authors, “woman . . . negotiates difference and
sameness, marginality and inclusion in a constant dialogue.” This “rewriting of gender in
dominant fiction” a “social and sexual . . . poetics of critique” challenges both the “the gendering
and the hegemonic process [which] create mutual reinforcement for the double consciousness of
women writers” (43). In HERmione, for example, H.D. challenges the nineteenth-century
marriage plot to offer an alternative “story” of bisexual romance and artistic quest that, instead of
ending in death, ends with the woman artist’s having come to a new conception of self. 7
Dahlen, moving further away from narrative in her critique of both Freudian and
narrative impulses, writes A Reading in the form of a journal or reading notebook and reworks
the (feminine) genre of journal “life” writing, allowing space for gaps, connections and
disconnections, leaps, parataxis. There is no linear beginning, middle, end, no conflict nor
7

See also Breaking the Sequence: Women’s Experimental Fiction for more on subversion of narrative by women
fiction writers, in which, for “women experimental writers, the woman in the text is also an effect of the textual
practice of breaking patriarchal fictional forms; the radical forms—nonlinear, nonhierarchical, and decentering—
are, in themselves, a way of writing the feminine” (3); although my readings go beyond textual subversion and
gendered writing, this text is important in consideration of twentieth-century women’s non/narrative
experimentation.
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resolution. Like the history annals cited by White before the narrator imposes a structure that
interprets and fashions the material in a specific way (the written history before it’s
narrativization), Dahlen’s “journal” or H.D.’s “transference” novel leave space for reader
engagement as well as draw attention to what White calls “the cultural function of narrativizing
discourse,” and the discomfort of dealing with a text that refuses to do so. The “fantasy” of
formal coherence is stripped away precisely to highlight the unconscious material, the material
without a constructed narrative plot. H.D. and Dahlen present material pulled from the
metaphorical unconscious, and use these variously in both narrative and non-narrative ways. The
play between the semiotic and symbolic challenges the social/cultural mandate to narrate, while
offering alternatives to narrative norm. If Freud opened space in the story of the Wolf Man—by
allowing for different readings of the original wolf dream—for greater play between fiction and
nonfiction, for additional ways in which to read childhood events, then H.D. and Dahlen further
this impulse by creating texts that allow space for memories, events, and Freudian texts to play
without closed conclusions. The texts, like their subjects, like Freud’s narratives, are in-process,
tentative, provisional, and like the therapeutic process, interminable. And they function as
political projects in the ways in which they rewrite narrative conventions for women as textual,
and cultural, subjects, and ultimately offer alternative models for gendered identification and
social participation.

HERmione
H.D. finished writing her autobiographical novel Hermione in 1927, about twenty years after the
original events of the story. Although it underwent revision and publication preparation by H.D.
before she died in 1961, it was not published until after it was recovered as a manuscript in 1981.
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The novel is based on H.D.’s life after leaving Bryn Mawr, while she was briefly engaged to
Ezra Pound, and before she initially left for Europe with her friend and romantic interest, Frances
Gregg. Though the story takes place before World War I, the novel is written well after, and
might be read to include H.D.’s trauma from the war and the loss of her brother. The story enacts
her struggle to find her identity as a poet, intellectual, and bisexual, and the concerns, including
the trauma of witnessing both world wars, that she would carry though much of her later writing.
It also deals more with her lesbian romantic life than her other autobiographical novels.
Although eventually H.D. lived in Europe with her long-term domestic partner, Bryher, both
women were also, at times, married to other men. In most of her work, H.D. was not open about
her personal, lesbian domestic life, though it was a regular topic of conversation in her analytic
sessions with Freud.8
In HERmione, H.D. deals with her earlier complicated relationships with Pound and
Francis Gregg (in the characters of George and Fayne), leaving her academic career (and
disappointing her father), and deciding to follow her own artistic pursuits. More generally, the
book is about Hermione’s struggle to become a (woman) artist in a masculine (modernist)
literary world. In the view of “society” she feels like a failure, but nonetheless follows her
creative intuition to do something other than what’s expected of her:
‘I failed,’ she flung it out again, ‘utterly.’ Would ‘I failed utterly’ keep people from
repeating as they would keep on, Tibetan prayer wheel, ‘What are you going to do, what
are you going to do, what are you going to do now?’ What was ‘now’ and what was
‘doing’ and what was ‘what’ precisely? Words went round, had odd ways of tacking off,
billowing out, full sail. (54)

8

See H.D.’s Tribute to Freud in which she relates her experiences in analysis with Freud. Freud’s own views on
bisexuality and lesbianism were ambivalent and conflicted, and always in process, as can be seen over the course of
his work (in particular see Jessica Benjamin, Chodorow, de Lauretis, Freud). Further, after her time in analysis,
Freud and H.D. maintained a life-long friendship and correspondence.
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Although H.D. had serious friendships with other modernist poets and writers of her time
(Moore, Williams, D.H. Lawrence) some of these more intimately intersected with her personal
life (she was engaged to Pound, and married Richard Aldington only later to divorce). Her
critical interrogations of gender, sex, and social roles and expectations, in relation to (and in
conflict with) her own intellectual endeavors emerge throughout HERmione. It is through the
Freudian delving into the unconscious that H.D.’s main character, and sometimes narrator,
Hermione, comes to terms with her own ideas of self over the course of the text. Writing of
HERmione as a type of Freudian autobiographical writing, Diane Chisholm explains, “Her is not
so much a prefiguration of The Gift and subsequent autobiography as a testament to the
inadequacy of the narrative discourse of case history for the production and signification of
visionary self-consciousness” (76).9 Further, relating H.D.’s writing to her interest in Freud,
Chisholm explains
H.D.’s poetic generativity is . . . supplemented by Freudian utterances: her type (of)
writing is a dissemination of Freudian discourse. We might translate this figure . . . as a
sign that she has determined how to conceive of their relationship as a desirable
intertextuality. Freud’s salting of H.D.’s type (of) writing reads allegorically as a
combination of semiotic practices, an intertextuality in Julia Kristeva’s sense of the term,
‘a permutation of texts,’ in which ‘in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken
from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another.’ (12)
At the time of writing HERmione, H.D. had read Freud and was already incorporating Freudian
theory into her own writing process. HERmione is a text that works through the double-ness of
subjectivity (heterosexual/lesbian, woman/artist) as Her tries to come to understand her own
desires and identifications. We might say that in HERmione, through Freud, H.D. brings her
childhood material to the (conscious) text. “H.D.’s figure of childhood fantasy and her technique
of recall through the ‘trance’ of simulated ‘transference’ are the structuring nuclei of her

9

See H.D.’s The Gift, a later, more cohesively narrative and popular autobiographical novel by H.D., written in
London during WWII and published in 1969.
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Freudian life-writing,” writes Chisholm (69). H.D.’s writing is not unlike Freud’s talking cure.
The text is the space in which to recall and articulate feelings and memories; like Freudian
analysis, writing is a process of discovery with the goal of further understanding of
contemporary circumstances. In the novel, Hermione uses psychoanalytic terminology in the
effort to make sense of her situation, while pointing out that simply giving names to phenomena,
without further investigation or analysis, is generally futile.
Her’s energy must go groping forward in a world where there was no sign to show you
‘Oedipus complex,’ no chart to warn you ‘mother complex,’ shoals threatening. ‘Guilt
complex’ and ‘compensation reflex’ had not then been posted, showing your way on in
the morass. (HERmione 47)
Hermione’s process-of-becoming happens over the course of the text and is told through the
negotiation of her relationship with George—the heterosexual, symbolically patriarchal male
poet who sees Hermione more as a decorative muse than a poetically intellectual equal—and that
with Fayne—Her’s intellectual counterpart and the object of her lesbian desire. The book begins
with Her’s sense of failure, moves through her unsure courtship with George and affirming
intimacy with Fayne, and ends with Hermione having acquired the ability to make decisions and
speak on her own terms.
Although there is a narrative frame in which the story moves through time in a linear
fashion, each paragraph and sentence seems to want to detour from this notion as H.D. creates
visual, sensory spaces of poetic and philosophical inquiry and reflection. It is as if the characters
only fade in and out of Hermione’s mental wanderings as characters in the performance of an
epic poem. For example, the following:
There are of course bits of colour to be thrown down like counters in a banking house, or
chips across a poker table. All your life you will retain one or two bits of colour with
which all your life will be violently or delicately tinted. You will have an infinitesimal
grain of purple dye or a flat counter to hoard or to risk in one reckless spendthrift
moment. There are gamblers of the spirit as there are gamblers of the mind, passions of
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the psyche as well as passions of the body. All of life may be spent looking in vain for a
counter that might bring glory or fame or wisdom which at some off-moment you may
pick up unexpectedly—from the gutter—then you save it or you spend it. (53)
The focus here is on the process of investigation and the happenstance discoveries often found
unexpectedly (“from the gutter”); the emphasis on discovery, and deciding what/how to deal
with what has been discovered, is of greater importance than setting out toward a particular goal,
which may only fall short. This may seem like gambling, to set out without specific direction,
though it can lead to greater discoveries. All of life may be a process, H.D. seems to assert, a
continual negotiation of finding fame or wisdom unexpectedly, and deciding how to use it.
H.D. enacts Freud’s process of bringing the repressed into consciousness and articulating
(or showing the attempts to articulate) through formal strategies (starts and stops, repetition) as
well as using Freudian vocabulary and theories. According to DuPlessis, H.D., in her prose
fiction, seeks “to unify such female experiences as (lesbian, bisexual, heterosexual) sexuality and
motherhood with creative power” (DuPlessis, H.D. 31). DuPlessis focuses her analysis on how
H.D. assumes “the authority of Otherness so that female-centered experiences and ties are the
source of theme and character, narrative and resolution, language and rhythm” (31-32).
HERmione enacts that sense of otherness through the fusion of form and content: from the story
of Her’s choosing Fayne over George; to the paragraphs and sentences that subvert and
undermine linear narrative progression. The intertextual play with Freud’s language and theories,
the metaphorical use of sexual and creative desires, and the narrative breaks that linger in spaces
of language, image, and sensation in which time stops and the movement of the story is halted all
contribute to enacting this “otherness” in the text. When Hermione thinks of Fayne, for example,
it is obvious that Her’s sexual and artistic self discoveries are analogous. Sexual/artistic selfidentification play figuratively off one another as they evoke the “search for identity” which,
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after Freud, is an interminable process of discovery and understanding. Or, as Susan Stanford
explains:
H.D.’s search for her identity as woman in both her life and her art went in both lesbian
and heterosexual directions with great intensity . . . . She brought the contexts of both
experiences into her sessions with Freud: the insecurity and fragmentation she wrote
about as a woman in relationships with men; the sense of wholeness and affirmation she
wrote about as a woman in relationships with women” (Psyche 46-47).
Hermione’s quest in the novel is to find a sense of self on her own terms, as a woman and as an
artist, and like many of H.D.’s other novels, according to DuPlessis, HERmione is “about the
repeated formations of a woman artist who must ‘create her creativity’ given the social, psychic,
ideological and political events reverberating with her femaleness: the conditions in which she
writes as a woman, the politics of gender” (H.D. 31-32). The “plot” is the process of
interrogation of self-identity in the context of outside elements pressuring Her (and H.D.) to
identify. Her’s father wanted her to be successful in science like him and her brother; George
(Pound) wanted her to be his muse and wife; her mother wanted her to marry well and
appropriately; and Fayne engaged Her in intimate friendship and wanted to travel to Europe with
Her. In the end, Hermione never goes back to school, refuses all of her mother’s advice on love
and marriage, breaks her engagement with George because, she realizes, he will never know her,
and decides to go to Europe on her own with other friends, instead of with Fayne.
An examination of the relation between identity and subjectivity is of fundamental
concern, especially in terms of the subjective “break” in the character of Hermione. The use of
pronouns throughout the book make Hermione at once subject and object, self and other, as in
the following passages:
Her Gart went round in circles. ‘I am Her,’ she said to herself; she repeated, ‘Her, Her,
Her.’ Her Gart tried to hold on to something; drowning she grasped, she caught at a
smooth surface, her fingers slipped, she cried in her dementia, ‘I am Her, Her, Her.’ Her
Gart had no word for her dementia, it was predictable by star, by star-sign, by year. (3)
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and
She said, ‘I am Hermione Gart,’ but Her Gart was not that. She was nebulous, gazing into
branches of liriodendron, into network of oak and deflowered dogwood . . . . (3)
and
Hermione Gart could not then know that her precise reflection, her entire failure to
conform to expectations was perhaps some subtle form of courage. (4)
Hermione is not an “I” but a “Her.” And the name “Hermione Gart” no longer makes sense or
defines her. The name itself signals her inability to “conform” to live up to expectations to which
she believes the name to be attached. She is Her, or Her is out there away from her. She will
spend the duration of the book extending and complicating this pronoun space in order to
emphasize the negotiations involved when a subject recognizes, or tries to understand, how
identity is continually in process. As the narrator explains:
Clutching out toward some definition of herself, she found that ‘I am Her Gart’ didn’t let
her hold on. Her fingers slipped off; she was no longer anything. Gart, Gart, Gart and the
Gart theorem of mathematical biological intention dropped out Hermione. She was not
Gart, she was not Hermione, she was not any more Her Gart, what was she? (4)
The repetition, additionally, causes defamiliarization which further distances the “I” from the
“her.” And the question “what was she?” seems to be the guiding question over the course of the
book. In addition to Hermione’s split subjectivity, the narrative subtly shifts between the regular
third person narrator (who refers to Hermione as Her, though it is a limited third person narrator
telling the story from Her’s perspective) and the first person, in which we hear Hermione’s
thoughts, which at times is more like a direct address to the reader. Sometimes it seems like
simple slippage between the two:
She must get away from Eugenia sitting in the dark like a great moth, dimity dressing
jacket, feet crossed on a low pouf thing, hands knitting, hands, hands . . . knitting.
Eugenia worked her old charm. She hypnotizes me. (original ellipses, 80)10
10

Since, throughout HERmione, H.D. regularly uses ellipses, in quotations from the novel I will include the original
ellipses without brackets, and place my own ellipses in brackets to designate where I have condensed the original
text.
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In this example, the “she” changes from referring to Hermione, to Eugenia (Hermione’s mother),
as the narration changes from third to first person in the last sentence. This type of move from
Hermione narrated in the third person, and Hermione thinking in the first person, happens
consistently throughout the text. Only occasionally does the narrator include a rhetorical
contextualizing device such as “Hermione thought . . .”; generally, Her’s thoughts weave in and
out between the larger narrative structure and the dialogue. Because this is a limited third-person
narration, we only know what the other characters think by way of their dialogue, whereas we
learn Her’s thoughts intimately. For example, later in the exchange with Eugenia from above,
Her thinks in first-person: “I am broken like a nut between two rocks, granite, and granite . . .”
(81). This statement alludes to Her’s split subjectivity sexually (as heterosexual fiancé of
George, and lesbian friend of Fayne), artistically (can a socially gendered woman follow her
artistic vocation?) and in response to nineteenth-century double-consciousness in which the
narrator/protagonist has to choose between marriage and death; yet, this moment occurs in the
middle of the novel, when narrative closure is still completely open to negotiation.
Throughout the text, H.D. is also interested in signification, particularly in terms of
naming, and using nouns to signify persons, places, things, as if understanding the use of nouns
might aid in the comprehension of what otherwise seems unintelligible or incomprehensible. For
example:
The woods parted to show a space of lawn, running level with branches that, in early
summer, were white with flower. Dogwood blossom. Pennsylvania. Names are in people,
people are in names. Sylvania. I was born here. People ought to think before they call a
place Sylvania.
Pennsylvania. I am part of Sylvania. Trees. Trees. Trees. Dogwood, liriodendron
with its green-yellow tulip blossoms. Trees are in people. People are in trees.
Pennsylvania. (5)
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Later in the novel, the narrator explains, “Words were her plague and words were her
redemption” (67), since Her wants precision in language where there is none. She seems to
realize that the precise nature of language is only a fantasy that can never be realized. Her plays
with this continuously, but calls particular attention to the discrepancy when she claims, “I am in
the word TREE. I am TREE exactly” (73). Saussure said the signifier-signified relationship is
arbitrary, in the sense that there is no inherent connection between them but that they come to
have meaning through use. And it is practice or habit that normalizes language use. The
consequences for a character such as Hermione are that words are both “plague and redemption.”
If one can call oneself “tree” and be “tree exactly” then one need not have more questions about
one’s identity and place in the world. If one can name things precisely, then she must also mean
and be understood clearly. However, nothing about identity, even if it is named specifically, is so
definitively clear, as Her finds time and again.
Getting married and changing one’s name, for example, is a standard “normal” cultural
practice, yet H.D., in calling attention to the language around the practice, shows its problematic
nature. What seems like unthreatening “naming” is actually an enactment of a more serious
oppressive power differential; it reflects both on Hermione’s sense of identity in her name, and
how language can affect, even change, actual social relations. “I am Hermione Gart and will be
Hermione Lowndes . . . it wasn’t right. People are in things, things are in people. I can’t be called
Lowndes” (112). Hermione Gart, in becoming Hermione Lowndes, becomes also subservient as
a wife and artist, a mere muse or possession. What may have started out as an egalitarian
relationship of mutual respect between poets, becomes irrevocably changed with the shift in
language. Hermione is a person who doesn’t fit the norm, or she realizes that to be “normal” is to
perform according to others’ expectations:
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Something hit me on the head, Gart and the formula, how dare they go on pretending I
am just like other people? For Eugenia . . . I will go on pretending I am just like other
people [. . .] Odd distorted Hermione descended the hall steps. She moved odd, distorted
like a mermaid with no feet to walk on [. . . .] (113)
Naming, and conforming to problematic expectations regarding gender and social roles, cause
Hermione a type of anxiety that emerges in the writing of the text; the obsessive repetition and
linguistic play becomes a way of working through the nature of the problem and serves to
emphasize the obviousness of previously hidden, accepted social expectations.
Meeting and talking with Fayne serves to further open the cracks of doubt that Hermione
has in agreeing to marry George. At times it becomes impossible to articulate her feelings, let
alone draw clear boundaries between herself and the others who have come to affect her. Within
the context of these two love interests, Hermione struggles to find a language to express her own
(odd, queer) voice:
‘I am, Miss Her Gart. And I am not. I mean looking at Miss Her Gart, I see a green land.
There is something to it, a long lane winding among birch trees.’ ‘No-o-o—not birch
trees.’ ‘Yes. I say they are. I say they are birch trees. We are and we aren’t together . . .
we go on and we do not go on together . . . there is fear and disaster but Fayne and
Hermione do not go on together [. . .] I can see you are and you aren’t here. You are here
and you aren’t here. I hate all these things that blunt you. You aren’t firm enough. You
are transient like water seen through birch trees. You are like the sparkle of water over
white stones. Something in you makes me hate you. Drawn to you I am repulsed, drawn
away from you, I am negated. You are not myself but you are some projection of myself.
Myself, myself projected you like water . . .’ (145-46)
Her’s relationship with Fayne is a crucial point in Her’s self-interrogation. In the passage above,
“you” is Fayne, which is also Her(self). “Drawn to you I am repulsed, drawn away from you, I
am negated.” Instead of threatening her autonomous selfhood (like George), the character of
Fayne helps to cultivate Her’s artistic self. Her’s relationship with Fayne is a relationship with
herself as woman and artist, and it is through their relations that she comes to a sense of clarity
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on her own terms. In a number of passages, Fayne and Hermione become fused/confused in the
pronoun her/Her such as in the following:
George should see Fayne. Things are not agaçant [annoying; irritating] now I know her. I
know her. Her. I am Her. She is Her. Knowing her, I know Her. She is some
amplification of myself like amoeba giving birth, by breaking off, to amoeba. I am a sort
of mother, a sort of sister to Her. (158)
Note the shift between the capital and lower case versions of the pronoun in the line “Knowing
her, I know Her.” As Susan Stanford Friedman explains:
Where her nickname symbolized her object status in Her’s relationship with George, it
signals a liberating woman-identification in her relationship with Fayne . . . . Unlike
George, who compares Her to art objects in a book, Fayne understands that Her’s writing
is the essence of her identity, as inseparable from her as breathing . . . . Hermione
discovers her creative center in her identity as woman through her love of her sisterimage. (Friedman, Psyche 43)
Although Friedman’s language here is a kind of dated feminist-speak, she points to something
important in the relation between Her and Fayne. The sister-image, the recognition of self in
other, the love of the same functions here in the play between lesbian love and artistic process. If
the heterosexual power differential in Hermione’s relationship with George threatened her ability
to “breathe,” to be Her self as a poet, then it is through the queer/non-normative spaces of sexual
and self-identification that Hermione comes to feel confident in choices that do not subscribe to
socially normalized expectations. This is exemplified in the following conversation between Her
and George:
‘But I won’t ever—ever be your wife, my Georgio.’ And he said ‘You’re being very
funny.’ And she said ‘You just said you didn’t want me.’ And he said ‘I always say that
in case I never get you.’ And she said ‘Anyhow I love—I love Her, only Her, Her, Her.’
(170)
Hermione “loves” both Her (self) and Her (Fayne, the other) enacting in the language itself a
lesbian love of the same, and the socially egregious act of breaking her engagement (and refusing
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to participate in the heterosexual norms of marriage and security for women) in order to follow
her (own) sexual and creative desires.
In another passage, Hermione narrates her thoughts between moments of dialogue with
Fayne:
Her bent forward, face bent toward Her. A face bends towards me and a curtain opens [. .
. .] Curtains part as I look into the eyes of Fayne Rabb [. . . .] Curtains fell, curtains
parted, curtains filled the air with heavy swooping purple. Lips long since half kissed
away. Curled lips long since half kissed away. In Roman gold. Long ere they coined in
Roman gold your face—your face—your face—your face—your face—Faustine. (16364)
In the whole of the section from which this passage is extracted there is confusion about who is
speaking to whom. The conversation is between Her and Fayne, and the interior narration is that
of Her’s thoughts, but the dialogue is not clearly contextualized to know exactly who is
speaking. Additionally, the opening curtains—signaling the opening of possibilities (sexually
and personally)—and the references to Swinburne, evoke both desire and fear. Her’s reference to
Faustine is probably that of Faustina of Rome (about whom Swinburne’s “Faustine” is written),
whose face was on a coin. She was also beautiful, dangerous, and unable to be loved. It will turn
out that Fayne will betray Hermione when Fayne and George have intimate relations with each
other. This will further complicate Her’s emotional relationships with both George and Fayne,
and stress her investment in herself as she negotiates her own needs in relation to these love
interests. The other characters act symbolically as the parts of herself with which she struggles to
come to terms: socially acceptable, heterosexual member of the Gart family, and queerly
identified sexual, artistic, and autonomous woman.
Central to the story then is the impulse, as in much of H.D.’s work, “to rupture the
universalizing of male experience in Freud, to undermine or deflect the postulate, which
reiterated a major element in Western philosophic and psychological tradition: that woman was
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deficient” (DuPlessis, H.D. 83). Mixing genres and registers of language, style, and voice H.D.
uses the character of George as symbolic of patriarchal social power as well as legitimate male
poet (versus lacking woman and woman artist). Hermione, the narrator/protagonist, creates a
space for the female subject and artist through her own psychoanalysis, in a sense. Her thoughts
and reflections, which often sound like direct address to the reader, act as a type of talk therapy
through which she comes to terms with her “role” in the story. H.D. enacts this through the
content of the story, as well as through the “Freudian” strategies she employs in the construction
of the text:
Freud’s analytic procedure—the talking cure, the chains of free association, the
metonymic combination playing across the axis of selection to construct a swelling,
interminable reading of any sign, this associative, ruminative, atemporal and
palimpsested style—was already H.D.’s technical procedure (in HERmione) but until
Freud she could not recognize that her palimpsested style, the [Kristevan] voice of the
‘chora’ was the definitive rupture from ‘vanishing points of sterility and finesse.’11
(DuPlessis, H.D. 85)
H.D. creates spaces of association, rumination, and obsession throughout HERmione as a way of
enacting the process of repression, retrieval, and articulation in analysis, but in the style of the
writing itself. A main example of this is in the conflict that comes out of Her’s ambivalent
relationship with, and later refusal of, George. This tension and realized clarity happens in the
assault scene, which functions both literally as a plot device and metaphorically as an example of
George’s violent oppression of Her as a self-aware subject and artist. Whether or not Her is
actually raped, the aggression and violence, I would argue, is comparable to a more gratuitous
11

She the intro to Kristeva’s Desire in Language in which she explains the relationship between the “semiotic” and
“chora”: “semiotic relates to the ‘chora’ (receptacle, from Plato) ‘an invisible and formless being which receives all
things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible’…. It is also anterior
to any space, and economy of primary processes articulated by Freud’s instinctual drives through

condensation and displacement, and where social and family structures make their imprint through
the mediation of the maternal body. While the chora’s articulation is uncertain, undetermined, while it lacks thesis or
position, unity or identity, it is the aim of Kristeva’s practice to remove what Plato saw as ‘mysterious’ and
‘incomprehensible’ is what he called ‘mother and receptacle’ of all things….”
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depiction in contemporary terms. When Hermione is held down and assaulted by George, it is
like the Freudian moment of repressed material fully coming into consciousness; it is as if she is
recalling her dreams, experiences, and thoughts about George and then finally has the “break”
she needs in order to see herself clearly in relation to him. Although this is not a single, clear,
transition moment—George does not disappear from the story—it is a decisive moment in which
it becomes clear that Her and George are at odds, that there is no egalitarian understanding
between them, but only a power differential. In this scene, George takes control and pushes Her
down onto the couch. They struggle, and his actions show him thinking little more of her than a
poetic and sexual conquest, his muse:
He wanted Her, but he wanted a Her that he called decorative. George wanted a Her out
of the volumes on the floor, out of the two great volumes. He wanted Her from about the
middle, the glorious flaming middle, the Great Painters (that came under Florence)
section. (172)
And Hermione realizes:
George never understood me. Rising to her feet, knowing that he would not understand
Her, she was drifted toward the divan. George with a twist and deft knee movement had
thrown her on the low couch; so lying she regarded the ceiling [. . . .] Now George had
put the lamp out. (173)
This scene, like a performance, enacts a more cliché romance narrative written in a dramatic
style. It is as if the main character being assaulted is in shock or traumatized in such a way that
she can only describe the scene from an ironic distance; the shift between third and first-person
narration is a formal cue of the confusion and discord at play. The scene unfolds as if Hermione
is watching, instead of acting as an actual character in the scene, the description alluding to the
figurative elements at play; because for Her, there is no other way to make sense of what is
unfolding.
Now more than ever she knew they were out of some bad novel. Sound of chiffon ripping
and the twist and turn of Hermione under the stalwart thin young torso of George
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Lowndes. Now more than ever thought made spiral, made concentric circle toward a
darkened ceiling. The ceiling came down, down. The ceiling became black, in a moment
it would crush down, crushing her and George Lowndes under a black metallic shutter.
The ceiling was a sort of movable shutter like some horrible torture thing out of Poe’s
tales, the wall that came close out of Poe’s tales was coming close, the wall was coming
close. Doors were no more in walls, the curtains were no more curtains. Walls were
coming close to suffocate, to crush her . . . ‘You’ve torn this chiffon sleeve thing
horribly.’
A twist, a turn. Men are not strong. Women are stronger. I am stronger. I turn and
twist out of those iron arms because if he had held me, I would have been crushed by
iron. Iron is in walls. ‘She said ‘Please put the light on.’ (173)
At this moment she claims a right to her authority as a person and an artist while commenting on
the bad romance novel that reinforces sexual hierarchy. She is not George’s muse but a poet on
her own terms, and will not be crushed by him (or the patriarchal hegemonic system that is
heterosexual marriage). She is not his sexual conquest but instead has the ability to fight back
and walk away. She continues to negotiate—by way of the textual play with pronouns and
language—a sense of self-identity as she can understand it, in relation socially to the other
characters. She calls attention to the fact that one is always in relation to others, that language
constructs our relationships with each other and with ourselves. Particularly, she acts as if she
does not know how to relate to George nor how to stay away from him, as if he has some power
over her still, even if he has no way to relate to her, and she knows that he never will. A later
conversation references a dinner during which Her and George had discussed a “boring”
performance that they had attended. Her’s narration loses some syntactic cohesion when, in
response to his comments, she explains: “Moment in the cab was nearest when George had said,
‘But all this is so unlike you.’ What was you and what was you and what was you? What was
like Her and what was unlike Her? George had no inkling” (188). The question seems to be
whether or not language can aid in any real understanding. Pronouns, and shifting narrative point
of view throughout the text, draw attention to the construction of the story by way of messy
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materials of language, that always remain inadequate for understanding ourselves in relation to
others. H.D. pushes this linguistic interrogation further, coming back to the notion of naming, of
nouns and their use as people, places, and things. Nouns are different and they are the same; and
all nouns are signs, made up of signifiers and signifieds, the precision of which is supposed to
aid in the understanding of meaning: a word (form) is attached to a concept (meaning). And
nouns in particular are the most concrete, material, and visual elements in language, like “tree” in
its visual representation and written out as a word.
It was obvious that people should think before they call a place Sylvania. People are in
things. Things are in people and people should think before they call a place Sylvania. I
am the word AUM. The word was with God, the place was Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania
was some sort of Lilliput or Gargantua, things like that, places like that, nowhere was
Pennsylvania. (198)
However, what becomes obvious is not clarity of meaning, but possible multiplicity of meanings,
even when using the most concrete elements of language: nouns. And this, combined with H.D.’s
purposeful play with pronouns and point of view, makes any idea of a single narrator telling a
singularly narrative account of events impossible. For example, in the passage below:
I am the word tree, I am AUM exactly. Fayne being me, I was her. Fayne being Her I was
Fayne. Fayne being Her was HER so that Her saw Fayne; there was no use trying to hide
under a midnight black hat rim for out of the black hat Her saw everything. Her was
Fayne, Fayne was Her so that saying to George did you love, one I love, meant nothing. I
knew George saw Her, say George, say Fayne. (210)
The characters and their signs (meanings?) become con/fused here as Her is dealing with the fact
of Fayne’s becoming involved with George after Her is finished with him. She and Fayne are
different, and the same. Again, in struggling to make sense, she turns back to language and the
fantasy of its precision and use as a tool of meaning and understanding. She replaces the
representation of “tree” with herself as the representation of the word “tree.” AUM is another
word for Om, the primary and sacred syllable, and is both a word and a sound. She claims, “I am
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AUM exactly,” the very root or primal sound in language. We are defined by and within
language. Fayne and Her become the same through language:
Fayne being me, I was her. Fayne being Her, I was Fayne. Fayne being Her was HER so
that Her saw Fayne; there was no use trying to hide under a midnight black hat rim for
out of the black hat Her saw everything. Her was Fayne, Fayne was Her so that saying to
George did you love, one I love, meant nothing. I knew George saw Her, saw George,
saw Fayne. (210)
The confusion here among names and identities also serves to create a new structure of being in
relation. Instead of the male-female, heterosexual binary that is the basis for the traditional
romance novel, this story both breaks that structure but refuses to simply replace it with another
binary structure. Instead of simply replacing the heterosexual with the lesbian (Her and Fayne
live happily ever after), everything becomes confused, identities mingle in the language and in
the attempts to narrate a socially unnarratable situation. Her and Fayne and George have formed
a triangle in which no one part is greater or more powerful than another. And each understanding
of her/his self is implicitly connected to the others. This image creates an alternative scene of
recognition that can no longer be shaded over by linguistic and social norms of gender and
sexual relations, there can be no more hiding behind the hat. The lesbian, and the poet, will be
recognized within the social context (even if still in relation to the patriarchal male poet) instead
of continually outside of it.
Further, the narrative, near the end of the novel, makes a final, decidedly non-narrative
statement:
Then in a moment, in an infinitesimal second, the moment that divides day from dawn,
that other moment that divides dawn from morning, perhaps that moment that divides
early morning from exact morning, will intercede. A moment will stand in a starched
apron and the moment will save Her’s being. I will draw back tenuous antennae of
delirium . . . Her will be quite sane. Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow creeps on its
petty pace from day to day and all our yesterdays and all our yesterdays . . . (216)
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Her’s focus on the moment, outside of past or present, the intensity of present tense (“the
moment that divides day from dawn”) is what brings her sanity. Concern with presence, in each
individual moment, is the antithesis of a narrative moving forward in chronological time in
which a clear beginning, middle, and end are designated and a cohesive moment of closure
resolves and finalizes the story. After she realizes sanity is in the present moment, the language
of the last line above seems to drift away in an abstract nonattachment, as if she has no relation
to the tomorrows and the yesterdays which seem to only exist as signifiers, without their
counterpart signifieds (of meaning). What is important is what happens between the tomorrows
and the yesterdays.
H.D.’s intellectual and emotional experiences, through Freud and her own artistic
processes, are evident in HERmione as we see deeper into the text. As Friedman notes:
H.D. fused the roles of woman, student, disciple, seeker, and patient into a united
intellectual and emotional complex of experience . . . . The healing catharsis of selfknowledge and understanding that she really began with Freud and that continued
throughout her life gave her the power to transmute experience into art. (Psyche 47)
She moves through the final, non/narrative passage above, as a way of maintaining the presentness of the text (the refusal to give in to desire narrative for the resolved end of the story) and to
show that identity is still always in process. Instead of narrative closure, after Her decides to go
to Europe with other friends and end her relations with Fayne, Fayne reenters the story—and
Her’s poetic and personal life—when she appears in Her’s room. Here the book ends, the
suggestion being that HERmione/Hermione will remain in-process.
In HERmione, H.D. is writing a twentieth-century love story, in response to the
limitations of nineteenth century women’s stories, which is also entirely a metaphor for her own
love of self as an individual and as an artist. She enacts the queerness of the content of the
story—the love triangle, her own “real life” bisexuality, her desires to do something other than
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conform to family and social expectations—in the formal elements of the text, and creates a text
that is experienced most profoundly in each moment of reading. There is no summary of the
story of HERmione without an understanding of the words, sentences, and paragraphs, the very
language through which H.D. makes her Freudian quest. In maintaining the triad structure of
desire, instead of bringing closure to the text through another binary-structure, H.D. creates a
new model for personal identification in relation. In the end Hermione is also George and Fayne;
she is the poet and the lover. As her relationships with George, Fayne, and Her/self shift and
move over the course of the text, HERmione as a meta-autobiography refuses to unify the
tripartite subject and instead leaves Hermione, and her readers, in continual process of becoming.

Beverly Dahlen, A Reading
Beverly Dahlen continues the impulse toward textual and subjective becoming through
the interminable process of writing her long work, A Reading. This series of twenty sections is
less narrative and more hybrid in form than HERmione, and takes the intertextual play further to
explore a variety of cultural concerns that extend out from Dahlen’s own personal politics.
Dahlen began writing A Reading in the 1970s, publishing the first book, A Reading 1-7, in 1985.
The most recent addition, A Reading 18-20, was published in 2006. The series, so far, is
published in four books, made of 20 sections in total, and may continue. The long work is
composed in the form of a journal, which records thoughts, ideas, and quotes from, or in
response to, other texts. Immediately evident upon encountering A Reading 1-7 are a number of
formal strategies that frame just some of its politics: the space of the journal (as genre of writing)
is reworked, turned into a hybrid form, and made public; only occasionally are the “read” texts
cited or referred to specifically; sometimes lines are quoted but no original source is given.
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Additionally, sections often begin and end in ways that avoid any clear notation of beginning or
ending (they begin in the middle of something and then simply end at generally non-specific
points); the work opens, in A Reading 1-7, for example, with the line: “before that and before
that” (15). And the whole series avoids heading toward any sort of closure. The process of
recording reading notes creates its own genre, in a way, and in a separate essay, Dahlen writes
that the work only “turns out to be something like a journal . . . that it was not preconceived in
terms of these or any other forms originally” (“Forbidden”).
Dahlen’s work incorporates a variety of textual and cultural politics of the 1970s and 80s.
A Reading begins in the late 1970s, a high time of feminist political activity and popularization
of French feminist language theorists including Kristeva and Irigaray, and the work of
psychoanalytic feminist theorists in response to Freud and Lacan. Especially in the first text, A
Reading 1-7, but throughout the series, Dahlen reads and negotiates Freud on her own terms. She
takes his theory of “free association” as her own method of composition for at least some of the
work, and further incorporates him into the text itself, putting her own writing and thinking in
conversation with Freud. The dialogic, exploratory nature of her work interrogates in order to
think through “knowing,” in order to “evade the censor . . . to say it all, to try to say everything”
(“Forbidden”). Further, Dahlen explains:
There is what I might call an interrogative style that seems to turn up frequently in the
writing of feminist women. It’s a style I’m ambivalent about—it annoys me—and yet I
find it to a remarkable extent, as here, in my own work . . . . What I am calling the
interrogative style of women questions because there are no answers. They are real
questions. They are questions about the ground of authority, radical ontological
questions, questions about the practice of writing from a center of experience that has
been defined by others as non-existent, an absence. These questions throw me into that
void, the gulf opens. (“Forbidden”)
Questions lead to discoveries and insights, even if there are no clear answers. A Reading is
“about,” and enacts, the “practice of writing” coming out of traditionally “othered” experience.
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Questioning is the beginning of the process, the opening of the void, which Dahlen negotiates
throughout her work. Interrogating and working through the possibilities for meaning and
knowing is a kind of ontological endeavor that cannot be captured in a linear narrative structure,
and Dahlen creates an open text that “knows” through interrogation. After Kristeva, Dahlen
incorporates material, formal strategies to enact processes of coming to know, or to be. A
Reading becomes a model for interrogative practice that opens space for subjects who do not
identify within symbolic “norms,” by way of non/narrative methods that move beyond the limits
of narrative conventions. We might add to Dahlen’s comments above Kristen Prevallet’s
understanding of “Relational Investigative Poetics” to think about writing that negotiates history
and culture, and includes intertextual dialogue within a poetics. Prevallet writes:
Instead of buying gas masks and digging underground shelters . . . I turn my rage and
confusion towards poetry, the unacknowledged legislation of worlds unacknowledged, to
reveal both systems of knowing (content) and structures of ideology (form). Poetry, the
work of radical linguistic, contextual, and metrical articulation, is a way to structure my
sometimes perpendicular thought processes, transforming confusion and anger into form
and meaning. (2)
Prevallet uses Charles Olson’s “Projective Verse” and Open Field Poetics, as well as other long
poems by women (Susan Howe, Anne Waldman, Muriel Rukeyser) as examples of poetic
projects that open to the messiness of history and the process of examining human experience
within the space of the poem. A relational poetics considers “texts as being themselves in a
constant state of motion, dispersion, and permeability that is inseparable not only from the
shifting social and political context, but from the cycles of the earth and the diversity of nature”
(4). The Relational poet constructs by way of a collection of gathered material, an “accumulation
of sediments” that may contribute to an “apprehension of the world not as an unshaped bundle of
materials waiting to be formed, but rather as a diverse and extensive patterning that is already
formed and transforming, already imbued with a logic” (4). This strikes at the heart of what,
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Dahlen is doing throughout her long work: gathering, looking for patterns, recording and
working with the bits and details in a reciprocal constructive process. As she gathers and
assembles, the work simultaneously informs her own knowledge about the work and about the
world; the text is a process of apprehension. And the materials of the text—the fragments,
quotations, pieces of history and thought—combine to build a hybrid genre work that breaks
away from conventional notions of poetry, journal writing, or autobiography to create something
else, an alternative model for coming to know through the practice of writing.
Writing on Dahlen’s work, Megan Simpson claims that A Reading is “a performance of
exploration and discovery in which the writing functions as a reading of the author’s life, self,
unconscious, relationship to language, and the cultural knowledge that informs and partakes in
the construction of all these” (83). Simpson examines the feminist, woman-subject of the text
through its Freudian-Lacanian elements, and Dahlen’s renegotiation of these, through Kristeva,
which foregrounds both an engagement and play with language and the psychoanalytic process.
“Dahlen’s sense of language as endlessly meaningful (i.e., generative) and yet interminably
indecipherable renders her project quite similar to H.D.’s. Both writers, of course, are working
out of Freud’s theory of the unconscious” (85). Language here is “the active agent” and “what
language is not, in this work whose primary method of composition is free association, is
seamlessly symbolic, coherent, or controlled” (85). Additionally, “the speaking (writing/reading)
subject in A Reading is shown to be in a constant process of construction—indeterminate,
interminable, fluid and multiple—indeed a series of overlapping and unfixed identities” (85).
The subject of the text, and the text itself, are fluid and multiple; the “messages” in the work
exist in and through the very methodology of the work itself as well as more directly taking on
cultural politics in its content. This will become clear in the close readings of the text below. In
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the meantime, it is important to note that Dahlen functions in this work as both writer and reader
(of other texts and of her own). The title, A Reading, works in multi-directional ways: who is
reading whom and/or what remains in constant motion. Within the Freudian-Lacanian
framework Dahlen seems to realize, according to Simpson, “the most powerful threat to the law
of the father . . . is simply the knowledge that knowledge itself is constructed and perpetuated in
the service of maintaining the authority of this law in the first place” (88). This is a kind of
knowledge that can be dangerous; when one can see through the authority of the law, through the
ideological construction of knowledge and social understanding, one becomes threatening to
those structures. Further, “the reading-writing subject-in-process in A Reading constantly asks
what knowledge is, even as she seeks to know; this asking often reveals itself through
contradiction” (88). A Reading performs the act of questioning, breaking through the language
and narratives that reinforce social norms: it queers those norms through active subversion and
critique, and enacts alternative ways of using language to create a different type of model for
reading and writing oneself into larger spaces of knowing. Simpson claims that “Dahlen is not so
much protesting gender hierarchies as she is celebrating the possibilities for getting outside of
them by using the language differently” (92). Through the contradictions and gaps that happen
by way of interrogation and investigation, one comes to see the constructed nature of power and
gender structures as these surface in Dahlen’s readings. Through dismantling linguistic
structures—allowing the Kristevan semiotic to resonate throughout the work—and making her
feminist politics transparent—through direct references and social commentary—Dahlen works
simultaneously textually and culturally to think political action from the ground up.
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Lynn Keller reads Dahlen next to DuPlessis as women writers who are consciously trying
to use language differently, and with a specific sense of politics in mind. 12 These are writers who
“have dealt with the problematics of an inheritance that positions man as writer and woman as
written partly by seeking out a female tradition of writers who explored language innovations
with a consciousness of the relation between gender and language” (241). Keller notes both
writers’ complicated relationship to masculinist tradition (literary, psychoanalytic) in which they
are implicated and simultaneously turn away, in DuPlessis’s terms, to pursue an “Otherhow” of
feminist writing practice. Keller further shows the connection between these contemporary poets
and two other important influences on their work: H.D. and Robert Duncan. She traces some of
the similarities, particularly between Duncan and both DuPlessis’s and Dahlen’s poetics and
process. Duncan seems to have served as a model for both poets in part because of his own
version of a feminist, queer poetics, and the three poets similar interests in writing that is
ahierarchal, polyphonic, nonlinear, nonteleological (247); the focus on Freudian thinking and
analysis in his own poetic process (248); the “acceptance of the artist’s alienation from
hegemonic society . . . and his determination to use poetry as social critique” (249); and what he
terms the “derivative” nature of the writing (250). These strategies call attention to writing that
reworks literary tradition. Work by writers such as DuPlessis and Dahlen is additionally “selfconsciously gendered” and “is composed with the transgressive awareness that while a woman
writes within the gender system, her position is also radically and inevitably ‘outside the law’”
(252). This would apply as well to Duncan who brought his own sexual politics to his writing,
creating poems that could be read as queer in form and content. Although Keller, DuPlessis, and
Dahlen seem to agree that there is no inherent connection between the feminine/female and the

12

Keller is referring to DuPlessis’ continuing, long poem project, Drafts, which is also hybrid in its intertextuality
and interested in correspondence between texts and among subjects.
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experimental (252), the consciousness of language structure and writing method, and an
awareness and politics of gender, combine to work through and inhabit the form-content
complex that becomes the work itself. The work becomes “queer” in its refusal to subscribe to
any proscribed theories of gender or sexual identification, linguistically or socially, as well as in
its subversive practices. In Dahlen’s work, the content (including domestic themes or journal
writing, Freudian theory, history, literary history, feminist politics) combines with formal
elements, themselves charged with a politics of challenging modernist and psychoanalytic
traditions. The work takes the private, “feminine” journal into the public space by way of a
written text that is both a product of literary tradition and directly in response to that as critique,
resistance, and reworking. The “otherhow” space that is still always articulated through, or
within, the context of the dominant linguistic discourse and cultural space becomes a tool for
widening or dismantling the dominant structure from within. The work of Beverly Dahlen, even
more specifically, disrupts and shifts conventional modes of knowing and understanding in
multiple ways. The combination of writing strategy, intertextual dialogue, and reflection that
happens through the body of the work makes a case for the displacement of the solitary writer as
all-knowing, inspired master-mind author, and instead instates spaces into the literary landscape
that open to various forms, styles, and voices that rework culturally accepted traditions,
prejudices, and binaries. Dahlen, in her long work, creates spaces that are heterotopic, in
Foucault’s terms. A Reading includes spaces that are simultaneously real and unreal, that open
what otherwise might be a linear space into a spatial network of connected spaces, each in
relation to the other, the whole reflecting the impossibility of a whole unless it is textured and
contradictory. This heterotopic space ultimately includes the actual and the potential, the present
and the past.
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The question of space, and spatial logic in the text, relates to the interrogation of borders
in formally innovative work; in part, the experimental text serves to open space in terms of
representation and genre, to ignore boundaries and advocate for the practice of new ways of
writing and thinking. In the introduction to Moving Borders Mary Margaret Sloan writes, “The
terms for defining innovative writing over the last three decades center on issues of formal
exploration, that is, on the interrogation of forms of representation and on the opening and
investigation of literary structures and genres” (6). The theme of the anthology is the movement
between, and manipulation of, aesthetic and culturally constructed borders. In Dahlen’s work, the
border between form and content is often erased, or shifted substantially. Sloan explains: “If
there is a particular focus in these writings on space as the ground for literary exposition and
therefore necessarily on questions of boundary, position, and closure, that interest may express
the radically changing status of contemporary women” (6-7). And it is at every level that Dahlen,
as a discerning reader interested in the politics of innovation in writing, and the politics of
women in the world, investigates how these boundaries are negotiated. A Reading 1-7 begins
with the following:
before that and before that. everything in a line. where it was broken into, the house. not a
body but still I could not see that it didn’t have a roof. then there was something to cry
about. assumption of protection. whether I thought the sky the top of. whatever does. this
I carry forward. the sky which was not a limit but apparently so. and that mistake which.
colored it. what color? as if in another light. so shadows. (15)
The series begins in the middle of a sentence that alludes to beginning (e.g., “in the beginning”),
as well as tradition (in literature) or history (we repeat history), and the concept of linearity,
which immediately seems ironic since the text is nearly the antithesis of linear. Dahlen writes,
“everything in a line” but what kind of line? A line of poetry? A line in which things fall in
order? Although there may be some order that these sentences follow, the paragraph seems
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random, definitely paratactic. And the next sentence (fragment) is curious since the first part of it
can be read as following the previous sentence, “everything in a line. where it was broken into,”
as well as with its own subject, “a house.” If read that with the previous sentence the text already
is commenting on its own methodology of writing sentences, lines, and then breaking into them.
And even in the rest of that sentence, “house” might be read metaphorically in terms of language,
and Dahlen’s project as a response to formalism in poetry. Further, the references to the “roof”
and the “sky” point toward this breaking out, or going beyond, limits of language and tradition;
she writes, “the sky which was not a limit but apparently so” foreshadows the politics of the
work in that appearances—or assumptions, like cultural myths and reinforced social “rules” and
“roles”—can be deceiving. Even the sky is not the limit (does not limit) but colors and shades of
“meaning” can be interpreted as having such limits. But this means that they can also be
interpreted otherwise. The point is to “be in” the process since, like in psychoanalysis, reading
and writing continue on indefinitely: “the interminable reading. the infinite analysis” (17).
Further referencing Freud and Lacan, Dahlen writes: “turning first to the chapter on mourning
and melancholia and later to the chapter on the uncanny. this was about mirrors. in some sense
she was my double. she died” (19). The mirror represents double-ness, the real and not real, the
subject who is not autonomous. But who “she” is in this passage, who is the subject, who the
double, who dies, one cannot tell from the text. In Kristeva’s theory of abjection, following
Lacan and Freud, the abject subject is part of, and rejected from, symbolic order. “She” in this
sense might be a kind of universal “She,” an abject subject within the phallic, symbolic order.
Freud will continue to appear throughout A Reading in various permutations. Dahlen also
references innumerable other sources and writers, though the specific nature of the references is
often unclear. For instance, she writes, “we do not love words the way we love things” (20) and
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although we might read this in Freudian terms, after the discussion of HERmione above it is
impossible not to think of Her’s obsession with language, in particular, nouns and naming. But
Dahlen’s line here is misleading, for read in terms of H.D., words and things cannot be
separated, or “things” are what make language come alive, as concrete elements of language.
Further, Dahlen early on begins to comment on narrative form; A Reading is, at least in part, a
response to narrative in terms of structure, linearity, plot, and character development. A Reading
should not be read as a poem simply because it is not narrative, but in its critique of narrative the
formal strategies of A Reading incorporate narrative elements as well as other elements of prose
and poetry writing. For example, in the passage: “following that she dropped from sight. follow
the thought, it goes somewhere. in narrative we follow a trail, the clues laid out. that’s how it
becomes the illusion of space. that we follow it. the ubiquitous Galápagos trail marker, the post
painted black and white” (21) Dahlen examines the idea that narrative structure inherently
includes clues not just for reading, but for reading with a sense of linear progression and
“meaning,” the payoff for following from one thought to another, from beginning, through
middle, to the end. Interestingly, she writes, “that’s how it becomes the illusion of space” instead
of saying that narrative is itself an illusion, narrative becomes the “illusion of space,” followed
by “that we follow it.” Ironically (and purposefully), the thoughts here are not easy to follow and
seem to stand still, in the middle of the trail, at the trail marker. The “illusion of space” is like the
illusion of the trail, which is only a trail because of the trail markers lining it. In narrative there
are “ubiquitous” clues to keep one reading forward. In this text there are no narrative clues to aid
in progressive, linear development.
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However, narrative does play a role throughout the series. In the following, we are again
reminded of HERmione and the relation between experience and writing, between cultural
identity and textual identity:
this is the story of my life. I cast her in the third person or in the second person at will.
who is this I? who asks the question already knows the answer. it is nothing, illusion,
something made up out of loss, desire. you suffer her fate. she, and not he. the child is a
gift and suffers the fatality of the given. (34)
This passage could be responding specifically to HERmione; it is possible that Dahlen had read
HERmione as an unpublished manuscript in the late 70s, or in the early 80s in its published form,
since A Reading 1-7 wasn’t published until 1985. Certainly, Dahlen was reading other work of
H.D. as a modernist influence; and because of their shared interest in Freud, H.D. can be said to
resonate throughout Dahlen’s work. As in HERmione, this passage foregrounds pronouns as the
linguistic representation of self in relation to world, as well as the narrative illusion of the clarity
of this relationship. The syntax itself, in its strangeness, enacts the difficulty of telling a life
story, particularly when the (female) subject is born into a “given” social/symbolic structure.
Additionally, Freudian desire to “know” or find meaning in one’s life story becomes infused
with narrative desire to progress through the text in order to arrive at an answer to the question,
“who is this I?” But the answer, like desire, can only be “nothing,” there is only the illusion of an
answer, ultimately only a lack/loss. Later, she writes:
how come it’s easier to write her, that third person. how come saying I means I. a
confession. the I is never identical with the fictional character being written. ‘the moment
of writing.’ but what I that is not a fiction, there isn’t one, me from moment to moment, I
think I know where I am. ‘where you are there arises a place.’ a theory of relativity. (72)
The relation between time and place/space, as well as subject and text is woven into this passage
that cites Rilke (‘where you are there arises a place’) and any number of other writers who could
be attributed for the quoted: “the moment of writing.” Writing in third person gives the writer
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subjective distance; in H.D.’s case this distance is always in flux as the narration moves between
first and third-person voice throughout HERmione. Dahlen is aware of the difficulties of
narration and how pronouns play a crucial role. And if “saying I” is a confession and also makes
that “I” fictional, this creates multiple layers of analysis that simply acceding to narrative does
not.
Dahlen’s non-syntactically correct, non/narrative analysis of narrative uncovers a
complexity, particularly for the woman writer as cultural and textual subject. Subjectivity in
narrative is a theory of relativity, in the sense of Friedman’s concept of the “geographics of
identity,” by which the subject is always contextualized, positioned, located in relation to
multiple elements simultaneously from one moment, or one space, to the next. Kristeva’s
subject, or identity, in-process, acts similarly: the subject in the world is in flux, always in
relation and not always progressing or developing in a linear fashion. The non/narrative text
enacts an interrogation of narrative, linearly constructed subjectivity, and aims for a type of
characterization that shows its subjects to be contextualized and in-process, even when the text
consequently becomes messy and complicated because of it. Although pushing further out and
away from cohesive narrative strategies, Dahlen does not abandon narrative altogether. Rather,
she purposefully weaves in and out of a narrative voice in order to simultaneously draw attention
to the difficulties of narrative form, while offering an alternative means of exploratory writing in
which desire for “meaning” is considered in terms of knowledge. This allows the writing (via
reading) to push open spaces for further thought, reflection, and insight. We might read this as a
relational strategy of gathering and resonance:
(All this language is floating. The men make statements. They use the forms of the verb
‘to be’ with confidence. What I write is provisional. It depends. It is subject to constant
modification. It depends.) (76)
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The writing, like the subject, is “subject to constant modification”; this is why the writing, like
analysis, is interminable. This is an alternative also to the Cartesian male sense of subjectivity in
which simply to state “I am” is in fact, “to be” without an understanding of positioning in terms
of linguistic or social context. In fact, “I am,” like the text, “provisional,” and dependent upon
any multitude of factors or elements at any given time. And because subjectivity is implemented
in and through language, the language then must float toward discovery (questioning) and away
from definition (making statements).
Not knowing can, in fact, be a means of discovering knowledge. Switching into a first
person narrator addressing a second person “other,” Dahlen writes:
the reading of the writing goes on, this is for you because you are not here. you are
always not here. you are never here. I make you up, I wonder how you look. and now it is
so much easier to write than to speak. an other is so much an hallucination it’s scary. I do
not know what I speak to. (78)
Two pages later this passage is repeated exactly. Although Dahlen repeats words, phrases, and
ideas occasionally throughout the entire series, this is one of only a couple of whole passages
that are rewritten word for word. This lends toward an interpretation of its importance, but also a
sense of anxiety. “I do not know what I speak to” might point to some sort of anxiety about the
project, yet this statement occurs in the middle of the first book, A Reading 1-7, and the series
continues on through three more books (so far) after this. Important to the project is this sense of
not knowing, of allowing the text to remain open. And here it also comments further on the
relationship between self and other, writer and reader, reader and (previous) texts. It is unclear
why the other of this address is “always not here. you are never here,” and why the syntactically
awkward “you are always not here” is repeated in more simple terms, “you are never here”;
however, the words “always” and “never” resonate in their antithesis even if the two sentences
say the same thing. It seems clear at least that even without a specific sense or understanding of
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her audience, the narrator requires “an other” in order to have a textual subjectivity, in order to
write at all; “the reading of the writing goes on” and in a circular fashion: Dahlen reads previous
writing, takes notes, writes her own text, reads more writing, and it goes on.
Dahlen’s strategies might lead us to consider the question of power and how she is
responding to that. Is the lack of power, of “othered” subjects, used as a positive motivation in a
text that circulates instead of progresses forward, toward some goal or end? The anti-symbolic,
non/narrative text, in Dahlen’s terms, may be as she writes, “a power which is no power. a
display of wounds. all that should have remained hidden, obscene, a great need, a lack” (88).
Thinking back to Hayden White, the non/narrative historical document is lacking when it is not
turned into, or accompanied by, a narrative account. Or, historical narratives might leave out the
original document altogether and instead narrate it for readers, so that the original remains
“hidden.” Many of Dahlen’s primary sources are hidden, in the sense that she doesn’t cite them
other than using quotes, and sometimes not even that. Though the “display of wounds. all that
should have remained hidden” is in fact on display here, not hidden at all; the sources are not
cited, but the material is transparently on the surface of the text, in all of its fragmentation and
messiness. Narrative cohesion smoothes over gaps and holes that make a story messy, but
Dahlen’s messy story gives us something else; like White’s examples of the annals or chronicles,
A Reading offers readers the language, detail, and space in which to interact and interpret. Before
language is constructed into symbolic language, according to Kristeva, this semiotic space enacts
emotion, music, and pure potential for exploration, in contradistinction to symbolic narrative
structure in which movement and understanding are ordered and organized with little flexibility
for the incoherent. Making the wounds, or the lack, positive and offering a credible example of
possible alternative ways of knowing, a text like Dahlen’s is going beyond simply reacting to
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“masculine” writing with “feminine” writing. Of greater importance here is the opening of the
continuum of possibility, for greater inclusion of linguistic and narrative practices that, in
Dahlen’s, terms might “disavow” difference and complicate our reading practices as well as our
understandings of gender:
if sexual difference is disavowed she
if sexual difference is disavowed she
will be more complicated (88)
If there is no sexual difference, then what is there? Although it may be impossible to imagine
such a scenario, it is the possibility of imagining that is important. Without sexual difference,
how does one exist as a knowing “she”? It is more complicated because it hasn’t been thought
before. This passage, the repetition of the first two lines, calls attention to how A Reading, in so
many various ways, leads us through questions and potential possibilities for thinking in different
terms, and challenging our inherited, normative beliefs.
Throughout A Reading, Dahlen creates alternative forms of expression, using and writing
over previous texts and ideas. Over the course of the series she alternates between long prose
lines and shorter, broken poetic lines, drawing attention to the white space of the page.
Sometimes she numbers the sections, and sometimes not, though each section ends with a note
on the dates of writing, and when applicable, revision dates. In order to conclude this reading of
A Reading 1-7, I have included the long passage below which acts as a poetics of the project at
large:
a white space intervening.
a white space intervening, white, white. that white light, static. questioning the first draft.
this is not a literary work, I told him, this is not fussy. this is not my mother dusting the
daisies. this is not domestic duty. this is not the idea. a preconception. this is it. the baby.
the corpse. you can take that body and cut it up forever. this is a metaphor. a something. a
meaning carried over. from one thing to the next. these are my leg hairs. the short hair
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that grows at the edge of my lips. lips, teeth. this is my little bow mouth. here it is. you
will never know what I mean. when I say you I mean me. erasing all the I’s and using
instead the third person. it alternates. an alternation, or alteration of generations. it
changes. in other words. i.e., it changes. that is to say, it changes. it alters. it becomes
something else, though its original form is still visible. one can trace that. he put a mark
over it, a cross, but the word could still be read beneath it. ‘the effacement of the trace.’
(90)
The line, “the effacement of the trace” comes from Derrida in Of Grammatology: “it is the myth
of the effacement of the trace, that is to say of an originary difference that is neither absence nor
presence, neither negative nor positive.” Both the trace and its effacement are based in originary
myths. Further, Derrida states, “Writing is one of the representatives of the trace in general, it is
not the trace itself. The trace itself does not exist . . . . In a way, this displacement leaves the
place of the decision hidden, but it also indicates it unmistakably” (167).13 The difference, or the
spaces between, the displacement, allow for movement between past and present, from previous
to contemporary texts. Dahlen, in the passage above, seems aware of the trace as both real and
mythical; previous ideas and practices both repeat and change until there is no longer an actual
origin, even if “its original form is still visible.” Like hereditary characteristics in families, new
writing both resembles, and is unique from, its precursors.
Absence and lack are necessary to presence, to signification. Dahlen builds on this idea of
language play as well as writing, and writing over, to show change and similarity; although
according to Derrida, the trace does not exist, has no original cause, it nonetheless lends toward
this idea of change and alteration which Dahlen repeats in the passage. In the very beginning of
the passage, she writes, “questioning the first draft,” mentions “metaphor” and “meaning carried
13

In Introduction to Phenomenology, Dermot Moran explains, “From Levinas in particular, Derrida takes the notion
of ‘trace’ as a mark of something absent that has never actually been present…As Derrida comments…a ‘trace’ is
not an effect since it does not actually have a cause. All signs are in effect traces. Indeed, the act of signifying itself
can only be understood as a trace. Derrida talks of language as a ‘play of traces’… In Derrrida’s use of the term
trace, it applies as much to the future as to the past, and indeed constitutes the present by its very relation to what is
absent” (469).
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over,” and a body that might be cut up into eternity, like the text in which only effacement is
continuous. What has come before is still always visible, even if it cannot go back to a single
origin. And the play of language results also in yet another reference to movement between first,
second, and third-person pronouns and the subjective layering that happens here: “when I say
you I mean me. erasing all the I’s and using instead the third person.” The effacement of the
trace, the effacement of the text, the erasing of “I” and use of “she” or “he” results in an insight
on the process of reading, writing, erasing, adding to; the process of writing/effacing a text, an
identity, is continuous, alternating, changing yet also retaining something of what came before.
The palimpsest as metaphor offers an example of transparency that more structurally coherent,
linear narrative writing does not as it neatly covers over that which might cause us to question.
As if concluding this passage, after the Derrida quote, Dahlen writes: “what thought there was
we do not know. we will never discover it. it is not there. it is gone, or it never existed” (90). And
so the point is not in discovering the “origin” but in the process itself of using/reusing, of
reading/writing/rewriting in order to discover new thoughts; though coming out of a history of
thought, they nonetheless also stand on their own. In a sense then, Dahlen’s text, based on and in
conversation with previous texts and ideas is, as she writes, “beginning anew. that we come to it”
(107). And it is through this hybrid genre text, that is both poetry and prose, narrative and
non/narrative, that the productive, processual space is opened for “conclusions” that cannot be
predicted ahead of time. She writes: “on the third day I embarked for the promised land. these
are narrative sentences and not statements. they are suspended. fictions. holding the breath,
breathlessly, to watch it, how it will progress, what will be the outcome, the end” (112). One
must watch how it will progress, from one suspended, fictional narrative sentence to another.
Dahlen draws a distinction between fictional narrative sentences, and (factual) statements, as if
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to emphasize the fabricated nature of narrative that we might not otherwise see through; narrative
catches our attention (and keeps us distracted), we hold our breaths, watching to see what will
happen.
The second book in the series, A Reading 8-10, repeats and expands upon themes and
texts from the first book and adds new material. In addition to Freud, Dahlen expands her
reading to include more feminist commentary, especially in relation to female historical figures
and writers, as well as references to Marx and larger social/economic structures in which Freud
as well as other thinkers and writers are a part. Both explicit and implicit references to H.D. are
included, as well as metacommentary on reading, writing, narration, and the “autobiographical”
subject of the text, or the problematic nature of that.
Dahlen begins section 8 with a specific image: “this leaf, the local. splotched or daubed
with silvery white a descending order of greens, and red. I read the seeds, colors and shapes,”
invoking the local, specific leaf within a hierarchy greens. Further in the paragraph, she writes,
“there is a project called nature beyond the pale. a leaf, a stream, infringed upon, not safely in
another dimension” (7). This book puts us immediately in a space between nature and culture, in
which the particular details of a leaf can offer insight into the social workings of the larger world.
Only a little further down the page the gender critique begins when she writes: “an undisturbed
genius. the genius of the room is masculine. but the mother is the muse. she who charms us by
her silence, and her beauty, or fascinates and repels by her ugliness, her oldness. and I in the
guise of the knight. in the name of the son I rebel” (7). Although Dahlen uses mostly lower case
throughout the series, the “I” is always capitalized, giving power to the female speaking subject.
The “I” is, at the same time, in this selection caught in a kind of gender confusion, if we read the
speaker as female. Though the female can be “in the guise of the knight” and can rebel “in the
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name of the son” this nonetheless seems to push the gendered binary not toward androgyny but
toward something more akin to a potential for queer identification that may or not be culturally
acceptable.14 Further in this section she writes, “she played the illusion of the bridal veil swathed
in hipboots. she herself unwinding. these identities. a wounded father, the lack, the absence” (7).
The genius of the masculine author is foregrounded and challenged by a female writer/speaker
doing in this text something different from masculine “genius” literary writing, even while this
tradition is invoked, instead of ignored. This project deconstructs, reads, and writes through
multiple registers, including literary history, using language that is at times narrative, and other
times, fragmented and paratactic; ideas repeat and shift, creating a constellation of investigations
into social, linguistic, and gender systems. As in the work of Stein, Dahlen’s uses of language
play function aesthetically in terms of sound and musicality, as well as participating in the
content of critique in the text. The politics are enacted within the lyric play of language, among
other things, as a challenge to traditional forms of lyric poetry that portrayed women as the
written, or muse, without agency.
it is the law alone that finds her unnatural
‘this is not nature’ I said to him
it is not nature you cannot speak of it
the law of the father determines her fate (13)
Literature, psychoanalysis, lyric poetry are not natural phenomena but are constructed according
to “the law of the father,” linguistic, social, and historical systems rooted in the patriarchal.
Again, the play between personal pronouns points to a shifting subjectivity, much like in
HERmione, in which the narrator negotiates her position between self and world. Dahlen further
references a number of historical female figures, weaving them into the poetic prose of the text,
for example in the passages below:
14

For Foucault “The binary regulation of sexuality suppresses the subversive multiplicity of a sexuality that disrupts
heterosexual, reproductive, and medicojuridical hegemonies” (Butler, Gender Trouble 26).
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the moon winked, she rides for us, her red-rimmed eyes. blind truth, it is ‘mediated,
female, and probably mad.’ the matter of Britain, the matter of Troy. a city lost. a woman
on the ramparts. she, she was its downfall, by her treachery, her betrayal. she, Guinevere,
or Helen, outside the law, that dangerous radical, the beautiful woman. (16)
recognize it. she was up all night writing. she thought he was skitterish, he envied her,
was finally jealous of her power. I was thinking of George Sand. (20)
. . . and Macbeth is tempted to enter a world of feminine evil. he is taken in by witches,
by powerful magic, by women who do not bear children in the ordinary way, but bear
prophecy, madness, death. they will act outside the patriarchal order. violating that order
is tragedy (84)
. . . Isis is looking for the fragments as if she were whole. as if she were. come on.
there’s a lovely picture. do not you believe it. Isis is blasted. look it over. there isn’t any
mother who is whole, who can be counted on to pick up the pieces. we all refuse it. no
one will do it. it’s too much like cleaning house, like laundry, like shit. too much like
bloody entrails. (85)
And she continually weaves references to Freud into the text, from “The Wolf Man” and “Dora,”
to the story of his own grandchild playing a game of his own invention: “fort/da, the child with
the cotton reel, a spinning wheel, the counter transference” (41). All of the above examples, in a
way, can be summed up in the fort/da story. The reference is to the recursive action in the game
the child plays with the cotton reel when his mother is gone, throwing it away from him and then
pulling it in, and repeating “fort/da” accordingly (French for “gone” and “there”). Representing
going and coming/returning, this process is not unlike psychoanalysis, which involves a
continual going into and returning, in which both analyst and analysand participate in the process
of narrating and/or giving meaning to the recovery of repressed material. This is also an analogy
for literary history in which prior material is used/referenced and revised, through which
ultimately there is no original trace. This is a more challenging yet still true analogy for women
writers who create, or participate in, an alternate heritage, having been excluded from the male
literary canons; or female characters who participate in the repetition of repression because of
their status as women. Over time, however, some of these women as artists or thinkers may be
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granted greater status, for example writers whose works are posthumously recovered or
published; or figures like Guinevere, Helen, or Emma who act outside the (patriarchal) law; even
though they will suffer the consequences, they will be remembered through history. Dahlen also
recovers, or recontextualizes, female tropes such as the feminine evil in Macbeth, or Isis picking
up the pieces, gathering fragments “as if she were whole,” as is the role of the woman/mother,
because no one else will do it.
In analysis, the repressed material never wholly goes away, but is used in the
transformation from symptomatic or traumatic repetition to more full participation in everyday
life. Participating in everyday life, however, also entails performing according to social and
sexual proscribed “norms” in which one may not feel comfortable or feel recognized, in Butler’s
terms. Dahlen, referencing Simone de Beauvoir writes, “she has mistaken it, mistaken the call.
the brotherhood will not include her. it is madness to think so. and for him also madness, or
pious sentimentality. she has a different story” (60). Getting other stories told is the continual
challenge. Revising or rewriting (repressive) literary history is like a game of fort/da, continually
disappearing and returning, progressing and receding, and becomes a kind of repetition without
origin.
History, or writing, though does not repeat in the same way every time. Feminist politics
or experimental writing, for example, push against boundaries and work to deconstruct limits
imposed through social, linguistic structures or habits. Breaking the habits, troubling the
repetition creates spaces in which new politics and ideas might happen. For example, Dahlen
writes: “there is an edge that has been gone over. past point” (117) and “what is language. a
pattern, an archaic heritage” (120). As in families, heritage repeats and changes. Patterns can be
altered. Limits can be pushed, edges gone beyond. Dahlen uses and recontextualizes Freud
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within the alternative history and canon of female production, and simultaneously creates a
formally alternative text that pushes the boundaries of literary convention, working against social
and linguistic structures as a politics within, and toward action outside of, the text.
For example, throughout A Reading 8-10 Dahlen references Marx, connecting references
to the Freudian/Lacanian Oedipal social/sexual system to the linguistic and the economic.
Language, in the Marxist model as read through Dahlen, is a fundamental element of the
economic system, which cannot be separated from the social. For example, in the following:
reading, I am prepared for this country, with vocabulary, descriptions of foxes, their
pictures, I may never see a fox. whatever else I know through books, it is nothing like
what is. is, is there. there is necessarily no link, no chain fence, stopped short. a word
suffices, it carries no weight, it is a part of the base of the superstructure. (121)
what does it profit anybody, you lost. you can’t do more than lose. it was settled that way.
a basis. base. the foundation. the base and the superstructure. (124)
There seems to be a discrepancy between what the narrator has read in books and what happens
in reality, “it is nothing like what is.” In writing that is part of the base and the superstructure,
that conforms to mainstream norms, cultural narratives, and utilizes conventional narrative
strategies, the “word” carries no weight, it is simply a part of the system. Although she may not
be suggesting the possibility of exiting entirely from the system, drawing attention to the
problematic nature of linguistic, social, and economic repression of “other” elements acts as a
politics that pushes against the restraints to recover language and strategies that work against the
repetition of social, sexual, economic, and linguistic norms.
years. the automatic text. we will not fall out of this world. how. I thought how can you,
are you. I was more than invisible. whatever language is, it is invented. it is a closed
system.
it is all the words you didn’t use. what was not there. they are always looking at it, what
is not there. what is absent. presence is one thing. but only one thing. (137)
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Dahlen in fact seems to say that the work of revision, of reconstruction has to be from within
“this world” and through the very language that had been used historically to control women’s
voices. “Language is invented” and can be manipulated, what has been left out can be included,
can be given material space.
A Reading offers an alternative in its very formal structure, as a non/narrative text that
might be read as analogous to possibilities for social, sexual, economic alternatives. Through
Dahlen’s reading practices, we as readers of her writing participate in the negotiation of narration
within a history of psychoanalysis and patriarchy. Writing itself becomes a process of
understanding oneself, one’s world, and critically thinking of greater political possibilities for
subjects in that world. Among these, we encounter constant slippage and movement, a spatial
simultaneity of ideas, practices, and suggestions that neither move forward nor backward in a
linear way. This practice of coming to knowing is recursive, indeterminate, and interminable.
Dahlen writes, “one writes to find out what one is writing. that is all” (144) though that is not all.
It seems more accurate to say, following Dahlen’s narrator(s) over the course of the work, that
one writes to find out what one knows, does not know, and what one can learn. Reading and
writing are paths to knowledge, the process of which is in itself indeterminate and interminable,
hence the continuous, inconclusive project that is A Reading.
on top of it
it was headquartered in an attic.
walking up the stairs in the dark
one hand against the wall.
what is contiguous, going back in a line
infinite regress, no beginning
no end of circling. (150)
therefore, this is a work about desire.
there is a part that is missing.
if this were known one might move beyond the pairs of
contrasts. (151)
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There will always be a part (at least) that is missing. What is absent, lacking, keeps us going, as
readers and as historical subjects. Desire is that which can never be fulfilled, unless it results in
the end, death. Dahlen’s project is non/narrative: it cannot perform itself as entirely narrative or
entirely not-narrative; it is a continual negotiation of knowledge used in the production of spatial
logics that serve to move us away from linear binaries and toward more inclusion of alternative
practices. And as Dahlen suggests, “one might move beyond the pairs of contrasts.” It is not
simply a matter of choosing one or the other, but through more dialectical relations among
elements, the more we might be able to “move beyond” the opposing contrasts. We might break
out of the linear, binary structures that hold us in a space without possibility or real choice.
A Reading 11-17 further comments on the interminable nature of the reading and the
writing, and uses desire, the negative, or lack, as positive motivation for continuing the series. As
the series progresses, the critique of narrative as ideology, and the general social adherence to
norms that confine and define, plays out in various examples and examinations. The often
disparate, fragmented, textured writing dismantles the rigid structures of social and sexual
thinking and offers new ways of using language to represent ideas and experience.
there will never be time to write all the sentences one may have been capable of writing,
even about one subject. take a subject, anything, it is so simple, but the sentence is
notched, can view the relationship from any one of a number (the number is infinite) of
stances. where would you like to stand to view this one. any sentence is merely an
example. it shows what might be done. a sentence is a model, in no way permanent, of
thought. (62)
The sense of infinity and impermanence also keep writing and knowing in flux. There can be no
closure because any sentence cannot permanently contain thoughts or ideas, and therefore the
text is always open to change and fluctuation. This is not unlike thinking which can change as
moments and contexts change. As Dahlen writes, “thinking is the same as writing. writing
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thoughts in which you move. follow one thing to the next. there, I said to her, write that, that’s
your first line. then what do you think of. then what do you imagine. do you begin there, not
hearing the others?” (69) Through writing one comes to know, or make sense of one’s thoughts.
And, like thinking, writing can be circular, can seem to have arbitrary beginnings and endings.
One moves through writing as one moves through thinking. In A Reading, thinking, writing, and
reading are always in close relation:
but of course there was the reading also. first one would have been
a reader. then one was helpless. then one knew nothing but the
writing. as the reader one knew nothing but the writing. then
the person disappears. then, and then the writing is all. all
there is. then there is nothing but reader, reader of the writing.
then we can only wonder at the person who might have been, the
someone who was there, now gone, disappeared long ago behind the
writing. there, perhaps, once, but that was long ago. the writer
may now be gone, dead perhaps. in any case, not there. (86)
Although one has to start with the reading, something prior must have been written, and again we
are inside the circularity of the trace without origin. In any case, the reading makes one
“helpless” and without recourse but to engage in the writing which then “becomes all”; of course
this is still intimately attached to the reading as one becomes “the reader of the writing.” And it
is the writing which will outlive any particular writer about whom we can “only wonder at the
person who might have been.” In the end, the identity of the writer is only that of the text itself,
as the text moves from the writer and into the world. Ultimately, Dahlen seems to have faith in
the text’s potential impact on the social:
a work one desired to see slim and easy. all this, and something
else too. why not change? why not make another pact with the
future. what of the past, that it stopped, at a certain place,
and not all would be, that not at all, that the narrative line
would be lost. muscles work, a certain pitch is achieved, desire
stands out, sweating over the surface. what is this but disgust,
what is it but
doesn’t it hurt, she said. there
the very picture of desire, the body a display of symptoms, the
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painful inanimate breaking out. (73)
She asks what may be the most important question: “why not change?” It sounds so simple.
However, reading history in a way that lends toward making “another pact with the future” might
both disrupt narrative tradition and be painful. The syntax in this passage makes the meaning
unclear, but this is part of the point: the disruption of the norm (in syntax, in narrative, in the
structure of desire, in reading history) in order to make changes toward a different type of future.
But the changes are not definitive. Breaking out of the narrative habits of history opens spaces
for alternative ideas, identifications, texts, practices that lend toward multiple future possibilities.
Breaking out of linear, binary structures of thinking ultimately can be a cognitive practice that
opens possibilities for more spatial, heterotopic, heterogeneous practices. If the nature of desire
is such that we keep wanting more, keep moving forward, so that to stop (reading, writing,
working for change) is to, in a sense, die, then we might think of Dahlen’s work as inclusive of
both textual and social desire: there can be no closure or conclusion because there is always more
work to do.
Like challenging literary tradition, social change can be difficult and painful, but the
desire for a different future makes it also necessary. A Reading, as a series, is a project of social
change through literary action (experimentation); there is no way to predict the outcome, but in
the process the writing continually builds upon what has come before in order to leave us no
choice but to consider the nature of choice itself, to question and reflect upon how we know what
we know and where that information comes from. A Reading doesn’t simply repeat the same
continuous social critique, but moves through examples and ideas in a circular and spatial
fashion so that these ideas resonate, while others accumulate, adding to the argumentative
impulse and call for social action that, ultimately, is a great part of the motivation of this work.
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A Reading 18-20 returns more intently to the theme of desire, taking the concept of
narrative desire in non/narrative directions. In addition to Brooks’s discussion of narrative desire
above, I look to Teresa de Lauretis’s notion of perverse desire as a way to further think about
alternatives to normative conceptions of desire and representation. Bringing de Lauretis’ (re)use
of the perverse, into conversation with Dahlen’s material, textual practices further makes my
point that the experimental works I am examining are invested in textual and cultural politics and
change for marginalized and “othered” subjects. Kristeva queers the symbolic, heteronormative
language system, and de Lauretis queers Freud, on his own terms, through his concept of
perversion. De Lauretis reworks Freud’s idea of perversion into a useful conception of lesbian
desire that can be considered outside of the Oedipal complex and Freud’s theory of castration.
The disavowal of castration, according to de Lauretis, moves the subject out of the Oedipal
model (penis envy/castration) and into the female body (outside of the relationship to the penis):
one’s own (subjectivity), or another’s (fetish). She explains:
the mediating term, the signifier of desire, is not the paternal phallus but the fetish. . . .
fetishistic or perverse desire goes beyond the Oedipus complex and in its own way
resolves it. For the instinctual investment represented by the fetish is an investment not
in the mother (negative Oedipus) or in the father/father’s child (positive Oedipus), but in
the female body itself, ultimately in the subject’s own body-image and body-ego whose
loss or lack it serves to disavow. (Practice 289)
The fetish, or the object of desire, as a same-sex object, makes the desire perverse, but de
Lauretis’ notion of disavowing castration (lack), and instead emphasizing the female body,
reforms the idea of perverse desire into a useful model for lesbian studies. Although focusing
specifically on lesbian desire in relation to the Freudian, Oedipal, heterosexual structure of
“normal” sexuality, de Lauretis also suggests that perverse desire might be considered in terms
of the non-normatively heterosexual. She explains that “if perversion is understood with Freud as
a deviation of the sexual drive from the path leading to the reproductive object . . . then a theory
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of perversion would serve to articulate a model of perverse desire where perverse means not
pathological but rather non-heterosexual, or non-normatively heterosexual” (Figures 86).
Perversion, simply put, is deviation from the norm. If (hetero)sexuality, as a model for social
structure, includes reproduction as its goal (sexual and social), then any deviation from that (nonsexual reproduction; refusal to reproduce oppressive social ideologies) can be considered
“perverse.” If “perversion” is seen as a turning away from “a socially constituted norm” and not
a refusal of nature, then this norm, or “normal sexuality,” can be seen as “a requirement of social
reproduction, both reproduction of the species and reproduction of the social system” (de
Lauretis, Figures 113). As a socially constituted norm, sexuality is repeated through cultural
myths and narratives, ideology, and (patriarchal, heterosexual) power structures.
Although not overtly writing from within a space of lesbian desire, Dahlen tackles the
social (vs. “natural”) throughout A Reading, in various examples. In this last book of the series,
she references Marx’s model of the base and superstructure which constitute economic and
social institutions such as religion, politics, and law. Like H.D., Dahlen is interested in what
happens outside the proscribed norms instilled within the socialization process that begins in the
Oedipal stages of development. And using de Lauretis’s notion of the non-normatively
heterosexual, from Freud and H.D. and into Dahlen, I think we can read a kind of perverse desire
in the formal strategies of the text that refuses to participate in a satisfaction of narrative desire—
which moves from beginning through a middle and toward an ending in resolution and closure. A
Reading perverts the narrative by focusing on its own material textuality, and its interest in the
disavowal of the (hetero)normative Oedipal model which suppresses female subjectivity and the
possibility of alternative object choice. The feminist text breaks away from phallic power
structures to focus on its own development and reach out to other, non-(hetero)-normative
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subjects, a kind of textual desire offering a non-narrative alternative to the dominance of
narrative norms.
In section 18, Dahlen writes from the perspective of a first-person autobiographical
narrator reading and thinking about desire through Barrett Watten, and Derrida:
Then I was reading a recent essay of Barrett Watten’s which begins: “The world is
structured on its own displacement.” . . . . I read it again and again. I tried to imagine
using it, going beyond it. All I could really imagine was quoting it in its entirety. What
did I want? the negation of a negation? Watten’s work reminded me of all I know to be
true: that the world, the self and the other are created out of absence, lack, desire; that
“desire is the desire for meaning itself” (I do not know where that quote comes from),
that desire is that which by definition can never be fulfilled.
“We make something out of what’s missing,” Watten writes, “by filling in the
blanks, giving our meaning to what has been negated. Such are the limits of art.”
So the world is put off, and meaning is postponed indefinitely; this is Derrida’s
différence. It is one of the meanings . . . of writing as/an endlessly unfinished work.15 (12)
In fact it is narrative meaning that is put off, postponed. If narrative desire only ends in the
closure of the text and death, then instead the writing or any art might continue on without
finishing. The negative space, the lack that is created by desire is actually positive space in which
we as readers, audience, citizens can participate and create, to “make something out of what’s
missing.” This doesn’t elide “meaning” but changes the terms of how to mean, or what
“meaning” means. Narrative meaning controls our reading and interpretation practices.
Non/narrative reading and writing calls on readers to participate, to bring our own meanings to
the gaps and spaces that are apparent in the non-cohesive, non-linear text. In this way, we come
to not only understand the “displacement” of the world better, but learn to engage more fully
outside the norms of knowledge and action.
Sections 19-20 continue to reference desire as well as religion and history. The series
continues, in this last book (so far) to weave the personal, political, and commentary on social
norms and institutions. Following the references to Marx and the economic-social structure
15
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contextualized by the base-superstructure, we can’t help but read “religion” in this last book in
terms of its normalizing, ideological function (by way of Althusser following Marx). Religious
narratives, like other sorts of cultural narratives, serve to keep norms intact, to give followers
faith and doctrine instead of gaps and spaces for questions. Like historical narratives, religious
narratives are meant to be easily digestible and consumed without effort.
what would it make up
though I have not charity
I’d be as tinkling brass or
field lilies
who are the poor in spirit
who walk around with the kingdom of heaven
in their heads
who’d be there counting out peoples
kindred in the roofs of their mouths
here is the church
and here is the steeple
mimicking past lives
the ghost of a chance
the productions of time congealing
the trees swaying in the wind
as they do in silent films
at 16 frames per second (21)
The tone is hard to read here, but there is at least a sense of pointing to the gaps, or the way that
stories (like children’s games) simplify “faith” so that one need not question. There is a
discrepancy, for example, between actually having charity in the world (action) and walking
around “with the kingdom of heaven” in one’s head (non-action). The lines “here is the church /
and here is the steeple” refer to the children’s rhyme in which one opens her interlocked hands to
show the fingers that represent opening the doors to “see all the people,” a narrative construction
not unlike a silent film moving slowly enough for the images to potentially linger on the brain.
In the style of Hejinian’s My Life, Dahlen also periodically moves back into the personal
memory realm, especially as it relates to narration and “truth” as it is assumed in the narrative
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text. Writing memory in this non-linear way draws attention to the difference between memory
and experience and how we, generally unproblematically, (re)construct this is narrative form:
sometimes the memory of something, place or room, returns so vividly, unexpectedly, as
if I were hallucinating the interior of my father’s car, say, in 1946, or when did he sell the
old Plymouth, the green one, ‘going to see a man about a horse,’ earlier, making the trade
for it, were we really to have a horse? and where would we keep him and shall we have a
buggy too (40)
Following this is a related commentary, which further repeats, from earlier sections, a concern
with the repression of women’s stories and writing in the service of normalizing masculine
literary tradition:
autobiography, memory and mechanisms of concealment
that fantasy or wish to sit up all night with her exhausting
one another with talk conceals
or you know what
lavish passion in the absence of a mother
impressing conscripting language into the service
of repression (40)
Although, again, the syntax makes a literal meaning unclear, the repetition of the word “conceal”
as well as the words “fantasy” “conscripting” and “repression” set a tone that critiques the use of
language for the construction of our life stories. In the first line, autobiography and memory are
listed as on par with “mechanisms of concealment,” as if the telling or writing of a life actually
has more to do with concealing than with revealing. The “absence of a mother” may refer back to
Kristeva’s theory of abjection, and a reconsideration of the mother figure suppressed in Freud’s
Oedipal narrative. Language is drafted into the service of maintaining the gendered status quo,
and used especially in the construction of cultural narratives that reinforce (ideological) social,
sexual, economic, linguistic, and religious, norms. Dahlen ends section 20 with a further
comment on this, and a question which serves to keep the reading, and the writing, going:
verisimilitude is after all a problem in fiction. it demonstrates our boundless need for
belief in the coherence of systems. we never notice it unless it fails. then we write
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contemptuous letters to the author citing the anachronisms. surely the old man was
capable of distinguishing truth from poetry else what’s a conscience for? (64)
Fiction, is a fiction then, another tool used in the service of ideology to help fulfill our need to
believe in coherence, even if this belief is shaken with the accidental intrusion of gaps. Dahlen,
however, highlights the gaps, making belief in “the coherence of systems” a more complicated
endeavor. The interrogation may be dangerous because as one (the feminist writer) moves away
from (masculine tradition) and into an “otherhow” space, she can’t know precisely what she
leaves behind. And, if she is wrong, or if she is doomed to “fail” the fear is always that: “she has
mistaken it, mistaken the call. the brotherhood will not include her. it is madness to think so. and
for him also madness, or pious sentimentality. she has a different story” (60). The question is
whether or not this story can be told, and how it will be constructed. But, in fact, her different
story may be a disavowal of simply joining the brotherhood, and the possibility of alternative,
potentially more positive, representations of (female or queer) self in relation to other.

Conclusion
Changes in practice can lead to changes in habits. If desire is a combination of instinct,
and construction through familial and social institutions, then breaking through the repetition of
these, with the goal of greater sexual/self understanding becomes a necessary, processual,
project. Perverting the norms in order to implement textual and social change, offers a whole
different conception outside of the Oedipal model of heterosexual relations and gender
subordination. Breaking habits in social institutions, including narrative, creates space for the
feminist text to exist as a positively perverse form of the desire for knowledge and understanding
that is, ultimately, always in process.
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Through different uses of narrative strategy, and different means of ending their texts,
both H.D. and Dahlen pervert the hold on narrative desire in order to break the habit of reading
for satisfaction and resolution. The focus for these writers is on the process of coming to know,
as a means to explore “other” ways of thinking and seeing the (female, lesbian, bisexual, artist)
self in relation to the larger world. Freud’s theory of castration means that men and women are
always framed within the context of the penis, while the disavowal of castration creates spaces
for other types of relations and contexts that can affirm non-normative sexual, literary, and social
practice. If Hayden White challenges our acquiescent notions of narrative history, and Peter
Brooks makes us think more deeply about how and why we read narrative texts, and even Freud
questions his own assumptions about narrative and sexual desire, then H.D. and Dahlen offer
further examples of disruption and troubling, giving us (perverse) non/narrative, feminist texts
that call into question how we know and why we act. These texts act as alternative models from
which subjects might identify as instruments of political change. From Kristeva we draw on
processes of becoming, through the textual and into the cultural/social realms. And through
material, textual practice and experimentation the implementation of new habits can come to
revise symbolic social structures. H.D.’s HERmione and Dahlen’s series A Reading, offer
material means for breaking habits of textual practice, masculine literary tradition, and sexual or
gender informed practices, and affirm an array of linguistic, social, sexual, and gender relations
practices, and identifications. The (non)narrative construction of the “I” in the texts, we see, can
allow for social identification in difference, and always in dialectical relation with symbolic,
normative discourse and culture.
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CHAPTER 3
The Text-Subject in Social Context:
Pamela Lu, Renee Gladman, and Claudia Rankine
Pamela Lu’s, Pamela: A Novel, Renee Gladman’s Juice, and Claudia Rankine’s Do not
Let Me Be Lonely examine postmodern identities, and enact oppositional poetics as textual
practice and cultural critique. These texts explore themes, such as the erasure of memory, the
genealogy of the “self,” and traumatic postmodern subjectivity particularly as they are relevant
for Asian and African American subjects in contemporary American culture. In these works,
formal strategies break away from normative practices and call attention to historical and
contemporary social issues for minority voices, particularly in relation to cultural ideology and
narratives of national identity. Through hybrid writing practices, these writers enact the theory
that oppositional poetics, languages, cultures, and histories disrupt and create gaps in totalizing
narratives, drawing attention to narrative’s ideological and fictional status. As Asian and African
Americans have not historically had access to dominant narratives, and have been traumatized by
violent histories, these texts point to the gap between experience and narration, and enact
possibilities for more complicated understandings of ethnic and gendered identifications. The
non/narrative texts read here are metaphorical and literal examples of plurality, difference, and
giving voice to historically silenced and marginalized subjects, while calling attention to the
social construction of narratives that serve to make our experiences cohere. And they act as
positive models of aesthetic practice and representation for subjects interested in exceeding
normative narratives of identity and citizenship.
National identity—constructed through narratives of what Homi K. Bhabha terms
“national will—is important to these writers as they construct narrators who are unable to make
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their experiences cohere in the context of those totalizing narratives. The narrator in Lu’s novel
cannot remember; the narrators in Gladman’s stories are lacking both memory and history; and
Rankine’s anti-memoir explores the lack of historical context for traumatized postmodern
subjects. These writers give us examples of how actual minority experience often does not fit in
with the larger cultural narratives through which we are “interpellated” as citizens. In his essay,
“Dissemination,” instead of “nationalism” Bhabha is interested in exploring what he calls “the
locality of culture”; he advocates for ways of “writing the nation” other than through dominant,
historicist national narratives that make the gaps, inconsistencies, complexity, and heterogeneity
of experience cohere; and he advocates “a form of living” that is, among other things, “more
hybrid in the articulation of cultural differences and identifications than can be represented in
any hierarchical or binary structuring of social antagonism” (291-92). Instead, looking to the real
experiences of diverse citizens, Bhabha underscores the space of ambivalence between the
national will and the “daily plebiscite—the unitary number” (310-11). This kind of locational
thinking challenges and complicates narrative historicity that constructs subjects in terms of
patriotism, citizenship, and national will.
Bhabha argues that “we need another time of writing that will be able to inscribe the
ambivalent and chiasmatic intersections of time and place that constitute the problematic
‘modern’ experience of the western nation” (293). Modern experience occurs at the intersection
of time and place, in the interstices, the spaces elided by dominant narrative strategies. Calling
for another time (and place) of writing, Bhaba advocates new forms and possibilities for the
representation(s) of modern, culturally and racially diverse, Western experience. This is precisely
where dominant narratives fall short:
To write the story of the nation demands that we articulate that archaic ambivalence that
informs modernity. We may begin by questioning that progressive metaphor of modern
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social cohesion—the many as one—shared by organic theories of the holism of culture
and community, and by theorists who treat gender, class, or race as radically ‘expressive’
social totalities. (294)
This strategy of “holism” seeks to eliminate difference, alternatively narrated histories and
experiences, and any questioning of how culture and identity are constructed and articulated in
contemporary society. Dominant historical narratives function ideologically to control the
understanding of nation and citizen in the present, to continually displace the “irredeemably
plural modern space” of the contemporary nation. Bhabha explains that “counter-narratives of
the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries—both actual and
conceptual—disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which ‘imagined’ communities are
given essentialist identities” (300). 1 These counter-narratives may function both at the level of
ideological socialization and in the aesthetic realm, particularly in work that enacts the
ambivalence and inconsistency of modern experience. By calling attention to boundaries or
limits, counter-narratives disturb the essentializing nature of ideology. Dismantling ideological,
narrative constructions of identity may increase possibilities for subjective representation and
identification both textually and culturally. Deconstructing narratives of the nation as a unitary
whole, and opening possibilities for representing dissident and alternative voices, is a necessary
oppositional strategy, and one that also requires continual deconstruction in order to avoid
further forms of ideological narrating. Bhabha gives the example of Walter Benjamin, who
“introduces a non-synchronous, incommensurable gap in the midst of storytelling” through
which “the nation speaks its disjunctive narrative” and “disturbs the homogenizing myth of
cultural anonymity.” At the margins, and from “the insurmountable extremes of storytelling, we
encounter the question of cultural difference as the perplexity of living, and writing, the nation”

1

See Anderson’s theory of “imagined communities” which, as Bhaba argues here, potentially is subject to the
danger of ideological essentializing of group formations.
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(311). Cultural difference then is both crucial to, and acts as an analogy for, heterogeneous texts
and the confusing task of “living and writing the nation.” In the face of cultural difference,
marginalization, and incommensurable experience, dominant ideological narratives become
suspect and disturbed.
Linguistic strategies that challenge dominant patriarchal, white, European language
structure and discourse have historically circulated among marginalized, and oppressed, groups.
Bell hooks explains that “words impose themselves, take root in our memory against our will”
(295). The title of her essay, “‘this is the oppressor’s language/ yet I need it to talk to you’:
Language, a place of struggle,” reminds hooks of “the link between language and domination”
(295).2 She is inclined to “resist the idea of the oppressor’s language, certain that this construct
has the potential to disempower those of us who are just learning to speak, who are just learning
to claim language as a place where we make ourselves subject” (295-96), and concludes that
standard English does not speak for “dispossessed and displaced people” and that it “is not the
speech of exile. It is the language of conquest and domination” (296). Standard American
English “is the mask which hides the loss of so many tongues, all those sounds of diverse native
communities we will never hear”; the oppressors “shape it to become a territory that limits and
defines . . . they make it a weapon that can shame, humiliate, colonize” (296). However,
oppressed peoples have historically needed to both speak the dominant language and remake it
“so that it would speak beyond the boundaries of conquest and domination . . . . Enslaved black
people took broken bits of English, fragments, and made them a counterlanguage” (297). It is yet
another way that language becomes a site of resistance (298). “We take the oppressor’s language
and turn it against itself. We make our words a counterhegemonic speech, liberating ourselves in
language” (301). Working from within the structure of language itself pushes the politics of
2
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dismanting and revising further than simply altering the content of narrative history.
Oppositional groups work through structural, formal articulations, as well as through traditional
stories that serve as hegemonic cultural and historical content, and toward creating new models
and languages in order to account for their experiences, and to use in more positive and affirming
ways.
Recognizing the need for the interrogation of structural systems of domination through
language and poetic practice, Erica Hunt argues that “oppositional poetics and cultures form a
field of related projects” that have taken “a critically active stance against forms of domination.”
Oppositional cultures, for Hunt, include “dissident . . . as well as ‘marginalized’ cultures, cutting
across class, race and gender.” Hunt further takes up this resistance to dominant discourse in
terms of poetics, explaining that:
conventional poetics might . . . be construed as the way ideology, ‘master narratives’ are
threaded into the text, in content and in genre . . . . Notions of character as a predictable
and consistent identity, of plot as a problem of credibility, and theme as an elaboration of
a controlling idea: all mirror official ideology’s predilection for finding and supplying . . .
the appropriate authority. Social life is reduced once again to a few great men or a narrow
set of perceptions and strategies stripping the innovative of its power. (681-82)
However, within the range of real and potential oppositional strategies that expand the “sense of
poetics,” she writes, “a more fluid typology would favor plural strategies to remove the distance
between writing and experience, at least as it is socially maintained by the binarism of fact and
fiction, of identity and nonidentity” (682). A greater field of possible strategies—in terms of both
form and content—that produce a wider variety of texts resistant to, or in negation of, “dominant
modes of discourse” that rationalize, conventionalize, and organize our ordinary lives will
continue to open (constructive) spaces for politics and social action (682). Especially “in
communities of color,” Hunt asserts, “oppositional frames of reference are the borders critical to
survival” (683). For Hunt, resistance happens on a variety of linguistic, formal, and narrative
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levels that begin in the negation and challenging of existing borders (be they literal or figurative),
and call for the creation of new formations and potential politics. She explains, “In literature . . .
oppositional projects replicate the stratification of the culture at large. There are oppositional
projects that engage language as social artifact, as art material, as powerfully transformative,
which view themselves as distinct from projects that have as their explicit goal the use of
language as a vehicle for the consciousness and liberation of oppressed communities” (684). Yet,
the stratification among different types of projects—in terms of both form and content—only
serves to create multiple and divisive groups that might in turn be more politically ineffective.
Considerations of “language as a mediation of consciousness,” in addition to concerns of “race,
class, gender, and affectional freedom,” is necessary, but should not be an alienating activity of
liberation (685-56). Instead, Hunt suggests that we think about “how writing can begin to
develop among oppositional groups, how writing can begin to have social existence in a world
where authority has become highly mobile” (687). In an age when memoirs of “truthful
experience” have become the bestsellers, and the advertising industry regularly appropriates
avant-garde aesthetic strategies to sell corporate loyalty, it has become important to recognize the
necessary diversity of oppositional practices working on various fronts against oppressive
regimes, and that these are not necessarily opposed but can work in concert toward various, but
mutually benefitting, political ends. Although Hunt advocates for the importance of radical
aesthetic practice and writing that deals with cultural critique through those practices, what is
important here is the call for recognizing the range and diversity of aesthetic practice,
particularly on behalf of writers who call attention to the varieties of social oppression for
contemporary subjects, instead of maintaining separate camps of aesthetic political thinking.
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Audre Lorde is an important figure who critiques social oppression from multiple
perspectives as a black, feminist, lesbian. Lorde writes poetry that although syntactically
innovative, does not come out of a radical aesthetic lineage, and prose memoir and essays that
are narratively normative and accessible. For Lorde, poetry and writing were a means of survival
in a world in which she continually felt unrecognized, and narrating her experiences were
fundamental to her own processes of understanding and coming to terms with her “identities” in
relation to larger social communities. For Lorde, writing was not a choice, but a responsibility. In
her book of essays, Sister Outsider, Lorde tells us that “poetry is not a luxury” (36), it is “not
only dream and vision; it is the skeleton architecture of our lives. It lays the foundations for a
future of change, a bridge across our fears of what has never been before” (38). As she explains
in her own memoir of politics and possibility, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name, there were no
examples or stories for black lesbians in the 1950s. Lorde tells her story of growing up black in
white schools, coming to understand her own sexuality through her relations with predominantly
white women, and working through the process of making sense of the relationship between race
and sexual orientation. She writes:
I was gay and Black. The latter fact was irrevocable: armor, mantle, and wall. Often,
when I had the bad taste to bring that fact up in a conversation with other gay-girls who
were not Black, I would get the feeling that I had in some way breached some sacred
bond of gayness, a bond which I always knew was not sufficient for me.
This was not to deny the closeness of our group, nor the mutual aid of those
insane, glorious, and contradictory years. It is only to say that I was acutely conscious . . .
that my relationship as a Black woman to our shared lives was different from theirs, and
would be, gay or straight. The question of acceptance had a different weight for me. (18081)
As she narrates her adulthood in Zami, Lorde struggles to support herself, moving from one job
to another, intermittently enrolling in college courses, and trying to overcome the emotional
damage done while growing up in her rule-structured, conservative parents’ house. And all of
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this is told through the stories of the women with whom Lorde had various types of relationships,
beginning with her closest friend and “sister” as a teenager and moving eventually into her most
powerfully intimate, sexual partnerships that came to help her identify on her own terms, even
within the context of a racially hostile society. The point, it seems, is the process by which Lorde
comes to identify as a black lesbian, to find recognition in the gaps and unrecognized spaces of
the social realm that do not cohere with mainstream notions of nation, and citizenship. The
stories she recounts in Zami lead the reader through her process of coming to terms with this
displacement; she creates narratives that inhabit the gaps of dominant narratives, dismantling
them, calling attention to the plurality of real, lived experience; the idea of “the many as one” is
exposed as fiction when “the one” doesn’t meet the prerequisites of “the many.” In her process
of identification, Lorde encounters many outsider sisters who embody counter-narratives for
sexual identification, though she can never entirely reconcile her own experiences as a black
lesbian for whom there are no (narrative) models, and no one with whom to identify. As a
subject, Lorde exists in the gaps in the cohesive, ideological fabric that structures the lives of the
citizens, and uses that space to construct stories that, in terms of their content, explode the
dominant narratives that oppress racial and sexual expression. Lorde’s oppositional poetics lies
in the writing of her memoir about her experience. Although the text is not formally
experimental, it has a conversational style and uses creative language and vocabulary in the
telling of an “alternative” experience within the larger cultural context. The text is for other black
lesbians, but it is also for a wider audience with whom black lesbians exist in everyday society.
Lorde doesn’t exist within totalizing cultural narratives for white or black women, recognizes
that there aren’t narratives for lesbians, regardless of skin color, and takes on new strategies for
narrating and representing herself in writing. In her historical moment, Lorde’s text opens a new
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space for the presentation and reception of black, lesbian concerns. Through her poetics and
politics, she is able to disseminate a unique perspective that, she felt, had not been voiced before,
and she is thereby able to encourage others to narrate their own uniquely contextualized
experiences that fall outside of mainstream cultural myths of identity.
Recognizing the importance of Lorde’s project, Lu, Gladman, and Rankine take their
experiences as Asian and African American subjects further into the realm of avant-garde
aesthetic practice to dismantle the totalizing narratives that claim to represent identity even while
its subjects are unable to identify with those stories. They create texts that critique the content of
cultural narratives of identity, and employ non/narrative strategies to enact identity-as-process,
and allow for new possibilities for articulating contemporary experience. Their narrators, like
Lorde, realize that they can no longer rely on the constructed narratives that never actually
represented their experiences, and they struggle through memory, history, and language in order
to come to terms with their paradoxical experiences: realizing that they have been left out of
narratives that represent experience, they seek to understand what their experiences have been in
order to then represent them. Their texts enact the processes of understanding and representing
experiences antithetical to larger cultural narratives.

Pamela: A Novel
Pamela Lu’s Pamela: A Novel is an experimental, fictional work that questions selfrepresentation, critiques identity-related experience, mimics the representation of self in the
media and in society in general, and struggles to find a clear notion of how one goes about
presenting memory and past experience in a text. Not only is Pamela a critique of the genre of
autobiography itself, but it seems to argue that narrative autobiography is especially problematic
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for people who have no access to history outside of those historical narratives culturally
constructed for them. Lu’s narrator tells us, for example, that this fictionalized history “was not
‘based’ on anything” but that “our virtual existence sponsored itself and did not conform to any
standard of correctness or realism, because such an original standard did not exist” (20). The
theme of virtual existence continues through the text, while the narrator, P (all of the characters
are designated by single letters), theorizes memory through a type of anti-autobiography. One
can document events as history, as having happened in the past, but the difficulty of creating a
text based on memory comes from the narrator’s knowledge that her experiences and memories
have been socially constructed by way of mainstream consumer culture; the mainstream
autobiographical text reinforces the status quo of “commodity culture” constructed memory. The
narrator thus constructs her own past through the formal strategies of the text itself. There is no
clear narrative progression; there are gaps between reported events and situations, and the
continuous commentary that runs through the text. What stands in the place of ‘meaningful’
memory in this text are experiences, events, and conversations that are recalled, but not
inhabited; the past moments are not brought to life through detail and image in the present
moment, but instead seek to prove that there can be no genuine, remembered experiences for the
socially constructed subject.
There a loss of identity and self-understanding at work in Pamela as a fragmented
subjectivity emerges. The narrator’s commentary throughout serves, in part, to reinforce the lack
of understanding, and the fragmented identity stands in for any sense of coherent identity. P’s
awareness that there may be no self, or only constructed, often incoherent selves, comes to
function in place of a lucid narrative identity. Her meta-narration constructs her as a
non/narrative subject aware of its own construction through ideology and hegemonic forces:
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“Our silence and invisibility was of the utmost importance to the state of the nation because the
very suggestion of us challenged and undermined the simplicity of narrative on which the
national identity depended” (29). Lu’s narrator functions as one reporting a life instead of
remembering, in other words, she seems to understand that a lack of real memory combined with
too much culturally constructed memory offers little foundation on which to set the present, and
therefore creates anxiety around any possibility of moving into the future. This is enacted in the
circular, non-progressive nature of the narrative; there are no starting or ending points to this
story. Lu foregrounds language and the formal properties of the text as a way to critique the
practice of memory in autobiographical texts, and she presents a narrator who is anxious, overintellectualized, parodic, and campy yet is always cognizant of the persistent critique of
subjectivity of the modern subject. Lu’s narrator takes on the theoretical terminology in order to
both enact and critique that theory. The anxiety surrounding the writing of autobiography in this
text—is there a self to write and to read?—is intricately woven through the text. And it is the
very nature of the modern subject as having little more than a fragmented present existence
divorced from history, and the history of one’s own memories, that troubles the subject’s ability
to remember outside of her role within media and commodity culture. Pamela challenges the
notion of memory as a foundation on which to base a subjective present existence, but also
submits that there can be no present existence, no sense of coherent identity if there is no
memory on which to base this self.
The structure of the text enacts the function and process of memory that is under scrutiny;
it also calls attention to the difference between real and imagined past events and the fact that we
(“we” the readers of the novel, and “we” the remembering subjects of our own lives) often can’t
tell the difference. It is not the difference that is important (between real and imagined) but the
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recognition of that difference and of the slippage between them. The imaginary or the virtual is
highlighted, calling attention to the virtual aspects of memory representation as well as to texts
that purport to represent past experience. Events reported are at the mercy of the uncertain
subjectivity of the narrator, and because none of the characters, including the narrator, are
developed fully, the details are incomplete. This makes it difficult for a subject to speak or
perform her identity. For example, early in the text the narrator remarks, “I did not have a
personality that I could effectively project outward, and in my worst moments, I did not have a
personality at all. I was a very poor impersonator of myself in public” (13). The difficulty comes
through the recognition that if there can be no authentic experience, there can be no authentic
memory, and no authentic self, though this also serves as a critique of the idea of ‘authenticity’
as an impossible endeavor in general. The fragmented modern subject may have a sense of a past
which is not her past necessarily, and this further entails a lack of personal connection to her own
history. For example, P explains:
we found it natural, if not imperative, to be assaulted and overwhelmed by memories
which were not our own but which we nevertheless carried as though they had actually
happened to us. In this sense, the history of our lives was always the history of something
else. We were forever displacing ourselves in the chain of events without knowing who
exactly was doing the displacing, and our lifetime goal, if we desired success in the
conventional sense, consisted not in getting to know ourselves, but in getting to know
ourselves less. (33)
The sense of near-identification recurs throughout the text, and is most pronounced when the
narrator and her friends try to make sense of their individual ethnic identities, as AsianAmericans, in the context of an accumulation of cultural myths about ethnicity. Whether the past
is real or imaginary, remembered or forgotten, it is fundamental for the articulation of a subject
in her present. Through her narrator, Lu may also be pointing to the greater historical trauma of
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modernity, and how the text is unable to account for a self whose (ungrounded) present moment
is underdetermined by a lack of memory.
Further, Pamela conflates history (traumatic history) and contemporary media society. As
P explains, “Just as R experienced the grim humor of situations whose anxieties predated her, so
she appeared at times to inhabit the outline of a self formed half a century ago—that is, R was
not a WWII survivor but she might as well have been; she was not a great moment in history, but
she played one on TV” (69). One thing that is apparent here is the continuity of past in present; R
is inhabiting a self from the past as if she cannot be held responsible for in her own present. In a
way, specific historical moments take on lives of their own as they are passed around through
stories, texts, and media and come to form vital elements of individuals’ existences. The great
moments in history, whoever decides what these are, are played over and over on TV, or we
replay great historical moments as if they were scenes from our own lives. Different messages
and memories circulate in any variety of ways, and we consume, repeat, and circulate them.
Lives and memories are constructed in no small part through our media saturated society,
but the danger lies in simply accepting that experience and memory may be based on myths and
illusions, and instead we must critique complicity. The tension for the narrator in Pamela is the
fact of having to negotiate her knowledge of the social construction of experience, and the need
to have a past to remember, in order to have a present to inhabit. The subject’s power over her
past, and therefore over her present, is manipulated at every turn. “It was as if television had
trained us to be nostalgic from the start,” the narrator explains, “so that we yearned from
childhood while we were still children and continued to be nostalgic for the present moment
before we had finished living it” (31). For the narrator and her friends, the sense of the loss of
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something they never even had in the first place is essential. There is no present because there is
no past.
In capitalist consumer society, the circulation of the commodity erases its
production/labor history, forgotten in favor of its presence in the present moment. In Present
Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis, Richard Terdiman invokes Marx and the idea of
“genesis amnesia,” or the forgetting of the origin and history of commodity production through
“the process of reification” by which the history of commodities, the “memory of their
production from their consumers, as from the very people who produced them” becomes hidden
(12). Further, Terdiman writes, “to understand what we have made, we have to be able to
remember it. Because commodities suppress the memory of their own process, they subvert or
violate this fundamental tenet of the mnemonic economy” (12). So a loss of memory actually
helps the capitalist system that articulates its subjects as consumers. If there is only a notion of
the commodity in the present, then each new commodity will have an autonomous life of its
own. Subjects are thus divided from the history of the commodities, and from their own histories
as producers of those commodities. In part, Lu is examining what happens to subjects who are
either cut off entirely from their own sense of history, or who only have a sense of history
created as an ideological social formation which serves to keep subjects embedded within the
structure.
The present for which the narrator and her friends yearn is based on some other past
altogether, and their present resembles a sort of virtual existence, based on imagined ideas
circulated throughout mainstream culture. It is a present existence of pieces that always fail to
add up to a whole, only held together by their desire to have a past that culminates in some type
of authentic present. Recognizing the impossibility of this, the characters exist in this continuous
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state of desire in which there is no unity of narrative, no unity of identity, no real context for
identification. Of her contemporary situation the narrator explains, “Such was the promise of a
manicured lawn, a two-car garage, and a swastika on every corner, and life there paralleled the
experience of a badly written sentence, whose construction consisted of numerous phrases, each
of which amounted to a complete sentence in itself, but whose sum total was less than its parts,
an idea amputated in mid-thought, a non sequitur” (42). She draws an analogy with a sentence
that is poorly written in the first place, and is constituted by phrases that ultimately add up to
nothing. Just because there are parts and pieces (memories, commodities, stories we tell each
other about our lives), and the desire to make them “mean” does not necessarily entail they can
or will add up to anything meaningful. Lu seems to ask how it is that one is supposed to move
into the future in the face of this distorted (badly written) present/past; if we have only the
present commodified moment, on what then does one base any hope for a future?
For an individual who is part of a group, the difficulty lies in navigating social narratives
of history; in Pamela, the idea of finding one’s identity is as foreign as having any identity to
find, particularly as a person identified as Asian-American and subject to the cultural myths and
messages surrounding this:
For C wrote with all the awful clarity and slenderness of someone who had grown up
Asian in Indiana, the memory of anger and that daily experience of coming home single
to watch the double of his face peel away from itself in the mirror now sublimated into a
stunning command of the English language that manifested itself as poetry, or a series of
eloquent, articulate stabs at reality . . . . If C worked in the sanctity of silence, then YJ
was always living and writing against a blind wall of cacophony that existed somewhere
between plain sense and the din of cultural expectation and popular music . . . .
As a consequence, she occupied the contemporary position of always being
foreign to herself. (16-17)
Although it is unclear throughout Pamela, to what extent the characters, other than P, are aware
of their double existence as subjects contextualized by “cultural expectation,” their actions as
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narrated by P serve to enact the complex ways in which Asian Americans struggle to make sense
of their present lives in relation to the historical narratives always already, and continuously,
interpellating them. However, it is the awareness of the situation that contributes to the
doubleness. YJ, the narrator explains: “occupied the contemporary position of always being
foreign to herself”; the contemporary is the space in which awareness is possible, but the
consequence of that is never having experiences that one can claim as one’s own.
French historian Pierre Nora, who writes on relations between memory and identity, may
be useful for further working through Lu’s project; Nora theorizes the relation between “real
memory” (which only existed in pre-historic cultures) and that tainted by contemporary media
culture. He writes: “Indeed, we have seen the tremendous dilation of our very mode of historical
perception, which, with the help of the media, has substituted for a memory entwined in t he
intimacy of a collective heritage the ephemeral film of current events” (7-8). He explains that
because “history” records and archives the past, we now only have a kind of memory that cannot
occur outside of its cultural context, and he uses this theory to further think about the role of
representation in relation to different kinds of memory, and what one might do with memory in
the context of one’s historical situation. Nora continues:
How can we fail to read, in the shards of the past delivered to us by so many
microhistories, the will to make the history we are reconstructing equal to the history we
have lived? We could speak of mirror-memory if all mirrors did not reflect the same—for
it is in difference that we are seeking, and in the image of this difference, the ephemeral
spectacle of an unrecoverable identity. It is no longer genesis that we seek but instead the
decipherment of what we are in the light of what we are no longer. (17-18)
In the gap between what we are and what we are no longer, we find the irrecoverable identity
which is the only identity we can remember. The original event cannot be reproduced, but only
represented. Remembering, recovering, and documenting memory is a process of decipherment.
This awareness is key to the representation of memory, of identity because one has to read

173
herself through difference, through the space of what is now not recoverable. Lu, as well as
Gladman and Rankine, seem keenly aware of just this, that the text is a hybrid process of
deciphering and representing memory and experience, and using those to theorize the
construction and function of identity.
A strong example of this occurs in the middle of Pamela, in which, in a moment of metafictional commentary, the narrator and author become confused, and a discussion of the text
itself arises in which the author takes over the text to theorize memory and the process of its
documentation as autobiographical writing. She calls attention to the separation between narrator
and writer, between the self of the past and the self of the present, and the difficulty of
communication between these different versions of self. The narrator, and the text, is always in
and of the past and that past stays within the confines of the document of text; the present can
recognize, but not connect with, the past self of text. The narrator explains: “I found the story of
myself to be endlessly fascinating, with its catalogue of histories, repressions, and picaresque
cast of characters . . . . It was a classic story of joy, disappointment, and discovery, and I often
reread my favorite parts in my spare time, vicariously living . . . as if I were actually P going
about her business in a world more believable than my own” (57). At the end of this passage, the
reader is unsure who is speaking. Is the narrator divorced from her own sense of self when she
reads her accounts in writing? Or is the writer including her own comment on the estranging
nature of witnessing one’s life documented in the text? She writes further of the relativity of this
situation: “There was the subjunctive of the real character speculating about the imaginary
situation, the fictitious character speculating about the real situation, and then of the fictitious
character speculating about the even more fictitious situation, which could prove to be either
totally unimaginable or, equivalently, as unimaginative as the plain facts” (57-58). The
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contingency and possibility, the merging and movement between fact and fiction, memory and
speculation, experience and the text as the documentation of experience, complicate (and
articulate) the reading experience. The text is the construction of the already constructed
experiences of a shifting narrator-self who is unsure of her own place in the writing/reading of
the text. Like Lu’s characters living double or multiple lives as both ignored and ideologically
constructed subjects, awareness is both crucial and potentially debilitating. But her characters are
continually in process of theorizing and living both their media constructed and “real”
experiences through creative and social endeavors.
For example, Lu’s audience-narrator explains, “I could hardly read my story without at
least on some level reading myself into it,” and further, “if I was at risk of suddenly becoming P
in the midst of a plausible situation, then P was similarly as risk of becoming not me but Pamela,
a project that I had invented to include both P and me, and that was expanding, day by day, into a
larger persona than either of us could handle” (58). The movement between Pamela (the text), P
(the narrator/main character of the text), and “me” (the writer of the narrative) in the
documentation of the text is explicitly exposed, and confused; “Pamela threatened to subsume us
in a state of suspended animation, stranding P in the past and me in the present . . . . P was an act
of memory but Pamela was an act of homicide” which assembled “the particulars of my private
existence into a form suitable for larger display” (59). The form suitable for display is the
(autobiographical) text. Although a writer is presumably in control of its construction, the text
can itself take over and ultimately function on its own terms; the “real” experiences of the
subject are subsumed by the text itself. Moreover, this section from Pamela suggests that the
temporal movement is completely disturbed when the life is presented as a text of memory and
the lines demarcating the tenses become frozen in print. Lu writes, “I had terrible fears of being
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abandoned not only by Pamela but by that abbreviated version of Pamela, P, who survived the
present tense by avoiding it altogether and prolonged the past by inflecting it into a space of
indefinite duration, like a note of music stretched out and played repeatedly to make a landscape”
(60). The past is prolonged to the exclusion of the present; although the writer/narrator reading
the document of the past can relate and enjoy it as story, there is a physical analogy here of the
text as the container of the past. The narrator, P, is able to avoid the difficulty of the “reality” of
the present tense, but this only has negative consequences for the writer/narrator who is further
separated into irreconcilable parts of herself (Pamela, P, me). If the past cannot be accessed
except through reading it as (possibly someone else’s) story, it is possible that the self of the
present tense can have no authentic experiences as those are always turning into past
experiences, which cannot be accessed. It is not then a past of useful memory, and therefore
elides the present altogether; on a textual level, the writer, the real, is elided by the narrator-self
and the text-as-life, as these come to stand in for any other sense of “authentic” experience. At
the end of this section the writer/narrator states, “If P was the wallpaper to the house that was
Pamela, then I was the resident who paced restlessly through the halls, shutting the storm
windows all around and watching the rain happen not to me, but to my house” (61). In only one
sentence, Lu points to the layers of identity through the negotiation of memory/past and present.
“I” lies within, or under, the layers of “house” and “wallpaper”; Pamela is the structure, P is the
decoration or culturally constructed subject, and “I” is that which paces and watches life happen,
always in process of negotiating her own identity.
Terdiman claims that there is a strong correlation between “cultural disturbance and one’s
contemporary situation and the way memory is considered and theorized in literature.” He is
especially interested in the “deeply historicized relation between the problem of memory on the
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one hand and the representation of experience on the other” (ix). Terdiman writes: “Of course
every culture remembers its past. But how a culture performs and sustains this recollection is
distinctive and diagnostic” (3). It is diagnostic of the particular situation of the culture’s
historical moment, and of the differences in recollection from that of earlier times. He marks a
difference between precapitalist societies and the modern time, and also between cultures that
remembered past events naturally, and how memory shifted with the rise of historiography and
the documentation of memory. In the “natural” memory process, for example, memories and past
experiences circulate among the present moment and there is less distinction between past and
present. When memory is documented as history, the text contains and defines the memory as
past and it becomes less accessible. Terdiman defines this “memory crisis,” particularly for the
period in Europe after the Revolution and the move into the nineteenth century, as “a sense that
their past had somehow evaded memory, that recollection had ceased to integrate with
consciousness. In this memory crisis, the very coherence of time and of subjectivity seemed
disarticulated” (3-4). It becomes a crisis because “memory is the modality of our relation to the
past” (7); if the mode of relation to the past has become distorted, how are we to relate to that
past? If there is no memory, or if there is a fear for the loss of memory, the effect may be on the
continuity of the subject, and of a culture, as it moves from past into present. “Memory stabilizes
subjects and constitutes the present. It is the name we give to the faculty that sustains continuity
in collective and in individual experience” (8). He continues, “Memory functions in every act of
perception, in every act of intellection, in every act of language” (9). In this way memory and
history are intimately related; quoting Michel de Certeau Terdiman explains: “Before we can
understand what history says about a society, we have to analyze how history functions within it”
(20). It is not enough to study cultures, people, and texts in their historical contexts (what history
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says about these); we have to also pay attention to how the history itself functions within the
people and the texts that they produce. Lu pushes this analysis in order to call attention to the
simultaneous crisis of history, as a crisis of memory in a late capitalist, postmodern time of
forgetting. Lu speculates about the possibility for history and memory in literature; are there
alternative means of representing the past? Is there a way to rearticulate the coherence of time
and subjectivity? For Terdiman, “What is at stake is nothing less than how a culture imagines the
representation of the past to be possible, for the problem of representing the past is really the
representation problem itself, seized in its most critical locus in experience” (32). In Pamela
Asian-American experience is shaped and articulated in the context of capitalist modernity. If
there is no way out of this type of structuring of experience, the text seems to suggest, then we
must take account of the difficulties and think about other possibilities for representing
experience. Lu’s characters, and her own commentary, work through their own memories (or
lack of) and experiences (real and virtual) in order to theorize and practice other possibilities for
representation.
Lu’s text theorizes its own construction as a theory of memory and might, in this way, be
compared to Proust’s Swann’s Way. At times in Pamela, feelings are employed in place of the
specific detail of memory; this is not unlike Proust’s Swann, who can only remember his feelings
in response to a sonata, and the sonata’s general architecture, before he hears it again and is able
to imprint the detail of its sound on his memory. In a way Pamela is like the moment before
Swann hears the sonata for the second time; the past events recorded are little more than
structure, there is no detail, nothing to fill in the basic architecture. There is feeling and
sentiment throughout Pamela about the past, but what is lacking are the details that bring a
document of memory to life. Although the writing gestures toward the detailed memory of the
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past, toward what is missing or under the surface, it calls into question the very possibility that
there is anything under the surface to get to. It might be argued that Pamela presents the idea of
memory only on the surface, as little more than a type of voluntary memory, before the Proustian
moment of diving further in when he bites into the madeleine. But if Pamela enacts memory as
little more than surface material, it is the narrator who suffers the consequences, who is unable to
form a coherent sense of her own identity—and readers are unable to form a coherent sense of
the narrator; Lu uses this as a strategy to destabilize “identity” itself so that as readers we
become involved in the process of working through, and reworking notions of how Asian, and
other American minorities, identify.
Further, Lu uses other formal textual strategies to represent the properties of past, present,
and future spatially, enacting the problem of simple, linear notions of the progressive movement
of time. We are always in space and in time simultaneously, and when we recognize the
difficulties of the present moment as constantly shifting forward from the past but never quite
moving into the future, this can contribute to a distorted sense of space-time, and the complex
layering of past and present in any particular moment or image. The narrator tells us, “for a while
I had been struck by the passage of time as a spatial passage, which drowned me at random
intervals in old familiar places I had never been” and then tells of a particularly Proustian
moment in which she witnesses the visual details of a memory of a garden from childhood while
looking out the widow of a train. She explains: “I was not remembering the garden itself, but the
most accurate perception of it, that is, I was remembering the exact feeling of my eyes and
mouth and the exact position and tension of the muscles in my arms that would have occurred
had I actually been in a garden in the residential section of Pasadena with my mother 22 years
ago, which I had not” (31). What is important is the feeling, and the experience of memory, even
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if there is no original event with which it is actually attached. This scene seems especially
responsive to Proust first in the narration of the memory: “I had grown accustomed to riding my
train with a book in one hand and looking out the window from time to time to rediscover the
magnolia garden my mother and I had passed while walking through a Pasadena neighborhood
when I was two: the shade of sky and fleeting shape of sidewalk were exactly as I remembered”
(31), and second in the admittance that the memory is fabricated. The point is to remind us not to
take Proust, and the writing of memories in general, at face value, which seems obvious, but
important especially when so much emphasis is continually placed on the authenticity of
memory in autobiographical texts. Lu is questioning the authenticity of memory and the
construction of the text of memory, and how necessary memory is in order to experience a sense
of self in the present.
For if L was ephemeral like a leaf in the wind, then she was also at one time anchored to
some tree at the heart of her matter which she dimly remembered and which she searched
for again and again in various uncanny, recollectable places spread out across the earth.
Such a motion of recovery was what led us that night . . . to an impressionistic replica of
her father’s living room in Woodstock—complete and large as memory down to the
antique mahogany armchair and the wide, rose tapestry rug that covered the hardwood
floor. (Lu 55)
The narrator explores this memory of the living room by describing how they spied on it like
voyeurs as the image was framed by the window through which they looked. The image is then
both visible in its detail, but inaccessible because whoever is looking is not supposed to be
looking. This image is “complete and large as memory” as if it is not actually a memory, but
only like a memory in its imagistic detail. The closest we get to any type of Proustian memory in
Lu’s text are images that are meant in some way to stand in for memory. This movement seems
to simultaneously critique Proust, and acknowledge the importance of his project.
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In a kind of post-Benjaminian way, this text seems to offer no utopian potential because
there is never a concrete sense of past and memory from which to move into the future.
However, it is the knowledge of this difficulty, this fluctuating sense of what it means to have a
past that is filled with memory, that is hopeful and that opens a space of possibility. The text
asserts that one can still have experiences, even while having a lack of memories; and the text
itself can be an experience (the writing and the reading of both its form and content). This text
comments on our modern condition in which, instead of having any sense of history, we are
distracted by commodity-driven, media culture; we live through a constant production of
memory-less/content-less ideology through which subjects are restrained from relating
meaningfully to historical events. Personal memory, and experience constructed through
dominant narratives, merge and intersect only to complicate the notion of experience. Products
of late capitalism, postmodern, Asian American subjects are products, and victims, of a
continuous present moment and cannot remember, and this inability to remember results in an
inability to identify, to have identity. The fragmented, marginalized subject is over-articulated
into a subject without a meaningful past, and the search for that past results in an awareness of
lack, and a suspicion of what might be called experience, and a need to document that
experience. Without a present grounded in a remembered past one can only question her own
sense of identity. Lu’s narrator explains: “Every generation preoccupied itself with the struggle
to produce something new—a defining moment, action, or style that would mark it as unique and
constitute an answer to the question of “’Who are you,’ or more often, ‘Who were you?’” (43).
The difficulty is of course leaving documents of the past that can at all accurately reflect that past
in order to have some coherent sense of present. “It seems at times that we were the only present
thing in our moment, where our moment was nothing more than a wishful standard
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masquerading as present reality and thus more suitably situated in the future tense” (91), though
this is not actually about the future at all, but is in fact critiquing the present moment as
“wishful” and “masquerading as reality” and therefore only imaginary, just as the future tense is
always only imaginary because it hasn’t happened yet.
Pamela ends in a virtual space: “For some time I remained sunk in my seat, fingers
clenched around the plastic armrests, until the sensation advanced and passed through me,
leaving me afloat once again in the perpetual predawn light and more than willing to let the
whole subject drop, in the midst of a moment that technically never existed” (98). The subject to
which the narrator refers may be the transcendent feeling of “being overlapped” and
experiencing the compression of her “thoughts, actions, feelings, preoccupations, and regrets”
(97), or it may be to the book as a whole. If this incident on the plane never occurred,
nonetheless we have the record of it here. If the events of the book never happened, still we have
the text that documents these events, we have a text of (non)memory that theorizes memory,
experience, and representation. In view of our contemporary society’s obsession with memoir
and biography, we need texts that open further possibilities for exploring memory in terms of its
social and cultural contexts, and that question our allegiance to dominant narrative that falsely
identify us as citizens. If it is a strategy of hegemonic power structures to impose narratives that
are without real content for marginalized subjects, then it is a necessary endeavor for writers like
Lu to disassemble these narratives and create other possibilities for remembering, narrating, and
identifying. The danger otherwise is of simply going along with what the institutions have
cultivated within us. Or, as Terdiman writes:
Such representations of the ghostly presence of the past have this in common: that—in
the same way that under capitalism Marx had claimed that the power and creativity of the
worker seem to pass into the tool—they seek to explain how in the modern period
memory appears to reside not in perceiving consciousness but in the material: in the
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practices and institutions of social or psychic life, which function within us, but,
strangely, do not seem to require either our participation or our explicit allegiance. (34)
The text that theorizes memory in such a way is working against being subsumed into larger
cultural and historical narratives, and creates a new space for theorizing experience and offers
another possibility for cultural identification. As an anti-autobiographical text, Pamela functions
as an alternative narrative of experience, an account of a culturally marginalized group in
opposition to the status quo of their invisibility; and this Lu does through disruptive,
non/narrative strategies that calls attention to the lack of memory and experience for subjects
indoctrinated in a narrative, media-saturated, fabricated present tense. In its lack, the text actually
offers a positive model of speaking, acts as a space for the narrator to voice her examination of
personal and social/cultural identity. Group identity here manifests in a collection of individuals’
stories “about” their Asian American experiences, reinstating them as social subjects while
refusing to collect them into a singular identity.

Doing Time: History and Narrative in Juice
In Juice, a book of four separate fictional stories, Renee Gladman constructs narrators-inprocess who, in various ways, seek to identify as contemporary subjects while missing whole
pieces of their own histories. This lack of history often results in narratives that are missing the
elements necessary for telling coherent stories, including details, background, and information
that would help fill in the content of the narratives. On occasion, only some of the stories
reference African American or lesbian experience in their content, additionally making the point
of the need for an understanding of history and the impossibility of articulating contemporary
experience without it, particularly for traditionally marginalized subjects. The narratives are
often surreal in the ways they refuse to clarify what is real and what is imagined, and the
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narrators often seem neurotic and obsessive as if the gaps in their own memories, and the lack of
real content in their own histories, makes them personally and narratively ungrounded.
Gladman’s narrators are compulsive about making sense of what’s happening around them,
though sense-making is clearly impossible with such a limited amount of information to work
with; instead there are gaps and fragments but no linear, cohesive historical narratives that seem
to make any sense. Her project in Juice is to put pressure on narrative structure (in general, and
in fiction writing in particular), to enact through form what she asserts in the content, thereby
gaining knowledge through the fragments, disruptions, and breaks in history, and demonstrating
how narrative functions in the construction of history.
Gladman begins Juice by setting up a feeling of temporal confusion through narrators
who seem to exist simultaneously in, or between, the past and the present. She uses an epigraph
from Alain Robbe-Grillet which reads, “In the modern narrative, time seems to be cut off from
its temporality. It no longer passes. It no longer completes anything” (5). In Juice, history is
incomplete, and time is an essential element of interrogation while there is a seeming lack of
movement and progress forward; even if at times the narratives allude to the possibility of a
future, time is static in a way that only circulates between past and present. A French film made
in 1961, Robbe-Grillet’s Last year at Marienbad has no linear narrative progression but instead
moves through scenes of a story between two characters (a woman and a man) so that the viewer
can never be sure of the “real” story or history to which the characters are related, although there
seems to be some indeterminate past event, experience, or relationship between the two that is
never fully explained. Gladman’s Juice in some ways echoes the film—in its formal movement
between real and imaginary without narrative contextualization, and the often surreal tone—and
incorporates the anxiety of subjects who suddenly realize they are unsure of their pasts as well as
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potential for the future. In the film, the man may be time or history itself personified to chase the
woman, as if she is haunted by her past, or oppositely, trying to move forward and completely
ignore a past which refuses to be ignored. The insistence on/of the past weighs heavily while, at
the same time, the woman seems to have total memory loss and cannot relate to that past.
Narrative scenes are played and replayed, reconstructed, cut and re-presented so that they are
similar yet different in each presentation. One reading of the film might argue that the man is the
past itself, the woman is the perpetual, amnesiac present, and the woman’s husband (a more
peripheral character) represents a future who, in playing the game of chance throughout the film,
always wins, is always able to predict opponents’ moves based on past moves and win (as if
moving forward). The camera moves in and out, working with perspective as if to see from all
angles, yet the viewer is always aware of missing information both textual and visual. We can
never really see anything about these characters, and yet we see everything in the fragmentation,
the difficulty and messiness of memory and history, the impossibility of a present based on an
illusive history. We are left at the end of the film, when the woman leaves with the man who
may be her past, with a feeling of incompleteness yet finality. The language in the end is
haunting, the scene is dark and quiet, the dialogue reflects the rigid patterns of straight lines of
the French gardens of this final scene, and finally the man alludes to the “statues in frozen
motion where you were already losing your way forever with me.” This English translation of
the French retains the ambiguous nature of the language to designate a clear sense of past or
present (or future): the passive voice combined with idea of “motion,” the reference to eternity,
the paradoxical notion that one might lose her way while she is in “frozen motion” only
reinforces in this final yet continuing moment the temporal confusion, or the film’s critique of
linear temporal simplification. It is surrounded by time yet can move nowhere. Gladman’s

185
narrators in Juice often exist in this temporal stasis in which they are consumed with the idea of a
past that they do not actually have access to. The narrators’ presents are based on incomplete
histories, or exist in the gaps between dominant cultural narratives and real African American
historical experience.
A reading of the first story in Juice, “Translation,” will show how the text enacts, through
both form and content, a genealogical method of doing history. Written from the first-person
perspective, “Translation” reads like both a personal account and an interrogation of the
narrator’s history, as the narrator in the story has returned to a presumable hometown from which
everyone has disappeared. In the first paragraph she explains: “but this is not a story about me
. . . this is about those of us who live among the great ink-stained mountains.” The mountains
may be signifying the space written by history, constructed through language. “Though I have
cut corners to get here,” she says “these are the basics of my story: the fact of everybody’s
disappearance, a conviction of flight and return, and a loneliness so startling that people will
want to paint it” (8). When she returns to this town, no one else is living there. And such a story,
one of an individual cut-off from her collective identity as part of larger social group, sets up
both the need for, and the difficulty of, group identification. The narrator at once needs to
incorporate the history of the community into her own contemporary understanding of herself, as
well as find a voice with which to articulate her particular experiences within that history.
For Michel Foucault, in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” past and present are not
continuous in a linear and progressive way; the past occurs in dispersion and discontinuities. In
order to understand history we must look to local specificities, read the body as primary text and
cultural object, think of history as a relational force; if we are formed as social/cultural subjects,
then we must look to the details, the gaps, the relations between seeming disparate elements in
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order to better understand history. Genealogy, as a practice, is an analysis of descent and
emergence, a way of doing history that breaks out of the linear and totalizing narratives of
historical documentation. As an argument for thinking history as process, genealogy recognizes
incongruities and inconsistencies, instead of blindly following linear, cohesive, ideologically
constructed History. It can be used as a way to see the material forces and details that constitute
the past and affect the present, and as a way of analyzing the past to interrogate present historical
knowledge. Foucault writes, “The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of
history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically
dismantled” (88). A genealogical method works to uncover the debris, lingers in the narrative
gaps, and might ultimately allow for the silenced voices and invisible subjects to tell their stories.
As a material example of uncovering the debris, “Translation” incorporates the subject of
archeology, both literally and metaphorically, into its narrative. The narrator explains,
“Everything I know began the first summer I was in an archeological gang” (8); this immediately
sets up the focus on, and importance of, history for the original people of her community, and the
marginalized element of that: instead of a research group, they call themselves a gang who works
on recovering the artifacts of their collective history. The narrator explains: “The town
established a gang of archeologists to explore the facts of our extended history” (9). Immediately
in these few lines we see that one can learn from the material fragments of the past and that
history is constructed with miscellaneous, dusty pieces of things that are put aside and later
revisited. For the narrator, the materials here have to stand in for history, because, as she says, “It
seems that some relatives were in a hurry and gave abbreviated narratives” (9). History is also
not only temporal but spatial. The physical artifacts are stored in what she calls the “past
shelter,” an actual physical space used to store the past. Only later do we learn that her brother

187
found the “break in the mountain or narrow upper cave” (12) that was to become the shelter. We
learn also that the children acted as the caretakers of the artifacts of the town’s history, though an
implied sexual abstinence points to a sense of possibility that lies in the past instead of the future.
The narrator explains that “communication between lovers was spatial . . . contact was not
desired; one was satisfied with what seemed like endless possibility, and so, dwelled in that” (910). The material array of fragments of the past offer the children a space in which to create and
dwell in experiences that bring past and present together, in a space which recognizes the
messiness of the particulars of history as having indeterminate potential effects on the present.
For example, we are told:
The emotion behind this story is colored by events that would be lethal to repeat.
That is, their unfolding would unleash a polluted something beyond anyone’s
comprehension. No science can explain what propels this story. The land can
hardly contain its volatile nature. Anyone observing my predicament would
wonder why I have continued on. But, in a way, because there are no observers, I
have no choice but to go on. (11)
Here history is constructed as it is being told, the “unfolding” of the events occurs in their telling,
instead of telling events as they had previously unfolded. “No science can explain what propels
this story,” she says. Is she talking here about the content of the story, or the method of its
construction? The land is the physical text of history hardly containing the “volatile nature” of
the story. The history may be one of a people who have seen great hardship. How, she seems to
ask, is a volatile history smoothed into a cohesive narrative? How does a single individual, or a
single narrative, embody and disperse such a difficult history? Even after the narrator recognizes
the incompatibility of content (the volatile events) with method and form (how to tell these
stories), she realizes the story must nonetheless be told in a way that recognizes the difficulty of
telling; there is no possibility of narrative unity here to smooth things over.
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In the next section, we learn that the narrator’s brother “was a pioneer” because “he
discovered a place that was not too close to our present lives where we could store our
heirlooms” (12). It is curious that the heirloom storage place is “not too close to our present
lives,” and one wonders both on the nature of the relation between artifacts of the past and
present understanding, as well as the grammatical confusion and significance of “our present
lives”: which present exactly she is talking about? The rest of the paragraph is more clearly in
the past tense and we read that “the town as a whole felt discomfort around these “gifts” from the
past,” as if they were not their own heirlooms (12). The townspeople seem disconnected from
their past, and, the narrator tells us, “In order to believe in them [the “gifts”], we did not want to
see them” (12), alluding to the magical role of the unseen artifacts to function as a past that acts
as a system of belief. The town “could not face the proximity of the past and did not want to use
it either” and they brought the things that “their forefathers had left them” to the “past shelter”
for storage. Then the narrator tells us that her home is “right outside the shelter” and she “would
want to go there,”; “and hang out with the things that root my people”; “The hope being that
upon their return I will have missed them less” (12). The present as spatial is rooted in these
physical artifacts of history as the narrator hopes that upon the return of her people (a gesture
toward the future) she “will have missed them less” a grammatically correct sentence in which
narrator and reader alike for a moment dwell in present, past, and future simultaneously. These
passages also reiterate the fragmentation of the past in the present; the narrator has only these
few artifacts (fragments, shards of “history”) and no real history.
Near the end of “Translation,” we get just a hint of what may have happened to the
narrator’s people: “Many years back there was a virus ravaging us—made the black skin of my
neighbors turn toward the mood . . . . Bear in mind this is a land without normal science” (16). In
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the context of the story so far, we might read this in multiple ways, but it seems apparent that
history requires us to complicate our notions of how it is constructed especially when taking in to
account race and social marginalization. When the experiences of a group of people do not match
the cohesive cultural narratives of “the nation,” other accounts must be made available; when
stories are left out and material history ignored in the later cultural narration, it becomes
necessary to read more critically and dismantle hegemonic narrative history with an openness for
what has otherwise been cast aside. The histories of marginalized groups rarely match the
narratives that are later constructed by dominant structures. Through “Translation” Gladman
considers the messiness of the materials of history—experiences and artifacts—to deal with the
complexity of the past in the present. But when there are no suitable narratives, or no narratives
at all, what is left? “When a tribe has been reduced to one, there is no talk of remedy. Well, there
is no talk. As a town, we had the most intriguing conversations. Now I play with leaves” (17).
Gladman seems to be asking how whole groups of people have been neglected in the histories
that have been constructed thus far, and how new histories can be written that refuse to totalize
experience and instead open space for the recognition of diverse voices and sensibilities?
The last section of “Translation” includes spirits and a return to archaeology. The spirits
of the past “are said to teach people about death” (19) but the narrator claims to instead teach the
spirits; the present informs the past. The narrator sits on this constantly moving line that falls
between the past and present, at the interstice that joins the ancestors, the histories, and the
possibility of the return of her people. In order to save history and a potential future, one has to
save the land, and, she explains, “to save this land I have to bring back archeology.” The narrator
continues, “In the appearance of any species there is an element of its disappearance and within
its disappearance a particle of return. And that is why we have storage” (19). The present storage
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of memories, fragments, material pieces of history keeps one close to the past while awaiting the
potential of return:
In our past there is a germ for survival, beneath our weathered clothes and
yellowed papers, a propellant of time. If I wanted to I could spend the rest of my
days devoted to time. Or end the township here for something on the other side of
the mountains . . . is there life there? Well, it does not matter if there is life
because I am not leaving this mountainside. It has been six years since the exodus.
A year since I last spoke. I have forty-two years left of health, and anticipate five
hundred years before the great tidal wave. Things here slowly returning to slime
and translation. (19-20)
The narrator simultaneously moves into the future—having 42 years left of health, 500 years
before the great tidal wave—and recedes into the past, the origin of slime and translation;
however, this is no starting place or point of origin, but a return to process and potential. The
slime is what is left after receding into the past, but is also what will be used as the material for
whatever will grow next, it goes back to the earth to begin again. Translation is a process.
History is translated into narratives that maintain the status quo, or the narratives are translated
into fragmented networks of the pieces of material experience that complicate the possibility of
cohesive historical narratives. When something is translated, it can be mistranslated, or undergo
a change of some kind within the text, thus opening a space for alternative knowledge or
understanding to emerge. We leave “Translation” in the space of translation, of process, of the
return to the space of possibility. This different way of doing history and narrative then might
also be a larger political project in its desire to call attention to rupture within the texture of
(narrated) history. Instead of determining the future through the reproduction of mainstream
ideologies, the present includes the fissures or breaks from which might emerge the potential for
a politics of recognition.
The third story in Juice, “No Through Street,” reiterates some of the same concerns,
through a narrator who is alone and unable to form any connections to the people around her;
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one finishes the story wondering whether or not the people referred to by the narrator actually
existed or were instead imagined. The missed connections, and the movement between the
narrator’s memories of her past and the contemporary moment, point to the necessary difficulty
of relating the two.
Fifteen years ago, as I walked along the tree-lined street toward my now-past future, I
saw Mr. Godfrey standing on the edge of his lawn in utter fascination of something.
When I think about it, I am sure that he had witnessed the chaos that I am now seeing.
What else could explain his suddenly heaving chest and the way his eyes glazed over
when they turned to me? (30)
The narrator returns to the street of her childhood after leaving it fifteen years before, in order to
confront her past: “Six days after my return, I stood again at the head of Hershey Street, still
unable to surrender my past to its obvious transformation. It was by accident that I found myself
there” (33). In the meantime, she claims, she had spent her time riding on trains “going east to
west” (34). Hershey Street seems to represent the past that the narrator has avoided, or forgotten
while she passed her time riding trains: “For twelve of the fourteen years that I know I was on
trains, I was wondering about my body” and only during “the last three of the fourteen years, I
had vivid dreams of my long-lost street” (35). Finally, years later she returns to come face to face
with her street and the memories of her sister. Her sister, as it turns out, is the painter of the
famous street signs, that of “Hershey Street” included, and who has in the present become
famous for her work. Physically reentering this space causes the narrator to respond in various
ways. She explains: “the feelings that anchored me the other day to the sign, Slow to Bridge,
were not feelings as much as they were remembrances. I think I see our childhood in that sign”
(39). Sometimes, “consulting the signs for direction,” she explains, “I . . . am brought back to the
highlights of my past. I can remember things in a way I cannot at the head of the ‘new’ Hershey
Street. I believe that if I saw my sister she would tell me more about my life, but if I have learned
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anything from my past, it’s that I must pace myself” (39). The signs point to the past and seem
necessary for understanding one’s place in the present, yet there is a hesitation; one must pace
herself when discovering the past. And, she leads us to believe, one remembers differently
depending on spatial location and physical context. The signs point to her past. The “new”
Hershey Street represents a present that she is not a part of. Yet, we as readers never get a real
sense of the childhood seen by the narrator, or the gap between that and her feeling of
displacement in the present space of return.
Eventually, the narrator goes to the museum where her sister has been invited to paint her
signs, as an exhibit. It is here that the sense of the past in relation to present should come
together, made whole by the narrator’s sister who can fill in some of the blanks in the story.
However, she finds that
the woman in tattered, paint-splashed clothes with kinky black and tan hair outlining the
beginning of what probably will be a spectacular piece of art was not my sister. She
didn’t even impersonate her when I walked up. She simply said that she had never heard
of me.
And I believe her. But then, where is my sister? And if this woman is the
directionalist whom everyone knows about, who is my sister? (44)
We can read a number of things here: the difference between the real and the imagined
(narrative), the perception of identity that may not match up to some outside reality, the effort to
make sense of one’s past in the present, and the relation between the stories of self and of others.
The narrator, existing mainly in the past of this space to which she has returned, in the end has
no relation to the present. But the present without the past would seem to make as little sense as
one wonders why the sister (who is apparently not her sister) “directionalist” is painting signs in
the museum, for which she has become famous in the real world of the streets; an apt metaphor
for the relation between real, individual experience and its “translation” into institutional,
cohesive narratives of “the many.”
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In Politics Out of History, Wendy Brown calls Foucault’s genealogical method an “other
way of conceiving the familiar” (96) and considers the relation of the past to the present, and the
relation between individuals and others. Genealogical history, she writes, “is precisely the
opposite of teleological history; indeed it is in a permanent quarrel with teleological history,
insofar as it treats the present as the accidental production of the contingent past, rather than
treating the past as the sure and necessary road to the inevitable present” (103). Using terms like
“contingent” and “accidental” emphasizes the focus on possibility instead of determination. The
present is the consequence of fractured and multiple details of history. History, in these terms,
cannot be thought as teleological because the potential for change precludes predetermined end
points. Brown writes, “Genealogy reorients the relationship of history to political possibility . . .
in place of the lines of determination laid down by laws of history, genealogy appears as a field
of openings—faults, fractures, and fissures” (103). The present is no longer constrained by its
histories, but is able to break through totalizing historical narratives to look for “openings for
disturbance” in which lie the possibility for change, action, politics (Brown 103). In order to
break through the myths and narratives to see what is left out, disruption is imperative. Brown
writes, “The measure of genealogy’s success is its disruption of conventional accounts of
ourselves—our sentiments, bodies, origins, futures. It tells a story that disturbs our habits of selfrecognition, posing an ‘us’ that is foreign” (106). This is not unlike how the narrator in
“Translation” moves through time and space with a disturbed sense of past and present; unsure
of herself, she writes, “I know that I am not the “me” of ten days ago—I certainly do not look
like that “me” or how I thought of her” (14). And in “No Through Street” when the narrator
comes face to face with the person she thought of as her sister and the key to understanding her
past, she realizes they are not related and do not even recognize each other, and this disrupts the
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narrator’s understanding of herself, and readers’ understanding of the potential past that, at that
moment, seems no longer possible.
This inability to identify with one’s past points to the recognition of constructions of
identity based on passively consumed narrative accounts. Brown continues, “Where there is
narrative logic or continuity, genealogy assaults it by introducing counterforces and revelations
of discontinuity” (106). These counterforces and revelations of discontinuity are enacted in the
structure and narrative strategies of Gladman’s stories; “the story” is in the broken logic of the
narrative form itself. The text takes on this genealogical method as a political act for which,
according to Brown, we need to first understand “the historical composition of our being” (108).
A politics of the present stands in view of the layered and textured history from which it has
emerged, and the “fractures in history become the material of possibility in the present to the
extent that they signify weaknesses or openings in the structure of the present—“‘virtual
fractures’ as Foucault writes, ‘ . . . open up the space of freedom’” (Brown 113). The fractures,
fissures, breaks, and gaps in the text itself, like in history, open the space for political possibility
in which the present is not simply determined for us, and in which totalizing narratives might be
translated into processes for change. The seemingly static nature of time in Juice is a strategy of
its interrogative translation project. Creating a static present gives the narrators the space they
need to delve into the past, to find the weaknesses and fractures, in order to open further space
for “political possibility.” Gladman’s narrators are adrift because they are in process of finding a
present tense that has not been predetermined. They create non/narratives that function as
examples and processes for change, and this, in Brown’s terms, “reorients the relationship of
history to political possibility.” Working through and coming to terms with History—and how as
marginalized subjects they do and do not relate to that history—and breaking with narrative as a
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hegemonic organizing strategy, allows the narrators in Gladman’s stories to act as vehicles for
greater understanding as well as narrative and political action in the present. Through her
non/narrative writing strategies, Gladman takes us through the process of interrogation and
imagining possibilities for subjects seeking to articulate their experience and further participate
as social citizens.

Documenting Postmodern Trauma in Do not Let Me Be Lonely
In her introduction to Everybody’s Autonomy, Juliana Spahr points to Frederick
Douglass’s understanding that “literacy is a pathway to freedom” (2). Douglass, she writes,
“would at times feel that learning to read had been a curse rather than a blessing . . . . It opened
[his] eyes to the horrible pit, but to no ladder which to get out” (3) and he came to recognize
“reading as a communal, not individual act”; that reading dependant on community can turn
“into a force that can be manipulated and used as a tool of resistance to respond to the
inhumanity of slavery” (3). In the case of Rankine’s Do not Let me Be Lonely, we can use
Douglass’s example to point to the inhumanity of the emotional violence of history, the ills of
contemporary culture, and the importance of “reading dependant on community” particularly in
relation to individual marginalized subjects’ negotiation of identity within the larger cultural
context. Rankine seems to assert in this text that as socially responsible citizens, we need to
become literate at “reading” culture.
As a contemporary poet, Rankine is concerned in much of her work with African
American history, subjectivity, and negotiations of contemporary culture. In Do not Let Me Be
Lonely she moves out of the realm of poetry and into a type of experimental memoir. This
hybrid, non/narrative “documentary” work can be compared to a documentary film, in which
arguments are made either overtly or subtly, and specific and varied examples are presented to
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support repeated main ideas over the course of the text. It is a work that engages the visual as it
makes the argument that images shape our knowledge and understandings as contemporary
citizens; and images from contemporary culture play a role in the experiences we have and the
stories we tell, especially of, and for, African Americans, though the history of African
Americans is the history of America.
Each chapter, or section, in Do not Let Me Be Lonely is marked with a photograph of a
television with static on its screen, and in the static the savvy viewer will notice a shadow of a
head, the reflection of the TV viewer, the reader watching the text unfold; the reader is hereby
implicated in the events that unfold “in culture” as it is accessed through the television screen.
Even if the viewer does not participate, she gains the knowledge of culture—via the TV, via the
documentary text—and may be held accountable for having such knowledge. Each chapter,
instead of carrying forward an overarching narrative, takes up a particular event or idea; photos
are sometimes included to—either directly or indirectly—relate to the idea of each chapter, and
some photos are framed by the same television image that marks chapter breaks. An early
section, for example, begins with the narrator explaining that she watches TV to help her fall
asleep, during which time, she says, “Sometimes I count the commercials for antidepressants,”
and notices a commercial for PAXIL which “says simply: YOUR LIFE IS WAITING”; this
message, on the page, is in white letters against the black screen of the TV. Without sound, she
explains, “it remains on the screen long enough so that when I close my eyes to check if I am
sleeping, instead of darkness, YOUR LIFE IS WAITING stares back at me” (29). The narrator
then gets a prescription of her own, it is not clear for what, and makes a list about deciding not to
take the pills, concluding: “My desire is to give the pills away as I might a pair of shoes I have
never worn. I want to give them to a friend, to someone who could decide to throw them away”
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(32). As a subject, she is split between the messages of the TV and the reality of chemical
medication, the dream-space of night and the daylight realization of diagnoses and prescription,
making us question the difference between the real and the imagined, between virtual, media/ted
experience and “real life.”
The reader of Do not Let Me Be Lonely gets the sense that Rankine’s narrator is cursed
with the ability to read the landscape of contemporary culture and write the individual voice as
part of a communal act; she constructs an intertextual and layered critique that calls attention to
the notion of a stable, single-authored, autobiographical narrative, and the myth of
“happiness”—that we are fed via various media—that is supposed to come with a comfortable
social and economic class position. Highlighting particular aspects of culture, race, and gender
point to the “relationship between literature and consciousness raising” (Spahr 5) to create a
complex work in which the seemingly clear and straightforward parts add up to a whole that is
nonetheless disjunct. Rankine’s documentation of specific events and reflections reveals a
traumatic situation that transcends the personal, and makes readers complicit in the cultural
critique and the psychic dangers that mark the crisis of the (postmodern) contemporary.
Is this a postmodern text? Or the “story” of a postmodern subject? (Whose life is
waiting?) If “both” is the too easy answer, nonetheless Do not Let Me Be Lonely is a work that
explores the possibility of postmodern subjectivity and enacts this interrogation through the
formal strategies in its construction. In Autobiography and Postmodernism Leigh Gilmore
describes this type of text “as a site of identity production” in which the subject is both “an agent
in discourse,” and “is understood as necessarily discursive” (3) or constructed according to
historically and culturally specific discourses. Using strategies that subvert narrative cohesion,
and refusing to give a clear account of the identity produced in this text, Rankine’s narrator
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enacts a subjective response to the gaps and contradictions in culture and (or because of)
discourse, and the notion of self-representation in an autobiographical text becomes impossible.
The writer of autobiography tends, according to Gilmore, “to heighten the contradictions in the
discourses of self-representation” and create subjects who “record the effects of fragmentation”
(8). Central to this postmodern subjectivity, Gilmore points out, after Emile Benveniste and
Roman Jakobson, that the pronoun “I”—considered to be the narrator and subject of the
autobiographical text—exists only in relation to others, and asks, “what readings of
autobiography are possible when the linguistic element upon which one would most wish to
depend for some sense of stability . . . offers both collectivity and individuality?” (7). Although
the text is no longer stable in terms of its presenting a unified narrator who directly transmits to
readers her subjective experience, we gain something here in the way the text and its readers
come into critical relation with the simultaneous individual and collective “instability” of the
text.
“Postmodern knowledge,” writes Jean-Francois Lyotard, “refines our sensitivity to
differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable” (xxv). Lyotard studies the
condition of knowledge and culture following transformations in postindustrial, Western society
and explains how our ideas of knowledge have changed especially with the rise of computer and
other technological advancements. Instead of grand philosophical narratives that regulate and
prescribe ethics and action, he believes that it is more relevant now to think about how we are all
contextualized by, and perform within, multiple smaller narratives, and the various roles we play
in our everyday lives. Additionally, he explains, “A self does not amount to much, but no self is
an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever
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before” (15). Rankine picks up on this notion, citing multiple stories throughout Do not Let Me
Be Lonely that only seem related by virtue of the traumatic details of the stories or their effects.
Fredric Jameson sees postmodernism as a reflex still contained within capitalism in
which consumption and commodification have saturated all aspects of contemporary life.
Jameson’s “postmodern condition” includes a number of symptoms including “historical
deafness” (Postmodernism xi); the schizophrenia that marks an inability to “unify the past,
present, and future of . . . biographical experience or psychic life” and through which we
experience a “series of pure and unrelated presents in time” (27); depthlessness, or the
multiplication of surfaces which mark culture and experience as spatial instead of temporal (12);
and feeling is replaced by euphoric “intensities,” as a result of the simultaneity of the spatial,
instead of the movement of the temporal. At the core of Jameson’s ideas of the postmodern is the
lack of temporality which results in an inability to unify through the use of historical
understanding. Style and materiality of texts and of life dominate the contemporary, and it is
through this depthless present that the past is read simply as an accumulation of commodifiable
styles. The simultaneous “presents” mark a breakdown of temporality seen especially through
the materiality of language and mere meaning-effects of postmodern writing. And the loss of
historicity leads to surface effects such as “pastiche” and “nostalgia” averting any more
thoughtful depth of reflection.
Rankine’s Do not Let Me Be Lonely serves as an example of a more updated, theory-inpractice of postmodern subjectivity. Read through and against Jameson’s summary of
postmodern effects above, Do not Let Me Be Lonely performs many of the elements by which we
might define a text as postmodern; further, it redefines postmodern textual practice in a
meaningful way that serves to enact a critique of contemporary culture, and to potential for
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political action. Her text ultimately critiques the notion of the postmodern subject as simply
reacting without agency. Although the contemporary subject, for Rankine, is traumatized by her
own loss of identity within contemporary culture, through the process of the text Rankine brings
her readers in to participate in a hopeful potential for something beyond that trauma; and this
rests in the—subtle and implicit—notion of community advocated in the text. Formally, Do not
Let Me Be Lonely enacts a non/narrative style of simultaneous happenings that seem superficially
non-connected; instead of progression, one chapter falls alongside the next, moments or ideas
reflect back and forth or stand alone, images hypertextually link the text to significance in the
technologically mediated world. Space is a topic of investigation throughout as the narrator
moves through different physical, psychic, and emotional spaces, and events under scrutiny
occur in a variety of locations. For example, Rankine explore a number of places and events
including James Byrd’s murder as he was dragged behind a truck in Texas; Abner Louima’s
assault; and the shooting of Amadou Diallo in New York; the Museum of Emotions in London
and the lawn in front of Buckingham Palace filled with flowers and cards for Princess Diana; and
the World Trade Center site after 9/11. The theme of death that runs throughout is immediate and
always framed in the present tense as a situation or state of being, not as the end of a progression
in time. For example, a television interview transcribed by the narrator shows how knowledge is
only formed from one moment to the text, making communication difficult:
Man: He is deceased?
Boy: He is dead to me.
Man: So he is not deceased?
Boy: I do not know.
He could be dead.
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Man: Is he or is he not dead?
Boy: He’s been dead to my life.
Man: Someone wrote in your file
that he is dead. Did you tell
someone that he is dead?
Boy: All right, he is dead. (15)
Lacking a common sense of understanding or language, these two characters seem to be
speaking simultaneously and communicating little between them. Do not Let Me Be Lonely
sometimes seems to include more lack than content in the ways it calls attention to gaps,
disturbances, and events that simply cannot be made sense of. And through all of this, real life as
well as fabricated characters function in solitary space (they are alone, lonely) as if constructed
by but unable to participate in any larger social network. Other thematic elements include
references to lost or lacking memory, such as the friend with Alzheimer’s who writes on a
message board, “THIS IS THE MOST MISERABLE IN MY LIFE” which the narrator connects
to the voice of Joseph Brodsky “saying, What’s the point of forgetting it it’s followed by dying”
(17); then the narrator repeats these two phrases back to back in a continuous circulation that
seems to exist in a moment completely outside of time, and resonates through the rest of the text.
Rankine seems to be emphasizing exactly that which does not fit into hegemonic, totalizing
narratives, the stories that have been left out, edited away, smoothed over. What is lacking is any
context for making sense of experiences that fall outside of the narrative myths of the American
Dream. In Do not Let Me Be Lonely, she creates a genealogy of debris that exceeds the narratives
of nationhood that her subjects have been ingesting throughout the twentieth century.
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This text utilizes a number of formal, textual strategies to explore space, enact
simultaneity, and emphasize repetition, in relation to real world events and emotions. It theorizes
and enacts the fragmented and simulacral elements of popular culture and contemporary
existence, and gives readers—as subjects implicated in the construction of the (cultural) text—
insight into the psychic, social, and historical causes and effects of trauma, suffering, and
loneliness. This text is anything but what Jameson might call “historically deaf,” depthless, and
without feeling. Do not Let Me Be Lonely moves trauma as a theme, like death, like loneliness,
through the book. Some of the characters suffer trauma in different ways; viewers may be
traumatized by events witnessed in these pages; contemporary culture itself may be read as
traumatized, having survived one violent event after another and continuing on, haunted by the
past. We the citizens of this contemporary postmodern culture suffer traumatic effects, in our
personal lives and in the stories that surround us, as new acts of violence and death recall the
infinity of past events. History is temporal. Trauma is about time, or about events happening, and
then recurring in the mind, over time.
Using Freud’s “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” Cathy Caruth explains that the traumatic
neurosis is “not the reaction to any horrible event but, rather, the peculiar, and perplexing
experience of survival” and asks the question “what does it mean to survive?” (“Violence” 24),
which seems also to be the question Rankine asks throughout Do not Let Me Be Lonely.
According to Caruth, the pathology or neurosis is not in the original event, but in the haunting
repetition of the image or event that takes hold of the traumatized in different manifestations, and
for which there may be no understanding. The obviously traumatic event for both family and
friends of victims, and the general American public, is 9/11—into which there is no real access,
nor does it seem possible to represent. Alongside a photo of a pile of stretchers made of wood for
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transporting rescued victims (or bodies) from the Trade Center wreckage, Rankine writes, “The
language of description competes with the dead in the air” (82). What does it mean to survive?
Caruth explains, “contemporary trauma” involves “a crisis of truth” that “extends beyond the
question of individual cure and asks how we in this era can have access to our own historical
experience, to a history that is in its immediacy a crisis to whose truth there is no simple access”
(Trauma 6); Caruth says this is an impossible history because it cannot be entirely possessed but
only possesses. The literary text, in working to translate experience into understanding, “as the
narrative of a belated experience . . . attests to its endless impact on a life” (Unclaimed 7).
Following Lacan, Caruth suggests “a kind of double telling, the oscillation between a crisis of
death and the correlative crisis of life: between the story of the unbearable nature of an event and
the story of the unbearable nature of its survival” (Unclaimed 7).
Rankine enacts this trauma through the presentation of events that are separate from, yet
intimately related to, subjective contemporary experience. The text seems to ask how we as
viewers are possessed by the traumatic history repeated in the violent acts against Abner Louima
and Amadou Diallo (56-57) ? How is the immediacy of this history a traumatic crisis? Instead of
access to some kind of truth or ability to make sense of the events, the narrator explains,
“instead, I get a sharp pain in my gut . . . . Not quite a caving in, just a feeling of bits of my
inside twisting away from flesh in the form of a blow to the body . . . / Sometimes I look into
someone’s face and I must brace myself—the blow on its way” (56). The experience is felt as
physical pain, the weight of the history of violence as racist control haunting the present moment
of watching Louima on television, of watching his photo in this text. And when Diallo’s death is
announced: “All the shots, all forty-one never add up, never become plural, and will not stay in
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the past” (57). The past remains aggressively in the present as the images will not fade until it
becomes possible to articulate the horrific and inexplicable.
The event that triggers the personal traumatic repetition at the center of this book is the
story of the narrator’s sister’s family who were killed in a car accident. The personal and the
cultural mingle and point to questions of action/inaction, personal agency, and the trauma that
history leaves for us in the present. The narrator tells us, “in truth I can do nothing but see in the
activity of her grief three people’s death” (63). Caruth points to Freud, who asks, “what it would
mean for history to be understood as the history of trauma” (“violence” 24). And she concludes
that such a history—individual or collective—bears with it the weight of a paradox: that
external violence is felt most, not in its direct experience; that trauma is constituted not
only by the destructive force of a violent event but by the very act of its survival. If we
are to register the impact of violence we cannot, therefore, locate it only in the destructive
moment of the past, but in an ongoing survival that belongs to the future. It is because
violence inhabits, incomprehensibly, the very survival of those who have lived beyond it
that it may be witnessed best in the future generations to whom this survival is passed on.
(25)
For better or worse, survival is passed on. And the text as a place/space to repeat the violence, to
make us viewers participate in the violence by way of its traumatic aftermath, may also work as a
means to understanding, or horizon of hope, by way of our communal implication and
responsibility: Do not Let Me Be Lonely. The writing of the text, and the act of reading/viewing,
might be used as a tool of resistance to the repetition of history, toward a future of collective
action.
Define loneliness?
Yes.
It’s what we can’t do for each other.
What do we mean to each other?
What does a life mean?
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Why are we here if not for each other? (62)
We are responsible for each other, Rankine’s narrator argues. Loneliness is what happens when
we refuse to making sense of tragedy and work toward the (non-traumatic) social, collective,
good.
The narrator tells a story about a “13 yr old boy convicted of first degree murder for
killing a six yr old girl.” She explains: “We hear on the television . . . I, or we, it hardly matters”
(67). The boy is convicted and “in this moment we are alone with the facts as he will be when he
understands” (67). We, viewers as members of a society in which something like this happens,
are complicit. We watch as he is sent to prison for life, we participate in his fate. The hope for
breaking through the repetition of violent history is in the basic relation between self and other,
reader and text. This is a story about the repeated violence in African American history, which is
American history, in all of its messiness, gaps, and traumatic effects. When a black man is shot
forty-one times, we are all implicated in the history that has instigated and then condoned this
event in the present moment. The contemporary traumatic is enacted as a symptom of our
collective, violent history/ies. The representation of this event in the text is both traumatic and
cathartic; in order to break out of the cycle, we need to see it and recognize it and then resist. The
text may mediate this process. Rankine points to Myung Mi Kim, who “did say that the poem is
really a responsibility to everyone in a social space. She did say it was okay to cramp, to clog, to
fold over at the gut, to have to put hand to flesh, to have to hold the pain, and then to translate it
here. She did say, in so many words, that what alerts, alters” (57). The text is an alarm. It is up to
readers to take action, to alter. Or, as Rankine’s narrator tells us, “I tried to fit language into the
shape of usefulness. The world moves through words as if the bodies the words reflect did not
exist” (129). The text can be a point of mediation, between experience and its resulting traumatic
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effects, and seems to enact violent personal and social experiences in order to break the cycle of
repetition.

Conclusion
These texts points to the need for narratives of history and nation as complex,
connotative, rhetorical, psychic, and diverse. Do not Let Me Be Lonely presents a history in the
present that is fragmented, confused, depressing, and yet hopeful for contemporary American
subjects. If, after Paul Celan, the poem is similar to a handshake, Rankine writes, “the handshake
is our decided ritual of both asserting (I am here) and handing over (here) a self to another.
Hence the poem is that—Here. I am here. This conflation of the solidity of presence with the
offering of this same presence perhaps has everything to do with being alive” (130). This is the
kind of storytelling through which “the nation speaks its disjunctive narrative” (Bhabha 311) and
as viewer/witnesses, we become involved in further opening spaces for counter-narratives that
give language to silenced voices. Through writing and speaking these alternative narratives,
subjects can respond to totalizing, nationalistic narratives, create other possibilities for
identification, and work toward the communal handshaking that occurs when citizens are no
longer writing, reading, speaking, existing in isolation but become, instead, a part of the process,
of re-narrating history and experience, of creating new types of national identities. And the ways
in which Lu, Gladman, and Rankine enact their cultural critiques through innovative,
non/narrative textual strategies further makes the argument that opening spaces for counternarratives involves not only the content of critique, but a dismantling and rebuilding of the very
social, linguistic structures that define and contain identity for subjects. In these readings, the
text-subjects’ “stories” act as models for the variety of subjects—and their various identificatory
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concerns—seeking alternative and expanded means of identification, through a more thoughtful
relationship between history,
responsibility.

memory,

individual experience, and collective, social
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CHAPTER 4
“Possibility is not a luxury”: (Re)presentation and (Re)identification
in The Transformation, Borderlands/La Frontera, and Dictee

Citing the tensions between collective, group identity and individual experience, Juliana
Spahr, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha create text-subjects who bear witness to
the problematic nature of Western, masculine, heteronormative narratives for identity, and speak
to cultural experiences that exceed textual and social norms. The text-subjects speak from places
of cultural and ethnic dislocation, and it is through their processes of (“autobiographical”)
writing that they dismantle and revise narratives of collectivity and personal identification. These
subjects generate new ways of using language and documenting history that represent new
strategies for identifying. Spahr’s The Transformation, Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera,
and Cha’s Dictee interrogate and revise social norms for gender performance, sexual practice and
desire, and narratives of ethnic and geographical dislocation. Dealing with geographic and ethnic
colonization, and historical oppressions, these subjects-in-process go beyond linguistic
subversion and cultural critique to construct new models for articulating non-normative, nonnarratable experience and history. These texts challenge binary structures—such as self/other,
masculine/feminine,

colonizer/colonized;

open

spaces

of

possibility

for

subjective

understanding; and act as models for expanding possibilities for representing experience and
politics. Their subjects enact the need for recognition, and go beyond this to become speaking
subjects, witnesses to their own experiences and the cultural conditions around them. Bringing
Kristeva’s textual/social politics together with Butler’s cultural theories, I use Kelly Oliver’s
theory of “witnessing” to deepen the discussion of the relation between textual subjectivity and
the hybrid, prose interrogation of identity, and the cultural manifestations of complex subjective
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identifications. These writers further negotiate the historical need for collective identification and
the antithetical individual experiences that cannot be fully articulated. Through strategies of recontextualization, re-identification, and re-collection, the subjects of these texts dismantle,
rearrange, and reconstruct the stories about their lives, while simultaneously trying to make sense
of those stories.
The difficulties of identification, when there is little to identify with, are opened for
exploration by way of subjects who are multiply positioned, and who enact this multiplicity
through the use, and revision, of language and textual strategies. The subjects of these texts do
not “fit” into binary, ideological notions of gender, sexual practice, and historical/cultural
experience; each struggles with the need for collective identification, and recognizes that there is
no stable self, no single discourse or perspective from which to speak and identify. From
queering heterosexual domestic relations, to transgressing culturally traditional narratives of
gender performance, to visualizing and recontextualizing the fragmented and incoherent details
of history, each subject moving through the space of her text is analogous to the multiply situated
and contextualized subject in the world, the multiple and contradictory discourses enacted
through the formal strategies on the page. The process of the text is the process, for each of these
text-subjects, to come to terms with a useful understanding of collective identification and it’s
relation to individual experience.
Diana Fuss calls attention to the relation between identity and identification and the need
to theorize the instability of these terms. Particularly for subjects who are marginalized in
culture, or who make life choices that do not fit in with hegemonic cultural narratives, the ability
to identify with others, or find space within an amenable discourse, is crucial. As Fuss explains:
Identification is the detour through the other that defines a self. This detour through the
other follows no predetermined developmental path, nor does it travel outside history and
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culture. Identification names the entry of history and culture into the subject, a subject
that must bear the traces of each and every encounter with the external world.
Identification is, from the beginning, a question of relation, of self to other, subject to
object, inside to outside. (2-3)
In order to connect with oneself, and connect in the world, one must have something with which
to identify. Identification is primarily understood through relations between and among subjects,
and even an individual subject’s inner and outer psychic life. Neither identity nor identification is
predetermined or static, but each remains flexible and open to change, always in relation to
oneself, to another, to a larger social world. Spahr, Anzaldúa, and Cha’s subjects seem implicitly
aware of the dynamic nature of identity, they work through their own processes of disavowing
norms and narratives to which they cannot relate, and they create new means, and new
possibilities—through language, history, memory, geography, and the body—for identification.
In addition to one’s having her own sense of identity, this is also central to political action. Even
for Freud, Fuss writes, “to the extent that every social group is constituted . . . through
identification between its members, through social ties based upon a perception of similarity and
shared interests, there can be no politics without identification” (10). The projects of the texts
discussed here, although diverse in content, all deal in textual politics that extend out into the
cultural realm for subjects invested in finding ways of meaningful identification. The call for
new languages, finding non/narrative means of representation, and seeking greater possibilities
for identification in the world is a politics in action. These texts offer just three material
examples that might motivate further textual practice and social change; they use formal
strategies to break through (symbolic) narratives that “naturalize” (gendered, sexual, ethnic)
experience; and they function within symbolic structures (of patriarchy, language, history) while
simultaneously embodying Kristeva’s semiotic space of disruption, rupture, contradiction, and
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negativity, in order to more deeply consider possibilities for alternative gender expression and
collective identification, by way of embodied experience.
Judith Butler explains that we need to recognize “how the norms that govern
contemporary notions of reality can be questioned and how new modes of reality can become
instituted . . . a mode of becoming that, in becoming otherwise, exceeds the norm, reworks the
norm, and makes us see how realities to which we thought we were confined are not written in
stone.” Troubling sexual and gendered identity categories is one way of pushing against
boundaries, of going beyond “norms” into other, potential spaces of action and being. And for
Butler this is not a choice, but a responsibility. “Some people have asked me what is the use of
increasing possibilities for gender,” she explains, “I tend to answer: possibility is not a luxury; it
is as crucial as bread” (Undoing 29). Pushing past boundaries and exceeding norms are necessary
political action, imperative for instituting “new modes of reality” through which even silenced,
invisible subjects can become recognized. And beyond recognition, they become speaking
subjects, witnesses to the detrimental effects of totalizing narratives and binary structures.
We can further turn to Susan Stanford Friedman’s spatial and geographical theory of
identity as constructed through multiply positioned discourses, in order to detect “possibility”
working through, between, and among gender, sexuality, identity, politics, class, race, culture,
geography, and language. And at the level of practice, we can see how these are enacted in a
variety of ways in the non/narrative, autobiographical-style text. Butler echoes this notion in
Giving an Account of Oneself, in which she explains, “if we require that someone be . . . a
coherent autobiographer, we may be preferring the seamlessness of the story to something we
might tentatively call the truth of the person, a truth that, to a certain degree . . . might well
become more clear in moments of interruption, stoppage, open-endedness—in enigmatic
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articulations that cannot easily be translated into narrative form” (64). The non/narrative text
represents this cultural incoherence, the multiple and constantly recontextualized self, at the
formal level of the construction of the text. For Butler, “the purpose . . . is not to celebrate a
certain notion of incoherence, but only to point out that our “incoherence” establishes the way in
which we are constituted in relationality: implicated, beholden, derived, sustained by a social
world that is beyond us and before us” (Giving 64). This discussion of cultural identity translates
into the readings of the primary texts discussed below as they enact this incoherence, and
textually perform the clarity and insight found in spaces of interruption and “enigmatic
articulations.” Subjects “interrupted by alterity” do not simply fit into cohesive narratives of
experience; however, finding new and alternative means of documenting this kind of antithetical
experience continues to offer alternative possibilities for recognition, representation, speaking,
and witnessing, that do not simply result in narrative cohesion and closure.

The Transformation
Juliana Spahr’s The Transformation witnesses postcolonial effects from the perspective
of an outsider colonizer in contemporary Hawaii, grounds its formal strategies in the
experience(s) of a multiply identified and conflicted narrator, and creates a textual space for the
interactions of language, history, identity, and the dismantling of binaries. Spahr writes a text
that is anti-memoir, in a sense; we cannot read it as entirely autobiographical though it is based
on her time living and working in Hawaii with her two, male, domestic partners. Key to its antimemoir quality is the fact that she uses the third-person pronouns, instead of first or second;
instead of using: “I,” “we,” “she,” “he,” “us” she uses only “they” and “them.” I read this as her
way of taking the focus off of her specific experience to offer a larger cultural commentary, to
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create a new way of thinking about being the white outsider recontextualized within the
historically saturated contemporary world of Hawaii, and to have a language for talking about an
unconventional domestic partnership between three, non-normatively heterosexual adults. In the
first part of the text the narrator neurotically obsesses over trying to make sense of living in a
place in which it becomes impossible to articulate that place. As an outsider she has no access to
cultural critique or interpretation, yet it becomes clear how the history of a place that has been
exploited and multiply colonized, and is in antagonistic relationship with its current colonizer
and owner, the mainland U.S., is affecting the everyday, present life of everyone who lives there.
In this first part of the book she uses the literal and metaphorical discussions of the rich natural
surroundings to attempt to articulate her anxieties, concerns, and inability to reason and speak
coherently. In the second part of the book, the domestic partnership of three moves back to New
York City, just before 9/11, and the narrative continues to attempt to make sense of cultural
dislocation, how “they” are different, and how New York is different, after Hawaii. The concept
of “transformation” happens on a variety of levels, from the narrator’s need to transform
language, to the literal transfer from one location to another, to how everything is different
during and after 9/11. And ultimately, the text works through a transformation of self that
happens over the course of a “non/memoir” that is also an extended analysis of self in relation to
her outer environment(s), and an individual in relation to collective concerns.
Spahr begins The Transformation with an analogy between the natural environment and
human society in order to think about naming, categorization, and the ways language is used to
construct explanations of natural and social phenomena. She writes: “Flora and fauna grow next
to and around each other without names. Humans add the annotation. They catalogue the flora
and fauna, divide them up, chart their connections and variations, eventually name them, and as
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they do this they read into them their own stories” (13). The relationships between colonizer and
colonized, native and other, fill a complicated Hawaiian history, and this is evident in language
drawn from natural surroundings. She uses the real and metaphorical example of the “huehue
haole,” a term used for white outsiders, and explains the origins of the term: “What was called
the maracuja, the passiflora, the passionflower, they called the huehue haole. Huehue is the name
of a climber native to the islands. Haole is the word that is used to describe some of them in this
story, people who arrive from somewhere else. In the world of plants it is also used to describe a
particularly noxious and invasive species” (13-14). If so much of Hawaiian culture is articulated
through the natural vegetation, environment, and landscapes, Spahr’s narrator understands that in
order to tell her story she must also interpret it through the material and metaphorical natural
phenomena in which she is now contextualized. She explains: “This is a story of the passiflora
and the tree canopy. This is a story of three who moved to an island in the middle of the Pacific
together” (14). The story must be told as a Hawaiian story, even while she is trying to come to
terms with the complexity of that story—or more accurately the multiple stories that construct
“Hawaii” and how her own stories now mingle with those.
The three who move to the island together are individually and collectively referred to as
“they” as a way to get around gender identification, though it is made clear that the triad
conforms to traditional heterosexual practices of sexual relations. Nonetheless, the genderneutral pronoun “they” troubles the construct of the heterosexual domestic partnership, even if
the narrator refuses to adopt queer terminology to signify “their” situation. The spatial and
political inquiry moves between domestic and public space, and is enacted in the form of
repeated phrasing and sentence constructions that write “around” meaning, pointing to the
inadequacy of language to provide articulate explanations for the layered understandings of self

215
in relation to other. The story that unfolds weaves natural phenomena with the struggle for
personal understanding within a context of complex historical and cultural politics, as in the
following example:
The minute they got off the plane they realized that the beauty of the island was its own
radiant thing full of boths and that they had to begin with these boths. It was an island of
both great environmental beauty and of great environmental destruction. And these boths
fed each other in a complicated feedback loop . . . . When they looked around most of
what they saw among the many things growing, flying, and crawling had been brought
onto the island after the whaling ships arrived. It told a story of beauty and a story of
mismanagement. It told a story of invasion and of acceptance as if it could tell both of
these stories using the same vocabulary. (Spahr 27)
Central to telling the stories and making sense of them is the difficulty of language. How does
one make sense of binary oppositions simultaneously? How can a place be beautiful and suffer
such consequences of destruction? How can such beauty be so historically mismanaged? The
narrator sees the paradox, and the sadness, of a place with such a complicated and layered
identity, a place that has been exploited for so long by so many different groups, and its
residents, both resistant and resigned, holding on to language, tradition, and stories that often
point toward various, different origins. Although Spahr uses the word “both” an important part of
her project is to undo the simplicity of binaries; there are never only two sides, but a history of
complex issues that cannot be neatly separated. This is apparent in the history and evolution of
language and the ways language is used in Hawaii, and Spahr’s attempts to find language to
articulate her own questions and analysis. She writes:
despite the expansionist language and all its tools, all the laws and all the imperialism, all
the economic dominance, all the military might, all the technologies, and all the
entertainments, the language politics of the island remained endlessly complicated. The
expansion did not happen overnight and one could point to how the local languages and
the languages that were often created by the arrival of the expansionist language to
someplace new, the pidgins and creoles, the burrowing languages, the negotiated
languages, refused to go away as evidence of how the expansionist language might not be
as good at expansion as one might think. (Spahr 95)
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Language controls and refuses to give in to control. The history of the uses and mingling of
languages in Hawaii reflect the complex cultural history of domination and resistance, of
different groups moving in and out, assimilating and fighting back, at various turns. Spahr enacts
this on the level of her own language through the use of repetition and listing; in the quote above,
the types of languages listed represent the layers of complex history and culture that one must
negotiate in order to make sense of the history of language in Hawaii. This list then repeats
throughout the chapter, with occasional slight variation. The text does not simply narrate and
explain a complex history of relations, but it instead tries to use the density of language in order
to present experiences themselves dense in construction. In fact, she seems to ask, what kinds of
vocabularies can account for the layers of stories and politics, for beauty and destruction? This
anxiety runs through the text; Spahr is asking how language can be used to account for the
histories of our relations to one another: colonizer and colonized, self and other. It asks how we
can possibly recognize and identify ourselves when we are constantly moving through contexts
and languages that are always already constructing and identifying us.
In order to move away from the binary, oppositional structure, Spahr uses the concept of
the triad as a model that challenges and resists given constructions; there is no easy language to
explain a sexual and domestic union of three people. In a triad, issues cannot simply be reduced
to those between self and other, or gender limited to he and she. The traid changes the dynamic
of the binary, indeed makes it impossible, and requires new means of language for explanation
and recognition. The triad works as a literal example of the difficulty of falling outside
traditional means of categorization and recognizability, and as a metaphor for breaking out of
cultural, binary constructions for gender, sexuality, and identification. The triad moves the
construction out of the self-other structure and into a more circular constellation of elements. If

217
history and politics could be understood in terms of constellations, instead of as binary issues in
which one must choose one side or the other, this could open space for greater possibilities of
recognition and understanding. The triad is the difficult anomaly that cannot be merely explained
or defined because it calls attention to the simplified, problematic narratives that otherwise
construct our everyday lives.
The model of the triad as a domestic partnership also works as an example of the nonnormatively heterosexual desire, in Theresa de Lauretis’s terms. The trio, consisting of two men
and one woman, claims to still fit into a model of heterosexual desire, though there are no
models for such a partnership of three. The narrator uses the example of receiving invitations that
include a partner, and having to ask about bringing both partners. It becomes a queer
construction in which the three are inevitably in perverse relation to one another, and in which
the non-normative heterosexual and homosocial elements mingle and fuse into a singular
domestic entity—the extent of the desiring relationship between the two men is never entirely
clarified. De Lauretis’s model of perverse desire offers a positive account of non-normatively
heterosexual desire, and combined with Spahr’s example of non-normative romantic domesticity,
already a space has been opened for further exploration. When one “chooses” to turn away from
social norms, the process can be that much more difficult without something else with which to
identify. If “perversion” is seen as a turning away from “a socially constituted norm” and not a
refusal of nature, then this norm, or “normal sexuality,” can be seen as “a requirement of social
reproduction, both reproduction of the species and reproduction of the social system” (de
Lauretis 113). Read in this way, Spahr’s triad is seen as a perverse response to heterosexual
domestic partnerships and a model for alternative practices, especially for those who are not able
to conform to the norms of social reproduction.
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The triad’s move back to New York, to the “islands in the Atlantic,” seems to be an
opportunity for relief from the difficulty of living an unconventional domestic lifestyle, in a
place of difficult language and history. Optimistically, the narrator explains:
The gray matter at the back of their brain told them to move to the islands in the Atlantic
because the islands were known for their perversions and various sexualities and they
wanted to live someplace known for its perversions and various sexualities. The gray
matter at the back of the brain wanted to move to the place that self identified as a place
of complicated sexuality, a place for people who liked to be getting in and out of various
beds in various different ways. A place that celebrated different beds and different ways
of bedding down and around. The islands in the Atlantic, were full of perversions of all
sorts and the stories told about the people of the islands had all genders in all the different
combinations, even the ones beyond the two that so defined their culture at this moment.
(123)
New York seems like a place full of other like-minded people, a place of “complicated sexuality”
within which, as a trio, they will feel more comfortable in their “perversions.” Eventually they
will find that there are still very few, if any, models that match their own, and this place of
becomes, in effect, no more accessible than Hawaii in terms of non-normative romantic
identification. They are not a three-some in a traditional sense, and they are not self-identified as
queer. Instead they have a specific schedule and heterosexual lifestyle that entails that one
woman alternates sleeping with two different men—whose specific relations with each other is
undetermined—and as a platonic trio they function as a domestic partnership of three. Here
collective identification falls short, or requires more complex thinking through. The sentiment
here echoes Spahr’s earlier reflections on the difficult relations between historical colonization(s)
and “native” collectivity in a place (Hawaii) where neither history nor native claims to that place
can be summarized in any simple terms.
Back in New York, the three also witness 9/11 from across the river, and among other
things, they become involved again in poetry readings and social gatherings. According to the
narrator, after “the buildings fell” things became both more meaningful and more difficult to
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interpret and understand. Conversations became “deeper” and more “resonant . . . as if they were
shaping their lives.” The narrator continues:
They felt that life was good as long as they could talk about the lyrics to Brandy and had
a relationship with other people who also knew the lyrics to Brandy and had a
relationship to them that was like theirs, that abandoned irony in the pursuit of all-out
sentiment. The readings and the gatherings were a sort of ephemera that rose up when the
buildings fell. They were a place to feel safe, to feel as if it were fine to be a pervert
because they were with other perverts, those who identified as queer or not, the pagans
and the abortionists and the feminists and the gays and the lesbians and the ACLU and
the People for the American Way. (187)
The narrator refers to the comments made by Jerry Falwell after the 9/11 events who blamed
terrorists and liberals among others for helping cause such devastation. Outside of this radical
and disturbing version of American patriotism, Spahr offers an example of the need for
communal identification as a politics as well as means of survival. Having others with whom to
identify can offer a safe place, a place in which what is seen by dominant culture as perversion
functions in positive and supportive terms. The readings and gatherings become a constructive
and encouraging space for “perverts” or simply those who didn’t identify with the extreme
conservative “norms” of citizenship articulated in the wake of 9/11, reiterating the necessary and
difficult struggle between individual and group identification, even if one is a part of a “group”
that has been identified by an oppressive narrative.
Further coming to terms with “their” own perverse domestic situation in the context of
the larger culture, toward the end of The Transformation, Spahr’s narrator strategically
references Sappho’s poem, “He is More Than a Hero.” In the poem there is a pair of lovers and
an other—the narrator—who seems to be in love with one of the pair, thus forming a love
triangle, used to reflect the awkward triad structure of the three lovers in Spahr’s account. The
narrator explains:

220
At that moment, they had agreed to a third point, a Sapphic point . . . . They agreed to no
longer see relationship as a feedback loop of face-to-face desire. Instead they had to deal
with a sort of shimmering, a fracturing of all their looks and glances. And it was because
of this third Sapphic point that they implicated themselves in they. (206)
The Sappho reference offers not only a possibility that is of three instead of only two, but
actually perverts the conception of heterosexual pairing and sexual object choice, and opens the
field for constructions that may or not be clearly articulated. It is at this moment that the narrator
seems to come to terms with their identification as a “they,” and the relationship of three not as a
unified subjectivity but “as a sort of shimmering, a fracturing” and as something that is awkward.
This is analogous to how describing or articulating the history, language, and politics of Hawaii
constantly turns linguistically and socially difficult and messy. The positive perversity of The
Transformation is in its recognition and exploration of dense layers of culture, history, sexuality,
and language that are constantly ignored and smoothed over by narratives that define identity for
cultures and individuals. Their perverse awkwardness results in a troubling that creates the space
for articulations of sexual, domestic, and cultural investments, and the construction of a model
for undoing and revising historical and hetero-normative binaries, thus challenging and
confirming spaces of collective identification.

Borderlands/La Frontera
Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera uses hybrid strategies, combining accessible
personal memoir writing with poems and reflections, in order to enact the multiple identity
formations through which she is working in the text. At its center is a continuously circulating
reading, undoing, and rereading of the traditional stories and cultural myths on which Anzaldúa
was raised as an Indigenous Mexican and American woman, raised on the border of Texas and
Mexico. The text is an example of feminist critique and queer transgression of traditional (binary
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and hierarchal) constructions of gender and sexuality, and extends further in its queerness into, as
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes, “the ways that race, ethnicity, postcolonial nationality crisscross with [gender and sexuality] and other identity-constituting, identity-fracturing discourses”
(Tendencies 8). As Anzaldúa explains:
For the lesbian of color, the ultimate rebellion she can make against her native culture is
through her sexual behavior . . . . Being lesbian and raised Catholic, indoctrinated as
straight, I made the choice to be queer. It’s an interesting path, one that continually slips
in and out of the white, the Catholic, the Mexican, the indigenous, the instincts. It makes
for loquería, the crazies. (41)
This path into knowledge is a necessary and conflicted journey, and it is this that is foregrounded
as the text negotiates registers of language, different styles of written presentation, the weaving
of Spanish and English, political commentary, and personal narration. Anzaldúa also
incorporates more difficult, innovative poetic passages that make the various strategies resonate
at yet another level, almost as if these are coming from another place of experience or
identification altogether. The text utilizes a fusion of formal strategy and personal narrative
content in order to enact the complicated relationships, as she explains, between psychological,
sexual, and spiritual borderlands that she reads and negotiates in this personal/textual process of
subjective understanding. The multiple layers and shifting registers, narratives, and contexts are
analogous to Friedman’s spatialized conceptualization of identity. Anzaldúa interrogates,
explores, and performs this theory of identity as a means of re-reading her past, through the
present, and toward an alternative model of narration and identification that she can take out into
the world.
Although this text is easily read in the ways that it enacts multiplicity in identity, what is
often left out of readings is the importance of the most textually innovative passages. The text as
a whole is hybrid in its use of a variety of generic strategies, but is often narrative and accessible;
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however, it is in the more difficult, linguistically indeterminate passages that Anzaldúa seems to
go into some other space of consciousness, in order to find the means for creating her new model
of identification. Her project, as she has come to determine it, is to work within the traditional
narratives of her cultural experience and revise these on her own terms. She ultimately creates
the persona of the “mestiza,” the one who is a mix of Mexican and indigenous cultural tradition
and feminist, lesbian, intellectual. But before she comes to the conception of this new way of
identifying, she must work through a Kristevan semiotic space of linguistic disruption and
subversion, as a means of going into the pre-Oedipal space, before the social, patriarchal,
religious, hetero-normative formations of the cultural traditions of her cultural identity. For
example, Anzaldúa titles chapter 4, “La herencia de Coatlicue The Coatlicue State.” Coatlicue is
an Aztec earth goddess who wears a serpent skirt, whose head is encircled by the joined heads of
two snakes. She is the source of life, and represents creation and destruction, life and death,
nourishing and devouring:
protean being
dark dumb windowless no moon glides
across the stone the nightsky
alone
alone
no lights just mirrorwalls obsidian smoky in the
mirror she sees a woman with four heads the heads
turning round and round spokes of a wheel her neck
is an axle
she stares at each face
each wishes the
other not there the obsidian knife in the air
the
building
so high should she jump would she feel
the breeze fanning her face tumbling down the steps
of the temple heart offered up to the sun
wall
growing thin thinner she is eyeless
a mole
burrowing deeper tunneling here tunneling there
tunneling through the air in the photograph a double
image a ghost arm alongside the flesh one inside her
head the cracks ricocheting
bisecting
crisscrossing
she hears the rattlesnakes
stirring in
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a jar
being fed with her flesh
she listens to the
seam between dusk and dark they are talking she hears
their frozen thumpings the soul encased in black
obsidian smoking
smoking she bends to catch a
feather of herself
as she falls
lost in the
silence
of the empty air turning
turning
at midnight turning into a wild pig how to get back
all the feathers
put them in the jar
the rattling
full circle and back dark windowless no moon
glides across the nightsky nightsky night (63-64)
We can read “protean” in the sense of coming first (or primordial), and in taking on different
forms, shapes, meanings, or exhibiting variety or diversity. In this semiotic linguistic space of
disruption and contradiction, before linguistic/social symbolic structure becomes dominant, the
Coatlique functions both in its movement into a pre-gendered, pre-patriarchal space—what
Anzaldúa calls the underworld—and represents the contemporary moment of heterogeneity and
possibility in the opening of the language of the text at hand. We immediately notice the spacing
of the language on the page, in which the words flow, yet do not move smoothly because of the
varied lengths of the spaces between words, and we get a kind of tentative movement into
another type of space; both the space of the page and the space in which the narrator is (fearfully)
attempting to go are unknown alternatives to the types of textual identifications that have come
before.
Simultaneously, in the passage above, we can read the connection between the “protean,”
the underworld, the darkness of night in which there are “no lights just mirror walls”; and the
mirrors that are “smoky” yet “she sees a woman with four heads”—as if she sees the multiple
heads of herself, while “each wishes the other not there.” It is at this point that the narrator
realizes there is no going back to some single sense of unified self (indeed there has never been
one), but instead: “the cracks ricocheting bisecting crisscrossing

she hears rattlesnakes.”
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Coatlique, the snake woman, represents the potential explosion, disruption, fragmentation that
begins first with only cracks that then multiply. Wondering “how to get back all the feathers” of
herself, the rattling continues and repeats. Further, there is no moon but only “the nightsky
nightsky night”; the underworld, although dark and unknown, offers the alternative to the space
of unrecognizability that “she” has suffered (65). She explores this question of unrecognizability
further in the next passages:
The secret I tried to conceal was that I was not normal, that I was not like the others. I felt
alien, I knew I was alien. I was the mutant stoned out of the herd, something deformed
with evil inside.
She has this fear

that she has no names

that she

has many names that she doesn’t know her names She has
this fear

that she’s an image

clearing and darkening

the fear that she’s the dreamwork

inside someone else’s skull

She has this fear

she takes off her clothes
peels off her skin
vessels
the marrow
reach herself

that comes and goes

shoves her brain aside
that if she drains

She has this fear

flushes out

that when she does

she turns around to embrace herself

swallow her and grin
“there”

the blood

strips the flesh from the bone

lion’s or witch’s or serpent’s head

into herself

that if

a

will turn around

She has this fear that if she digs

she won’t find anyone

that when she gets

she won’t find her notches on the trees the

birds will have eaten all the crumbs
that she won’t find the way back

She has this fear
(65)

The problem is the repetition of the self as unknown—enacted in the repetition of the words fear
and name—the unnamed cannot be recognized. Or as Butler writes:
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I may feel that without some recognizability I cannot live. But I may also feel that the
terms by which I am recognized make life unlivable. This is the juncture from which
critique emerges, where critique is understood as an interrogation of the terms by which
life is constrained in order to open up the possibility of different modes of living; in other
words, not to celebrate difference as such but to establish more inclusive conditions for
sheltering and maintaining life that resists models of assimilation. (Undoing 4)
Anzaldúa’s narrator “has this fear that she won’t find the way back” but in fact, there is nothing
to return to, only this movement toward a potential, new, open consciousness. Recognition for
this narrator is the impossibility of recognition within her experience of narrowly defined
languages of identification. If she is named, it is because she has been identified within a system
that doesn’t recognize how she doesn’t fit in to the parameters of that system. The difficulty here
is in the impossibility of defining oneself by way of language that doesn’t allow for alternative
possibilities; the challenge is finding the ability to articulate one’s experiences when there is no
acceptable language for doing so. Pushing against the boundaries of personal narrative, this text
calls for expanded possibilities for recognition through its refusal and rewriting of the personal,
poetic narrative. In the process of working through an oppressive past of patriarchy, religion, and
historical ethnic cultural limitations, Anzaldúa revises narrative and identity on her own terms. In
her own life she explains the choice to identify as a lesbian, and in writing she constructs a queer
text that doesn’t conform to any particular genre specifications. By bringing these together in
Borderlands/La Frontera, she creates a new identity through her own readings of the spiritual
and cultural narratives she has known all her life. In seeking to re-frame an oppressive past,
Anzaldúa avoids its total disavowal and is able to explore and re-use it in ways that seem more
relevant for her own experience. Taking on this revised past, incorporated within a present that
recognizes the complex and non-static nature of identity, Anzaldúa creates spaces of possibility
for further exploration, through a text that includes and explodes conventional ways of “doing”
autobiographical identity politics. And crucial to this exploration and articulation of a new model
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are the semiotic spaces, the spaces at the border, the frontier, before terms and stories have been
defined and categorized. In this primordial, pre-Oedipal space, Anzaldúa finds the non/narrative
means to reconstruct what happens at the interstices of history, tradition, collective identity, and
queer experience. It is in the process of the writing itself that the processes of questioning and
revising begin to open space for the creation of something new altogether. The “New Mestiza” is
not a final answer, but a place of beginning, a beginning that is always still in process, a place of
continual negotiation. It is through the formal openness and experiment in the text that leads
Anzaldúa toward a reconceived relation to traditional collective identity and her own shifting and
dynamic personal identifications.

Dictee
Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictee is memoir as the site of the impossibility of
memorializing. While past impressions and artifacts are collected in the text, materials come
together and separate, weave and unweave themselves into the space of the text that is outside of
the various temporalities to which it points. Dictee is a retrospective constellation of materials
that, through its accumulation of the messy details of history, refuses the idea that a subject is a
unified self who gathers and then documents her memories into a coherent personal narrative. In
her article on Dictee, Anne Cheng asks how a text can be read “as a ‘multicultural, feminist,
post-colonial and ethnic memoir’ when its process of recollection continually stalls and refuses
identification even on the simplest level?” (119). Since, she continues, this text speaks “through
disembodied yet multiple voices, borrowed citations, and captionless photographs, this supposed
autobiography gives us a confession that does not confess, a dictation without origin, and history
without names” (119). The text “offers up bits of re-collected narratives, but they stand in the
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text as half-revived, half-buried information. Indeed, in Dictee, acts of recollection (in the sense
of memory recall) are frequently indistinguishable from acts of collection (in the sense of
gathering bits of objects)” (Cheng 119). Throughout the text images, references, and artifacts are
treated as evidence and of a personal and cultural history: from the presentation and parody of
French lessons and dictation, to the diary writing of Cha’s mother, to images of Korean protests,
violence, and revolutionary acts in the face of Japanese occupation. The form of the text presents
the past as historical documentation that mingles with family history, personal reflection, voice,
identity, and memory. Like a scrapbook, images and fragments of text are pasted together, often
without captions, to form particular constellations within larger histories, single moments
representing the past in the instant of the (present) text.1
This non/narrative, non/memoir begins, even before the book begins, with an image of
the writing of a Korean exile on the wall of a Japanese mine. Translated, it reads: “mother/I miss
you/I am hungry/I want to go home” (Park 226). Korea was occupied by Japan from 1909-1945,
and the history and emotion of this runs through Dictee. The entire collection of fragments
spread throughout the text resonates into a final image, in place of any solid conclusion, which
comments on the difficulty of vision, of looking out beyond one’s own capability or perspective.
The words etched on the wall, and this final image, create a frame around the text, the stories of
the mother and historical female figures framing the story of the child. The narrator continually
negotiates her own writing and experience through the women’s stories, the images and pieces of
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history, the historical characters that run through the text. First, in order to set up this frame
before looking into the body of the text, it seems useful to read the final image:
Lift me up mom to the window the child looking
above too high above her view the glass between
some image a blur now darks and greys mere
shadows lingering above her vision her head tilted
back as far as it can go. Lift me up to the window the
white frame and the glass between, early dusk or
dawn when light is muted, lines yield to shades,
houses cast shadow pools in the passing light. Brief.
All briefly towards night . . . . There is no one inside the
pane and the glass between. Trees adhere to silence
in attendance to the view to come. If to occur. In
vigilance of lifting the immobile silence. Lift me to
the window to the picture image unleash the ropes
tied to weights of stones first the ropes then its scraping
on wood to break stillness as the bells fall peal follow
the sound of ropes holding weight scraping on wood
to break stillness bells fall a peal to sky. (Cha 179)
Cha is commenting on the book as a whole, on this collection as an act of lifting the silence, “as
the bells fall peal follow the sound of ropes holding weight scraping on wood to break stillness
bells fall a peal to sky.” Falling bells, one can imagine, are noisy. “Peal”: a loud burst of noise,
while the ringing turns into the sound of the movement of “weight scraping on wood” breaks
stillness, the stillness and silence of letting history go untold. In this account, “bells fall,” ring
out, and they appeal, the sounds ringing and resonating to end a text that remains open. The
material text holds the accumulation of details and voices, pieces of narratives and images,
between its covers. These are the materials the narrator has to work with in the construction of
the subject of the text, which is the process of accumulation and collage itself. Reading this final
image back into the text highlights the importance of writing the noisy gaps and fragments into
history, as well as how that history is constructed through language and writing.
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Language, history, and writing are also intimately connected to speech and the body. Cha
creates play between language and speech, silence and voice, words and the physical
phenomenon of speaking (or being unable to speak). Elisabeth Frost writes that Cha “provokes
through verbal and visual means an inquiry into the nature of cultural identity and corporality”
(“In Another” 181). For example, in one section Cha includes diagrams of the parts of the body
used in speaking, swallowing, and breathing, from the mouth down the neck and into the lungs.
This focus on the “corporeal suggests that text and image are tools to render the body
intelligible,” writes Frost. The body is as difficult a text, as a difficult text, hence the need to
consider the body in terms of the history of resistance in Korea, according to Frost, and in the
textual document that revises (or sees again) that history. Imperative to this project is the practice
of giving language to unspoken history and silenced subjects who, through the text, can testify to
the events of the past. Cha writes:
Dead words. Dead tongue. From disuse. Buried in
Time’s memory. Unemployed. Unspoken. History.
Past. Let the one who is diseuse, one who is mother
who waits nine days and nine nights be found.
Restore memory. Let the one who is diseuse, one
who is daughter restore spring with her each appearance from beneath the earth.
The ink spills thickest before it runs dry before it
stops writing at all. (Cha 133)
The one who is diseuse is the one who speaks well, the one who, because of her skill, will
“restore memory.” But there are two here: the mother, like memory and history is restored and
given the ability to speak in the text; and the daughter, we might read, is the writer of the text,
restoring what has been buried. This re-collection, or re-construction, of fragments is the task of
the writer who uses language to restore memory; the project is a dialogue between mother,
daughter, history, memory, language, geography, image, and speech. The noise of the text breaks
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the silence, fills in some of the gaps left by history. The narrator daughter needs to tell the story
of the mother, of the mother’s history, in order to come to terms with her own story. She needs to
write it all out, while “the ink spills thickest” even if the story is still incomplete, constructed in
stops and starts, fragments and incoherent details. The relationships between the hybrid elements
of the text constellate between the covers of this book to open into a world that redefines what it
means to record history and narrate experience. Or, as Frost writes:
Cha combines divergent modes of representation: visual images . . . alternate with
passages of English, French, Latin, and Chinese. Hand-written passages and calligraphic
ideograms large enough to fill a page blur the lines between the discursive and the
imagistic. Cha evokes multiple discourses and their accompanying conventions: lyric and
epic poetry, parable, translation, correspondence, catechism, historical narrative,
cinematic prose. (181)
Cha also organizes Dictee into nine sections, each named for one of the Greek muses and
contributing to the “mythology” she constructs for “subjects marred by unspeakable loss—
silence, exile, or death” (Frost 182). At times, Cha offers meta-commentary on the complex
nature of hybridity in Dictee. The following selection is one part of a longer piece, “Aller,”
which is followed by another piece, “Retour.” The idea of going and returning is recursive, not
unlike the unburying of history, the writing of memory or past events. Dictee is in continual
process of going into history to recover material, and coming back out to record, revise, rearticulate that history. This becomes not simply an endeavor, but a responsibility; the one who
has the skill for speaking is the one called upon to act as witness, the one to write it all down.
Cha writes:
Forgetting nothing
Leaving out nothing.
But pretend
go to the next line
Resurrect it all over again.
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Bit by bit. Reconstructing step by step
step
within limits
enclosed absolutely shut
tight, black, without leaks.
Within those limits,
resurrect, as much as
possible, possibly could hold
possibly ever hold
a segment of it
segment by segment
segmented
sequence, narrative, variation
on make believe
secrete saliva the words
saliva secrete the words
secretion of words flow liquid form
salivate the words
give light. Fuel. Enflame. (129)
There is a sense of necessity—to speak, to (re)write history—that runs through this text, but
there are also gaps; there are no overarching narratives and few captions or rhetorical,
contextualizing devices to help the reader through the materials that are presented. The narrator
is constructing a material document of experiences that have not been previously recorded, or
have not been put together in such a particular context. Personal history merges with official
history, and all of this runs through the hand of the narrator, documenting by pasting fragments
and details together. Similarly, Carol Jacobs interprets Walter Benjamin’s theory of memory, or
documenting the past, “in which the past must and must not be told—neither as conventional
flowing narrative, nor, certainly, as report, but as epic and rhapsody, literary forms that mark
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their own ruptures” (29-30). If then the past cannot be told as a chronicled and flowing narrative,
then maybe there is, in Benjamin’s terms, not necessarily a thing called autobiographical writing,
but only writing that seeks to uncover the past in its layers and ruptures. Cha writes, “Forgetting
nothing / Leaving out nothing. / But pretend.” It is always a (necessary) (re)construction that can
only happen “within limits” in which one can only “resurrect as much as possible . . . segment by
segment / sequence, narrative, variation / on make believe.” There seems to be a simultaneous
erasing and rewriting of memory; the details of the past are made louder, more visible, given
voice in their constellated messiness as they are contained by the text, through language; or as
Cha writes: “secretion of words flow liquid form / salivate the words / give light. Fuel. Enflame.”
The text that rewrites history is a political practice in which light is shown on what has
previously been secret, untold.
Putting herself in charge of documenting this past—and creating an interpretation based
on the way in which she constructs the text—Cha is acting as witness to the stories and histories
she engages. Witnessing, according to Kelly Oliver, is crucial to a politics that goes beyond
subject recognition in order to give subjects voice and the ability to participate in documenting
the truths of history. In Witnessing, Oliver tells the story of a Holocaust testimonial by an
eyewitness who gives her account of the “Auschwitz uprising in which prisoners set fire to the
camp”; although the witness reported seeing four chimneys on fire when there was actually only
one chimney, Oliver explains, the discrepancy points to something especially useful:
The Auschwitz survivor saw something unfamiliar, Jewish resistance, which gave her the
courage to resist. She saw something that in one sense did not happen—four chimneys
blowing up—but that in another made all the difference to what happened. Seeing the
impossible—what did not happen—gave her the strength to make what seemed
impossible possible: surviving the Holocaust. (1)
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The witness reads possibility into her account, and although the account she reports does not
match the facts regarding the chimneys, it lends itself to a historical truth that is outside of the
particular details. While before this event there was little hope of Jewish resistance and survival,
this witness reframes that thinking to include hope—opening a space for the possibility of
resistance and survival—within her testimony.
Oliver presents witnessing as “response-ability,” the ability to respond, which one cannot
do when one is merely recognized but cannot speak. To be a witness is to be given the ability—
in fact the “responsibility”—to respond to others and events. Further, “address-ability,”
according to Oliver, is an ability that one cannot have if one is not considered a subject with
agency to be addressed, and to respond. This notion goes beyond theories of recognition, which
Oliver sees as antagonistic in structure—following a Hegelian model—and limited to
recognizing oneself in another, or being (submissively) recognized by another. Instead, Oliver
writes:
Through the process of bearing witness to oppression and subordination, those othered
can begin to repair damaged subjectivity by taking up a position as speaking subjects . . .
the speaking subject is a subject by virtue of address-ability and response-ability.
Address-ability and response-ability are the roots of subjectivity, which are damaged by
the objectifying operations of oppression and subordination. (7)
During the Japanese occupation of Korea, the Japanese made it illegal for citizens to speak
Korean. This lack of access to their own language also made them unable to speak at all, in a
certain sense. That Korea, for Cha, entails a confusion of silence and oppression, of resistance
and subordination. In reconstructing that history, both visual and aural aspects of language are
essential to her account. What the page looks like is as important as how the language sounds, or
what it means. Cha finds visual recognition, written language, and speech in fundamental,
intimate relation in her witnessing of past events made present in the text. Dictee, consequently,
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functions as a type of “retribution and compassion” in the ways in which it gives voice to
historically silenced subjects, and as textual witness, reconstructs fragments into a testimony that
articulates that history on behalf of those subjects. As Oliver explains:
I would argue that testimonies from the aftermath of the Holocaust and slavery do not
merely articulate a demand to be recognized or to be seen . . . . They are also testifying to
the process of witnessing that both reconstructs damaged subjectivity and constitutes the
heart of all subjectivity . . . . The demand for recognition manifest in testimonies from
those othered by dominant culture is transformed by the accompanying demands for
retribution and compassion. (8)
Oliver further writes that “compassionate relations” between subjects can manifest by way of
processes of “working-through whatever we might find threatening in relation to otherness and
difference” (10). Dictee is an important text on many levels, but particularly in the way that it
works through the history of oppression of the Korean people, and Cha’s sense of her own
identity as a Korean-American subject; she transforms her cultural and personal history into a
testimonial document that speaks. Her project, through the process of the text, is in figuring out
what, and how, “to say.” This kind of working through might function, in Oliver’s terms, as a
kind of “social theory of transformation” through which it becomes “necessary to reconceive of
subjective identity in a way that does not require abjecting or excluding others or otherness in
order to have a sense of oneself as a subject” (10). Working through traumatic history, through
the materials, documents, and first-person accounts, functions as a way for Cha to reconceive of
her own identity, to come to terms with the history on behalf of her own family and the various
unrelated historical characters of the text, and bring that into the (revised) present. Dictee is the
space in which Cha becomes witness to that history, and is able to alter the present and potential
future, on new terms. Because, as Oliver tells us, “None of us develops a sense of ourselves as
subjects with any sort of identity apart from relations with others,” witnessing becomes not
simply a project of individual identity, but an “ethical and political responsibility” (10-11). For
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Oliver, to “conceive of subjectivity as a process of witnessing” necessitates the ability to address
and respond “in relation to other people, especially through difference” in order to also “realize
an ethical and social responsibility to those others who sustain us” (19). The witness to history,
the document that gives voice to the previously silenced, enacts a model of political and social
transformation. As the formal hybridity of Dictee enacts the complexity of the stories,
experiences, sentiments, languages, and histories, so does the document itself perform a
transformation from silence to speech, from obscurity to transparency, from hope passed from
mother (tongue, land) to daughter (one who is skilled at speaking), so that future generations can
look up and out the window toward another horizon.

Conclusion
All three of these texts offer final examples of how experimental writing can and does
open possibilities for politics at the textual level, and in the world, enacting the difficulty and
necessity of using language to increase means of recognizability for both textual and cultural
subjects. Moving from the focus on contemporary American culture in chapter 3, the texts in this
chapter deal with geography and diaspora in ways that comment on, and complicate, personal
and “ethnic” identity. These writers “write the self” through their own and others’ histories of
dislocation and subjective exploration. Their personal histories and articulation of experience
work politically to create textual models for the representation of “the antithetical” within the
context of dominant cultural narratives. Kristeva writes: “The text is a practice that could be
compared to political revolution: the one brings about in the subject what the other introduces
into society.” In different ways, each through her own historical and geographical displacements,
Spahr, Anzaldúa, and Cha’s text-subjects gain new perspectives on the relationship between
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individual and collective identity, and advocate for the negotiation of subjective identification on
new terms. From Spahr’s project of constructing alternatives to mainstream heterosexual
domestic relations, to Anzaldúa’s interest in transgressing and rewriting traditional narratives for
women, to Cha’s re-visualizing and re-framing of the fragmented and previously invisible details
of history, these writers create subjects-in-process who move through the spaces of the text
similarly to multiply situated subjects in the world, while the multiple and contradictory
discourses of the world are enacted through the formal strategies on the page. The subjects of
these texts become witnesses to the limited nature of ideological narratives, and the limiting
effects of binary structures, and they instead serve as models of alternative narratives and
practices. They speak to and for historically silenced subjects and their texts witness the gaps in
history and language for colonized or culturally oppressed subjects. Pushing beyond textual
subversion, these text-subjects, over the course of the texts, come to realize the ability to address
(address-ability) and the ability to respond (response-ability) giving them, and their readers,
agency as a mandate to create change; creating what Oliver terms a social theory of
transformation. Change happens in different spaces, over and across time, and through various
means. Breaking habits of narrative, textuality, subjective and cultural understanding, and
representation can lend toward social transformation, in theory and in practice.
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This dissertation examines how twentieth-century experimental women writers construct
non/narrative texts whose text-subjects mediate identity and call for increased possibilities for
subject-identification in the world. The use of innovative formal strategies and experiment with
narrative, combined with the content of identity critique, make these texts political projects that
variously explore gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity in relation to contemporary American
culture. In this project I bring discussions of identity into the theorization of formally innovative
writing. I work to move away from the kinds of essentializing practices of identity politics—in
which subjects are fit into specific identity categories—and toward more complicated,
contextualized, and historical understandings of identity formation. I begin with the notion that
identity categories, or markers, play out in different contexts and are, at different moments:
simultaneous, fluctuating, overlapping, and spatial (instead of hierarchal). I then continue toward
readings of literary texts that function as new models of identification for spatially
contextualized subjects. This project is significant for the way in which it brings together a
diverse selection of non/narrative writing by women in the twentieth-century, and combines
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textual and cultural analysis to think through identity issues in relation to contemporary social
subjects.
This project is grounded in literary modernism and moves into work by contemporary
American women writers at the end of the twentieth century. I begin by pairing the work of
Gertrude Stein and Lyn Hejinian in chapter 1, and that of H.D. and Beverly Dahlen in chapter 2.
As modernists, Stein and H.D. are key figures who negotiate identity and non/narrative writing,
and are important influences for Hejinian and Dahlen. The paring of modern and contemporary
authors in the first two chapters illustrates a correlation between writing styles and practices as
well as how these diverge from the early to late part of the century. Hejinian’s body of work,
beginning in the 1970s, can be read as coming out of Stein and thinking avant-garde practice
through her own contemporary politics as a Language poet. Dahlen seems to pick up H.D.’s
Freudian project, and additionally incorporates deconstruction and feminist criticism of the
1970s and 80s in her work. Hejinian and Dahlen also serve as intermediaries between the
modernists and later contemporary writers—many of whom have been influenced by modernists
such as Stein and H.D., as well as subsequent avant-garde authors and practices. Chapters 3 and
4 focus on contemporary prose and hybrid works by Pamela Lu, Renee Gladman, Claudia
Rankine, Juliana Spahr, Gloria Anzaldua, and Theresa Hak Kyung Cha. These writers, to
different degrees, use a variety of formal strategies and problematize narrative autobiographical
writing to simultaneously focus on language as instrumental to subjectivity and to represent
“experience” as cultural content. They negotiate practices of avant-garde experimentation and
writing that explores identity-as-process through examinations of gender, sexual orientation,
race, ethnicity, and history. Their text-subjects become witnesses to the discrepancies in
culturally inscribed norms, and call for expanded possibilities for narrative and social
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representation; their texts become new models for representing contemporary subjectivity.
Reading the primary texts through theorists including Julia Kristeva, Judith Butler, Susan
Stanford Friedman, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, and Kelly Oliver, among others, offers me ways to
show how textual practice and cultural critique in this literature lend toward theorizing expanded
possibilities for personal and social subject identification—how subjects identify—in the world.
This project is invested in continuing to open spaces of possibility for textual practice and social
subjectivity, as well as the feminist political impulse to dissolve margins and bring those
“marginalized” voices into spaces with greater potential for personal and social identifications
and politics.
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